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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
DEGREE AND PATTERNS OF FORMAL NGO PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (ECOSOC): AN
APPRAISAL OF NGO CONSULTATIVE STATUS RELATIVE TO POLITICAL
PLURALISM
by
Barry D. Mowell
Florida International University, 2017
Miami, Florida
Professor Markus Thiel, Major Professor
The United Nations (UN) has invested increasing levels of effort in recent
decades to cultivate a more effective, diverse and democratic institutional culture via the
inclusion of and interaction among international civil society organizations (CSOs) and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to supplement the traditional role of states as the
primary transnational actors. The principle vehicle for the UN-civil society dynamic is
the consultative status (CS) program within the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), wherein a diverse range of nearly 5,000 transnational organizations
ostensibly participate.
This research examined patterns of participation and the nature/level of
CSO/NGO involvement within the UN, with particular focus upon ECOSOC. In
examining participation patterns, the research identified patterns related to
geographical/proportional representation among developed and developing regions and
world regions in general and also as related to policy/issue areas represented. In terms of
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involvement, the research sought to assess the types and degree of contributions being
made by CSOs/NGOs in association with the UN. To address both areas, the research
employed a two-prong methodology including (1) a detailed analysis of the UN’s online
integrated Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) database and (2) a comprehensive survey
questionnaire mailed to a randomly-selected sample of 10% of all organizations holding
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.
The findings challenge the assumption that UN association with international civil
society has realized pluralist ideals in that substantial variations were found to exist in the
representation of policy/issue areas, with some areas far better represented than others.
Perhaps more importantly, the research revealed that only a minority of organizations in
the ECOSOC-CS program appear to be actively/regularly engaged with the UN, with a
large minority of CS-accredited organizations engaged only periodically or to a more
limited extent, and a substantial minority not participating/interacting in any way. Rather
than exemplifying pluralism within the constructivist tradition, findings imply support for
liberal institutionalist theories in that decades-long expansion of IGO influence has
facilitated a corollary expectation of expanding international civil society and an
associated expectation of linkages between transnational governance and democratic
institutions on the one hand and transnational civil society on the other as a standardized
norm.
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I. CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM WITHIN UN-ECOSOC

General Statement of Problem Area & Research Purpose
A diverse range of civil society organizations has increasingly been involved with
the United Nations. This includes record numbers of civil society organizations (CSOs)
also known as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which hold formal consultative
status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the main organ for UNcivil society interaction. A primary goal of the UN has been to cultivate a more effective,
diverse and democratic institutional culture via the active inclusion of and interaction
among international organizations and civil society to augment the traditional role of
states as the primary transnational actors within the organization. This study seeks to
determine the patterns of participation and effectiveness of civil society organizations
within the UN, with a particular focus on CSO/NGO participation within ECOSOC. As
the number and diversity of organizations holding ECOSOC consultative status has
increased, have the patterns of their involvement and influence changed?

Significance of Study
This study is significant for three reasons. Firstly, the UN practice of cultivating
formal association with reputable international civil society organizations has expanded
significantly in recent years and has been described as the most dynamic area of growth
and change within the UN framework (Alger 2002). In 1946 when the practice was
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initiated, only 41 CSOs/NGOs held formal consultative status with the UN, but as of
2016 the status was afforded to nearly 5,000 organizations of various types, representing
a wide range of issues across the globe (United Nations 2016, 2). However, it is unclear
what patterns of participation exist among the diverse range of CSOs/NGOs which have
formal status with the UN. For example, what, if any, geographical patterns of
participation exist? Early in its history of direct association with CSOs/NGOs the UN
cultivated relationships with western organizations almost exclusively---largely reflecting
a dearth of such organizations based in the developing world. In recent decades, a
multitude of CSOs/NGOs have emerged in the developing world, many of which have
pursued ties with the UN and may have eroded the western-centric dominance of the
organizations within ECOSOC. However, other geographical patterns may be found to
exist such as disproportionate representation of some world regions relative to others--e.g. European and/or western CSOs/NGOs are more predominant than those
headquartered in Africa. Also, topical patterns of participation may also exist via some
issues and interest areas being proportionally better represented than others. This could
be evidenced through the nature of the CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status as most
are issue-specific in their focus and also by analyzing the participation of CSOs/NGOs in
topic-specific initiatives. For example, human rights as an issue appears to be well
represented within the UN-ECOSOC civil society framework, much more so than many
other policy/issue areas. Analysis of geographical, topical and other patterns of
participation among CSOs/NGOs is important in cultivating a general understanding of
the inter-organizational dynamic. Importantly, most previous attempts to study such
issues have focused upon one or very limited numbers of such organizations or have been
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specific to a particular issue area such as human rights or development rather than
seeking to understand overall patterns of civil society participation within an IGO
(Tallberg et al 2013).
Secondly, the number of CSOs/NGOs with formal standing at the UN has grown
exponentially, potentially allowing non-state actors an unprecedented level of access and
input. Proponents of the trend see it as a catalyst for global justice and democracy in
which more populations and issues are afforded a voice and in which civil society
expertise on specific issues may contribute, but it is also viewed as a means for the UN to
research and implement many multilateral initiatives such as the Sustainable (formerly
“Millennium”) Development Goals, (Grady 2005; Pubantz 2005). Large-scale
participation of civil society organizations within IGOs particularly in policy formulation
roles also potentially enhances the legitimacy of the IGO (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010).
Yet, a preliminary assessment of CSO/NGO participation in UN conferences suggests
minimal actual participation by most of the organizations which have attained formal
consultative status. A large number, possibly the majority, of CSOs/NGOs which have
obtained formal status within the UN may never have engaged in any meaningful way
with the organization, which would presumably diminish the claims related to a
dramatically expanded role of civil society and democratic pluralism within the UN
(Mowell 2015). To understand the effectiveness of civil society organizations within the
UN framework, it is necessary to determine their degree of participation within the UN
and also to understand the factors which encourage participation and barriers which may
prevent participation.
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Thirdly, analysis of patterns and the degree of participation may serve as a
foundation for further research related to CSOs/NGOs and civil society at the United
Nations such as understanding the political, fiscal or other reasons for CSO/NGO
participation or the lack thereof. For example, should the study reveal that a key
impediment to participation with ECOSOC is that many organizations do not fully
understand the consultative status process (i.e., CSOs/NGOs do not know how to
participate), future analyses could explore ways to better introduce the organizations to
the UN bureaucracy and streamline their matriculation into the consultative status
program. More profoundly, if many CSOs/NGOs fundamentally lack the organizational
or fiscal ability or sincere commitment to engage with the UN via the program perhaps
the consultative status program or its admission criteria for CSOs/NGOs should be
scrutinized for viability.

Origins of Research
I served as the United Nations representative for two organizations holding
consultative status with ECOSOC and was variously accredited to UN headquarters in
New York, Geneva and Vienna. Additionally, I advised multiple CSOs/NGOs
concerning consultative status and the application process and had an opportunity to
communicate with the leadership of those organizations about possibilities of making
contributions to the UN’s work. While the experiences were not uniform, in many cases
the CSOs/NGOs appeared less interested in actual collaboration and networking than in
the (real or perceived) prestige and credibility such an association could potentially bring.
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Some of the organizations seemed keenly interested in how UN-affiliated legitimacy
could factor into publicity in general and donor/fundraising appeal specifically.
As this pattern repeated---though not universally---among different CSOs/NGOs
with which I had involvement, I became curious as to the degree of participation of such
organizations which held consultative status. I began to question whether I had
experienced something unique or whether lack of genuine commitment to participate was
common among CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC. As a part of a
Florida International University graduate seminar on International Organizations, I
undertook a preliminary examination of the UN iCSO database which seemed to indicate
that lack of meaningful participation on the part of CSOs/NGOs with consultative status
was commonplace. My initial assumption that my perceptions/experiences were likely
atypical and that most accredited CSOs/NGOs were active participants began to change
as I examined the database.
It turned out that many such organizations had not participated in any UN
conference or other function in years---if ever---and it seemed that it was commonplace
for CSOs/NGOs to lose their accreditation status due to inactivity. They may have
officially designated UN representatives and submitted one or more required quadrennial
reports, but neither of the latter denotes substantive participation or contribution. The
preliminary analysis of the iCSO database did not reveal the full extent of participation
rates or what accounted for them, but it became increasingly apparent that CSO/NGO
unwillingness or inability to participate in UN forums may be a common phenomenon.
Not only could I find nothing in the literature that specifically addressed lack of
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participation among CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC, the UN and
the majority of the literature tended to exalt the association as an example of
strengthening of pluralistic and democratic traditions within transnational institutions, a
view which contrasted sharply with my own experiences and preliminary foray into UN
data. This research is the culmination of questions raised by the aforementioned problem
and seeks to clarify the nature and extent of CSO/NGO affiliations with UN-ECOSOC
and explore barriers to and catalysts for such interaction.

Key Terminologies and Concepts
A wide variety of terms and acronyms are used in this research. Many of the
terms are perceived and used in a discordant manner by different scholars within the
literature. For example, while some may regard civil society organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, and voluntary organizations as
essentially synonymous, others may perceive one or all of the latter terms as distinct in
some subtle regard and not use the terms interchangeably. Clarification of many of these
often overlapping or conflicting terminologies as found in the literature and key concepts
underlying the terminology is necessary to frame further discussion.
The concepts of civil society and civil society organizations (CSOs) are core
components of this study. Linz and Stepan (1996, 116) offer a frequently cited
description of civil society as being comprised of groups which freely self-organized
independently of government influence which seek to “articulate values, create
associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.” Waisman (2006) defined civil
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society in similar light stating that it is “a slice of society, whose core is the web of
voluntary associations that articulate interests and values, and their system of interaction,
as long as these units are not under the control of the state” (Uhlin 2009, 272-73). In the
broadest of senses, CSOs are all voluntarily organized associations independent of direct
government and/or market control. In a tripartite division of societal activity, the realm
of civil society is everything not found in the domains of government or
business/commercial activity, wherein organizations pursue collectively goals (Thiel
2014). Early concepts of civil society regarded it as the mediating institutions that
bridged the gap between the individual and the state (Himmelfarb 2000, 95). Reflecting
such a three-part division, the term third-sector organization (TSO) has been used in the
literature to refer to civil society/CSOs. Some scholars have a broad and inclusive view
of civil society as being comprised of widely diverse professional and labor associations,
religious organizations and perhaps most famously via his example of bowling leagues
and their decline as symptoms of broader waning of American civil society, Putnam
(2001) also includes recreational-related organizations.
Many regard civil society as having a potentially clear and vital role in that the
latter and the private sector can be relied upon to more efficiently supplement or replace
roles traditionally carried out by sovereign governments ranging from the provision of
social and charitable services to even helping resolve complex international issues
including even peaceful resolution of military conflicts (Haufler 2008). Perceptions of
what constitutes civil society may also be influenced by political perspectives.
Addressing the latter phenomenon in the United States Eberly (2000) states:
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For conservatives it (civil society) embodies a vision for a larger role for
community-based charities, especially faith-based ones, which can be substituted
for flawed government programs. Libertarians have recently embraced the term
civil society…as a synonym for privatization, implying that the term’s major
attraction may be its usefulness in expanding the marketplace and limiting the
state. Alternatively, many liberals see civil society as a means to deepen
community participation in public projects, thereby improving both the
performance of government and the public’s acceptance of it.
Universal agreement does not exist concerning the parameters of what does and
does not constitute civil society and also, what specifically is and is not a CSO. Many
regard civil society as those organizations which are “striving to improve society” and to
effect political and/or economic change via public activism (Edwards 2009, 2). Some
scholars (e.g. Diamond 1994) eschew the inclusion of apolitical or informal organizations
such as recreational associations as constituting civil society via the perception that such
groups are more inwardly focused, private and yield less social or civic capital. Yet,
commonly such organizations have a multifaceted character wherein a bowling league,
religious group or book club can also have more direct and formal roles within the civic
sphere via conducting voter registration drives, collecting donations for charitable or
activism-related endeavors, or initiating programs working with youth or otherwise
supporting civic good.
Questions can also potentially be raised as to the classification of labor groups or
professional associations as civil society or CSOs. By virtue of their connection to
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business and commerce-related issues would labor unions such as the Teamsters or
professional associations such as the American Medical Association be best classified as
manifestations of the civic sphere or the business sphere? Addressing questions
surrounding how to classify political parties given their potential connection with or
control of government, Edwards (2009, 28) contends that “political parties are in civil
society when they are out of office and out of civil society when they are in.” Since the
entire membership of the American Judges Association and the vast majority of members
of the National Education Association or the National Air Traffic Controllers Association
are employed by government entities, can they be regarded as “civil” society and
divorced from the realm of government or alternatively from the realm of business as
they are all concerned with the economic interests of their respective professions? While
the classification of certain organizations including labor unions, professional
associations and political parties remains a subjective and contested issue, examples exist
of all of the latter types of organization being granted formal consultative status with the
UN within the rubric of its international civil society outreach.
The terms civil society and CSO may not be completely interchangeable in the
minds of many in that the former is a broader, more general and inclusive reference than
the latter which refers to a more formally organized constituency which also has more
defined agendas. While different interpretations of the term exist, most broadly the term
civil society could be perceived to be comprised of most or even the entirety of a
population and the totality of diverse views and interests it contains. Expansive models
of associational life would include most non-state or non-market free associations within
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a population as constituting civil society (Edwards 2009, 29). In contrast a CSO is a
formally organized segment of the population coordinated behind the goal of promoting
an agenda on behalf of a defined constituency. Registered voters or politically-active
persons in the United States exemplify civil society, but neither could be regarded as a
CSO, whereas the League of Women Voters is both an element of civil society and a
CSO.
Some question also exists as to the “voluntary” character of certain civil society
outlets in the Tocquevillian sense of totally free, libertine association. Uhlin (2009) notes
that structural factors and various sources of societal pressure could make it difficult for
many people to not join organizations such as party-related youth or civic groups in
communist or authoritarian states, or religious-related organizations in deeply religious
societies. Thus in some cases, what is perceived to be a voluntary association may be
obligatory to at least some degree culturally or politically or at minimum subjecting
individuals to direct or indirect pressure to participate. Many organizations are heavily
funded via governmental or corporate sources raising questions as to autonomy as well.
Also, larger CSOs generally have a paid professional staff to carry out core components
of their mission. Due to such considerations, the terms private voluntary organizations
or voluntary organizations (PVOs/VOs), sometimes proposed as a synonym for
CSOs/civil society, have not become standard nomenclature within the literature, though
some organizations including the US Agency for International Development (USAID)
continue to utilize the terminology. The latter, which provided $2.8 billion in funding to
support such organizations in 2013, defines PVOs as “tax-exempt nonprofits that
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leverage their expertise and private funding to address development challenges abroad”
(USAID 2016).
Nonprofit organizations or NPOs, sometimes also described as not-for-profit
organizations, are those non-governmental entities “organized for purposes other than
generating profit and in which no part of the organization's income is distributed to its
members, directors, or officers” (Cornell University 2016). NPOs are closely associated
with the concept of charitable organizations, but distinguishable via their altruistic, noncommercial operational parameters, where at least theoretically some charitable
organizations could be for-profit enterprises. Though the term NPO is not widely used in
the contemporary literature of international relations it is often viewed as equivalent to or
overlapping with the more commonly-referenced concepts of CSO or NGO entities as
evidenced in the World Bank’s attempt to define civil society:
The World Bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by a
number of leading research centers: “the term civil society to refer to the wide
array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in
public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based
on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of
organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based
organizations, professional associations, and foundations” (World Bank 2013).
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The term nongovernmental organization or NGO came into usage within the UN
via the organization’s original charter in 1945 due to the need for the UN to formally
differentiate between participation rights for state or IGO actors as opposed to what were
often described at the time as transnational private organizations---i.e. international
CSOs as opposed to specialized intergovernmental agencies (Willetts 1996). The League
of Nations had previously referred to such groups merely as private organizations, while
many such organizations themselves in the early 20th century self-described as
international institutes, international unions, or international organizations. By the
1970s, the term nongovernmental organization or acronym NGO had emerged as
common public usage via the popularization of UN institutional jargon (Willetts 2011).
Presently, the term NGO is the preferred term within UN-ECOSOC whereas other UN
bodies continue to use the term CSO.
The World Bank (2002, 1) offers the following definition for NGOs: “private
organizations that pursue activities to relieve the suffering, promote the interests of the
poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community
development.” Today the term/concept of NGOs is more widely referenced in the
literature than certain comparable alternatives such as CSO or (P)VO, in part because of
the perception that NGO may be a more delimited concept than many alternatives and
also because NGOs are regarded by many as being the best-organized elements of civil
society and accordingly having a greater chance of exerting influence upon state and
transnational actors than less structured civil society entities (Riddell-Dixon 2008).
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Willetts (1996) argues that there is essentially no practical difference between an
NGO and a (P)VO, but the term NGO may imply neutral connotations and applicability
to a broader segment of political actors, whereas (P)VO suggests moral approval of
perhaps a more limited range of civil society. NGOs are also occasionally compared to
social movement organizations (SMOs). While proponents of SMOs may often regard
their enterprise as being somehow more progressive or dynamic than NGOs, this is not a
correct perception as NGOs for the most part are components and direct manifestations of
social movements. For example NGOs such as the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children or A Child is Missing, Inc. could not have emerged as easily or
flourished financially or otherwise without underlying social movements galvanizing
public attention and advocating for the safety of children from abuse, abduction and other
forms of victimization.
The United Nations classifies a highly diverse range of private entities as NGOs
and in fact has only very general criteria for the designation: the organization must be (1)
independent from government control, (2) not-for-profit, (3) non-criminal, and (4) not
seek to challenge the government of a state either as a political party or by a narrow focus
upon a human rights issue (Willetts 1996). Beyond the latter basic criteria, the nature and
organization of NGOs varies widely. Interestingly, in terms of levels of operation, many
UN-recognized NGOs are community-based organizations (CBOs) which operate on a
local or regional level within a single country, and many others are national in scope,
operating only within a single country. Local or national-level NGOs may still covet an
association with the UN as a vehicle for networking and exchanging ideas with other
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organizations, providing feedback to the international community concerning their areas
of expertise or to pursue the possibility of international support for their operational
goals. There is also a diverse range of NGOs according to policy focus areas and
diversity of UN terminologies and classifications related to the latter such as
environmental NGOs (ENGOs), market advocacy NGOs (MANGOs), and technical
assistance NGOs (TANGOs).
In terms of functionality, NGOs are classified by many IOs including the World
Bank into two basic categories, those with an operational focus and those with an
advocacy focus. NGOs with an operational focus usually pursue positive change directly
through projects such as the delivery of public welfare or other services, emergency
relief, or environmental causes, usually on a local, regional or otherwise smaller scale
(Willetts 2012). Examples of operational-oriented NGOs include the American Red
Cross, Catholic Charities, and Food for the Poor. Advocacy-oriented NGOs strive to
accomplish larger-scale change via influencing political systems on behalf of their
specific causes such as human rights, animal rights, environmental policy, or other issues
(Willetts 2012). Examples of NGOs principally focused upon advocacy include Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, the National Rifle Association, and the US Institute
for Peace. It is also possible for an NGO to assume characteristics of both operations and
advocacy with the World Wildlife Fund being a possible example.
It is worthy of mention that the term NGO has been subject to ongoing debate as
to the verbiage and the underlying meaning(s) it conveys. Critics of the term note that it
is a negative (“non”) description, seeking to address what it is not, rather than what it

14

is/does. For example, the term pressure groups has been suggested by some as a possible
alternative in that the latter term more descriptively conveys what the organizations seek
to achieve, apply pressure within a civic or political sphere to obtain desired outcomes
(Willetts 1982). The existing acronym NGO has also been subject to attempts at
reinterpretation in more positive light, including “Necessary-to-Governance
Organizations” (Gotz 2008, 245; Jonsson 2010, 34). The latter term and concept raises
another key issue as to how divorced such organizations actually are from government
when NGOs often carry out government-related projects such as the provision of public
services and are frequently dependent upon government funding, issues which will be
explored more fully elsewhere in this research.
The line between civil society or NGOs as opposed to government or business is
not always distinct. Many NGOs derive significant portions---in many cases the vast
majority---of their funding from government and/or business sources. Concomitantly, in
the case of many such organizations skepticism exists as to the degree of organizational
independence in the face of financial dependency. In some cases governments or their
functionaries have actually created and at least to some degree managed NGOs, which
are termed government-operated NGOs (GONGOs) and may in reality be “non”governmental or “civil” society organizations only in name (Hemment 2012). A lesser
gradation of the latter may be quasi-autonomous NGOs (QUANGOs), which receive
most or even all of their funding from governments and may pursue specific projects at
the behest of government, but are not founded or directly managed by government---a
model common in many countries such as Britain which has some 1,200 such
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organizations (The Guardian 2012). In contrast, social movement organizations (SMOs)
or grassroots support organizations (GSOs) better exemplify the concept of “civil”
society in that they originate from widespread support within the population, presumably
represent agendas derived from the citizenry and are bottom-up rather than hierarchical in
origin and in terms of their locus of control and agenda-setting.
Other terms of significance to the research include those related to the
international scope of civil society and NGOs. Of an estimated 10 million NGOs
presently operating in the world today, the vast majority operate within a single country
and often only within a geographically limited local area. The majority of such
organizations are also relatively small, with 72% of NGOs in the United States having
annual revenue of less than half a million dollars for example (NCCS 2007).
Approximately 40,000 NGOs are believed to be international in scope in that they operate
in multiple countries (NGO.IN 2016). Within the literature, such entities which operate
across international borders are variously referred to as international nongovernmental
organizations (INGOs) or transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs).
More broadly, international organizations or IOs are any governmental, business, or civil
society organizations/NGOs operating in multiple countries—e.g. the United States Trade
Representative, multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Exxon Mobil, and Amnesty
International respectively. Intergovernmental organizations or IGOs are formal
associations among state actors or their organs, with the United Nations, Arab League,
European Union, and Organization of American States serving as examples.
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For the sake of consistency and clarity and for the purposes of this research, the
concepts of CSOs (though not necessarily civil society, which is arguably broader in
scope) and NGOs are for the most part regarded as synonymous and interchangeable.
The vast majority and possibly all CSOs could conceivable also be regarded as NGOs in
the broadest of senses/uses of the term NGO and the terms are largely used
interchangeably, including among most UN venues. In this study, preference is given to
the term NGO, as is also the standard practice within the United Nations Economic and
Social Council, the principle focus of this research.

Theoretical Framework: A Summary Overview
Dahl (1961) famously characterized the political process as an arena in which
there is a diversity of actors/groups competing for and sharing power and attention.
While different interpretations exist, at its most basic the concept of political pluralism
contends that a truly democratic system must have more than one locus of power. The
classical model of political pluralism as espoused by Dahl and Lipset (1981) essentially
holds that decision-making and politics are primarily the domain of government but civil
society and other non-governmental entities can exercise influence over the process
(Hauss 2011). In terms of a national polity, power and the opportunity for input should
not be vested solely in one party, demographic cohort, sub-region or other group but
rather distributed equitably among as many segments as possible. Research conducted in
the US has shown that political structures that are more pluralist may contribute to
broader participation in policy issue-areas which affect the populace (Okoth 2013).
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In recent decades, the concept of pluralism has received attention as related to the
distribution of power and influence within the transnational institutions including the UN
(e.g., as a catalyst for global democratization: DeMars 2005, Risse-Kappen ed. 1995,
Willetts 1996; for the diversification of moral authority: Boli and Thomas eds. 1999,
Gotz 2008, etc.). Historically, the UN has functioned as an association among states with
national governments holding a monopoly on influence. For the first decades of its
existence UN agenda-setting and the actions (e.g. relief, monitoring) undertaken
internationally were carried out largely by state actors. The explosion in the number of
international civil society organizations afforded the UN not just practical opportunities
to diversify the implementation of its initiatives at the ground level via non-state, civil
society organizations, but also to diversify the chorus of voices participating in the UN
process and partly decentralize the focus away from state actors. Whereas national
governments presumably represent the interests of their citizens, they may frequently
reflect the political agendas of the elites or the regime in power. Civil society
organizations such as NGOs have been perceived as having a more “bottom-up”,
grassroots dynamic in which the views of the citizenry, often including marginalized
segments of a society, may be better represented. Accordingly, increased direct UN
involvement with NGOs would serve as a step in the direction of democratic pluralism
and facilitate more interaction with non-state actors internationally. Also, the greater the
diversity among NGOs in terms of regional/geographical representation and issue areas
represented, the greater the contribution to pluralism. For the purposes of this research,
political pluralism is defined as sharing of influence among and active engagement of a
diverse group of stakeholders within a political dynamic. Relative to the relationship
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between NGOs and UN-ECOSOC, an exploration of political pluralism entails
assessments of the degree and nature of actual NGO engagement (i.e. is NGO influence
actual/potential or largely symbolic?) and the degree of proportional and equitable NGO
representation by country/region and by policy focus area.
The concept of pluralism as espoused in Kantian classical liberalism and liberal
institutionalism contends that ideally democratic systems have decentralized power
structures and significant influence and participation from diverse sources, rather than a
limited segment of a polity. The latter has been described as the most compelling
argument on behalf of UN involvement with civil society organizations in that it
facilitates a multi-actor framework and contributes additional voices, perspectives and
expertise to international forums/regimes which have traditionally been the almost
exclusive domain of states (Mingst and Muldoon 2015; Whaites 1996; Willetts 2006).
Succinctly, if vibrant civil society participation helps to foster democratic processes,
increased roles of civil society within IOs will help facilitate democratic processes within
the IO. Within the pluralist tradition of constructivism, NGOs are regarded as the
principle organizing element and the voice of transnational civil society, and as
representing the interests of people and grassroots movements, separate from and
diffusing the power of states (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 11). Beginning in the 1990s,
NGOs and civil society organizations in general were regarded as primary catalysts for
the emerging pattern of bottom-up international democratization. Burgeoning global
civil society including thousands of newly UN-affiliated NGOs sought increasingly
proactive roles in contributing to global problem solving and transnational governance,
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potentially competing with the influence of states within international regimes and
functioning as agents of change upon states and transnational institutions via grassroots
influence (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 10-13). The process of policy formulation also
benefits from pluralism as stakeholders may potentially consult international/domestic
policymakers during the formulation process, thus developing more effective and/or
democratic policy (Bunea and Thompson 2015; Tallberg 2012). Additionally, pluralism
holds that the actions of IOs/IGOs and states may become increasingly subject to the
oversight of transnational civil society organizations and that such an outcome reflects
democratic institutional trends (Keohane 1998).
Pluralism also entails considerations related to cultural diversity within egalitarian
democratic institutions in that it advocates that all groups can maintain their distinctive
identity and be afforded opportunities to participate and have their voices heard without
being relegated to the margins (Abu-Laban 2008, 2). It can be regarded as an ethic of
respect that places value on and prioritizes human diversity (Global Centre for Pluralism
2012). The United Nations advocates diversity in representation, and the expanding role
of increasingly diverse (geographical, policy issue areas represented, etc.) ranges of
NGOs within ECOSOC and other organizations reflects institutionalized commitment to
pluralism. The UN has assumed a direct role in attempting to facilitate such pluralism
within the consultative status framework via encouraging NGOs representing the
historically marginalized (e.g., the global south, human/indigenous rights-related
organizations) and providing funding to allow NGOs from developing nations to
participate in UN forums. However, significant question exists as to whether such efforts
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favoring plurality have yielded genuine improvements in the diversity of representation/
participation or whether they are largely symbolic (Kymlicka 2007, 3-25).
The theoretical perspective underpinning the proposed study is a critical appraisal
of pluralist assumptions relative to the expanding role of CSOs/NGOs within the United
Nations and the associated perceptions of the decentralization of power away from states,
the diversification of perspectives geographically and culturally, and the strengthened
role of civil society within the UN. The international community has become
characterized in recent decades by decreasing dominance of state actors and
concomitantly increasing involvement of non-state actors including NGOs (McKeon
2009, pg. 6; Pubantz 2005). The most significant non-state actors within the UN
framework and global civil society in general are NGOs which continue to grow in
number and influence within the UN and international arena (Bennessaieh 2011, pg. 72;
Smith 2006, pg. 109; Hill 2008, pg. 129; Reimann 2006, pg. 45-67). Due to the latter
trend and the understanding that NGOs make key contributions to civil society and
democratic institutions, advocates of democratic pluralism within the UN regard the
expansion of NGO influence within the organization as an appropriate means of
diversifying input and for further democratizing global governance. Article 71 of the UN
Charter (Appendix B) authorizes the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to
form formal consultative arrangements with NGOs. UN conferences intentionally place
state parties adjacent to NGOs in parallel conferences in order to impart a perception of
pluralism and democracy (Anderson 2012, pg. 235). In 1996, NGOs with a national or
regional scope were for the first time considered for formal accreditation with the UN,
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with the goal of democratizing access---particularly for NGOs in developing nations
(McKeon 2009, pg. 124).
However many scholars question the degree to which the expanded role of NGOs
within the UN actually exemplifies democratic pluralism. Critics note that the increased
profile of NGOs may be more perceptual or symbolic than substantive with regard to the
balance of power and influence which overwhelmingly remains with state actors within
international governance. Also, NGO representation at the UN may be more symbolic
than substantive in terms of degree of active engagement of NGOs within the UN
dynamic, as the theoretical number and diversity of NGOs in theoretical affiliation with
the UN is not meaningful without active engagement.
Kotzian (2015) contends that civil society can theoretically strengthen democratic
institutions within IOs/IGOs (1) via transmitting information between agents of
international governance and the public and (2) by helping to hold organizations such as
the UN accountable, but NGOs within the UN-ECOSOC framework appear to often fall
short of one or both of the latter goals (particularly the second) in practice. McKeon
(2009) and Omelicheva (2009) argue that while the UN has become increasingly
inclusive of civil society, for various reasons such as limited channels of participation
(not all UN organs permit extensive NGO participation and those that do usually regulate
levels of participation via the NGOs affiliation status) and, logistical obstacles (NGO
financial/personnel resources may impede participation) it has largely failed with regard
to full incorporation of civil society into the global political process---i.e., formally
affiliated NGOs often provide minimal if any input, and have little-no oversight role.
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Carpenter (2010, pg. 216-217), Anderson (2012, pg. 222) and Willetts (2000, pg. 196)
note that access to the UN is not available to all NGOs equally and that barriers such as
the cost of attending UN conferences serve as significant impediments for many NGOs to
participate. Hemment (2012) has suggested that a large portion of the NGOs created
during the post-Cold War civil society expansion are “Potemkin NGOs”, either state
funded/directed organs or that otherwise exist as civil society organizations more in
name/theory than practice---i.e. devoid of ground-up, popular, grassroots support or
active membership.
Many studies have addressed the expanding number and roles of NGOs globally
in recent decades but few theories have been posited to address the actual behaviors of
NGOs within the international arena such as patterns of participation regionally, topically
or the degree to which they are actually engaged with the UN (Barnett and Finnemore
2006, 177-178). Many of the attempts to address the latter have been critical including
Bloem, Attia and Dam (2008) who cite the challenges inherent to coordinating large
numbers of NGOs and the associated issue of quantity versus quality of input. Carpenter
(2010) also notes the politicization of the NGO screening committee/process and the
otherwise un-level playing field financially or politically among NGOs that may seek
association with the UN---e.g. an NGO with a harshly critical position against one or
more national governments is more likely to be denied status. Cooley (2010) and
Edwards (2009) note that many NGOs are so dependent upon state or corporate funding
that many are arguably organs of states and state policies/agendas rather than independent
entities. Thiel (2017) notes that to date, CSOs have been largely marginal players within
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IOs including the EU with regard to agenda-setting and policy-development. The latter
examples of political idiosyncrasies presumably call into question the UN-NGO program
as a vehicle for democratic pluralism within the organization and also the legitimacy and
independence of many NGOs and the nature and value of their contributions to the UN.

Research Parameters
This study proposes that the expansion of the number and role of NGOs in
consultative status with the UN (ECOSOC) does not necessarily equate to meaningful
collaboration between the UN and civil society, and accordingly the ideals of democratic
pluralism are not being fully realized via this dynamic. Specifically, a large percentage--possibly the majority---of NGOs which have attained formal consultative status with UNECOSOC do not appear to participate in UN functions (e.g. conference attendance,
presentation of or assistance with research) or otherwise make any observable
contribution to representing civil society at the UN. This study further proposes that
analysis of patterns of NGO participation with UN-ECOSOC will reveal gaps with regard
to geographical representation as well as gaps in issue areas both of which also
undermine the tenets of democratic pluralism via claims of expanded NGO participation
at the UN. Most empirical studies of NGOs at the UN have focused upon a limited
number of organizations within a single issue area (Clark et al, 1998). A strength of this
study is that its breadth of scope in seeking to analyze patterns of participation of all
NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC will reveal macro-scale patterns
within the institutional dynamic.

24

Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses
Questions:
#1a: What are the patterns of participation of NGOs in the UN-ECOSOC consultative
status programs in terms of country and regional representation and are countries and
world regions proportionally represented?
1b: What are the patterns of participation and proportional representation in terms of
policy issue focus areas (e.g. human rights, environment, relief, etc.)?
1c: What types and degrees of participation exist among NGOs which hold consultative
status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council?
#2: Why do some NGOs in consultative status utilize the status to participate in UN
functions, but others do not?
#3: Why do many NGOs holding consultative status fail to participate in any meaningful
way in UN-ECOSOC functions?
Guiding Hypotheses:
1: Imbalances exist in patterns of participation of NGOs in consultative status with the
UN Economic and Social Council with regard to country/regional involvement (e.g.
NGOs of developed states are proportionally better represented than those of developing
states) and regarding the policy issues with which the NGOs are concerned.
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2: A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of
understanding of the process through which NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC
can participate make some NGOs more active than others.
3: Given such constraints, most NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not
participate in any meaningful way in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive
contribution (providing input at conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN
goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society.

Research Design, Methodology and Instrumentation
The study will utilize a qualitative methodology in analyzing patterns of
participation (institutional input) of NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC
and in survey case studies of NGOs. Data obtained from the extensive UN integrated
Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) online database will be analyzed for macro-scale
patterns of CSO/NGO participation within UN-ECOSOC. Organizations with
consultative status will be analyzed according to 1) region and country, 2) year and
classification of UN status (general, special, and roster), 3) organizational type, 4) field
and geographical scope of activity, and 5) degree of participation in UN meetings or
other venues. Qualitative analysis of these data via a simple descriptive approach should
be sufficient to operationalize the first guiding hypothesis and in part (i.e., some of the
evidence supporting widespread lack of participation in the UN-NGO program)
operationalize the third guiding hypothesis. These data will also help identify NGOs and
their contact information to be selected for the empirical case study.
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Individual survey case studies utilized CSOs/NGOs which identified English as at
least one of several languages spoken in order to minimize logistical obstacles inherent to
attempting to survey or otherwise obtain information from international organizations--which should also increase survey participation rates among organizations selected for
inclusion in the study. Utilizing random sampling, 10% percent of NGOs which have (1)
obtained consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, (2)
identified English language proficiency in their UN database profile, and (3) have a
valid/complete email address listed in their contact information were selected for a survey
(see Appendix A). The latter information used in sample selection is obtained from the
publicly-available online UN iCSO database.
The random selection of CSOs/NGOs for inclusion in the case studies occurred
according to the following procedures. Utilizing the publicly-accessible UN iCSO online
database, an alphabetized list of all English-speaking organizations in consultative status
with ECOSOC was generated. Of 4,601 NGOs with consultative status at the time the
sample pool was selected, 4,383 (95.3%) were identified as speaking English as one of
several languages. In alphabetical order, each CSO/NGO was numbered consecutively.
The online resource www.stattrek.com was utilized to generate 439 random, nonduplicated numbers which served as the basis for sample selection in the research.
Questionnaires containing primarily fixed choice (i.e. number line) items and a
small number of open-ended items will be distributed by email to selected NGOs with the
goal of understanding why the organizations have or have not participated in the UN
consultative status program in which they were accepted. Follow up by phone and/or
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email with some participants will permit elaboration/clarification of survey responses if
necessary. Survey/interview data will be analyzed in an interpretive-qualitative manner
so as to address the second and third guiding hypothesis. Information derived from both
the UN iCSO database and surveys/interviews will be analyzed via content analysis and
descriptive reporting. In an effort to increase response rates and also to aid in the candor
of information furnished, anonymity will be provided in that the names of the
CSOs/NGOs, persons affiliated with them or any other identifying characteristics will be
withheld by the researcher from the study or any publications derived from the study.
Following the initial email informing randomly selected participants of the study
and requesting that they complete and submit the survey, several follow-up/reminder
emails were sent approximately every 10 days to 2 weeks. Such follow-up intervals are
traditionally deemed appropriate by survey researchers as shorter intervals risk being
perceived as irritating, and longer intervals don’t convey importance, allow more
potential participants to forget about the study/request and risks needlessly prolonging the
time needed for data collection (Burton 2000; Edwards 1997; Mangione 1995). All
follow-up contacts contained the original survey and consent form as an attached Word
document for the convenience of potential respondents who may have deleted or
misplaced the original email, a practice commonly recommended by survey researchers
(e.g., Dillman et al 2009; Thach 1995). Each follow-up contained a slightly different
message emphasizing a different reason to participate or other piece of information, as
research has shown that the latter approach, rather than a repetition of the identical
message, could be more effective in eliciting responses (Cialdini 1984; Dillman et al
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2009; Hildreth et al 2006). The first reminder was sent November 10-12, 2016 and
succinctly stressed the importance of the study, its brief nature, and my availability to
promptly answer any questions concerning the study via email. A second reminder was
emailed November 22-23 which mentioned each of the latter again and also emphasized
my willingness to send the survey in other languages as well and notice that the deadline
for submission had been extended through December 2. The third and final follow-up
was sent on December 2 indicating that the deadline had passed but that late submissions
would still be accepted if submitted promptly.
Literature related to survey research suggests that subsequent contacts/reminders
regarding surveys yield progressively diminishing returns with regard to response rate
and this was generally my experience in this study (Dialsingh 2008; Gideon 2012).
Many survey researchers note that response rates for subsequent follow-ups can yield as
little as half the prior return rate, meaning that once three follow-up reminders have been
sent the likelihood of any significant number of responses from further follow-ups would
likely be close to zero and thus not justifiable (Gideon 2012; Mangione 1995). In the
period following the initial email contacts with potential respondents---and prior to any
follow-up reminders being sent, a total of 22 surveys were submitted. Subsequently, 21
more were submitted after the first follow-up email, 16 after the second, and 3 after the
third for a total of 62 survey responses, yielding a response rate of 14.1%. The majority
of surveys were submitted via email attachments, but 5 were submitted by mail, and 1 by
fax. All of the latter options were made available to participants for their
convenience/preference and with the goal of maximizing rate of response.
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High response rates for academic research of this type can be difficult to achieve.
Survey research literature note the existence of long-term trends in declining response
rates to all types of surveys, possibly the result of increased volumes of spam over time
(Panel on a Research Agenda for the Future of Social Sciences Data Collection 2013;
Gorard 2003). In addition to multiple follow-up emails and allowing multiple modes of
submission at participants’ discretion (email, mail or fax), several other steps were
undertaken in an effort to increase the questionnaire response rate. Prior to distribution
and following several rounds of editing, the number of questions included in the survey
was reduced by nearly one-half from the original version and additionally several items
that were originally more open-ended were converted to fixed-choice items in an effort to
make the survey less daunting and time-consuming to potential respondents. Assurances
of anonymity and an extension of the original submission deadline are both
recommended strategies for increasing response rates in the literature concerning survey
research and both approaches were employed in this study (Ballantyne 2005; Dommeyer
et al 2002).
Response rates can vary substantially depending upon the type of survey being
conducted. Internal surveys such as those undertaken by employers with their workers,
universities with their students, or businesses with their clients or suppliers tend to have
higher response rates than external surveys in which the researcher is seeking to obtain
input from a target audience with which no existing connection or exists. For example,
Nulty (2008) found an average online response rate to 9 different internal higher
education surveys in which institutions sought input from their enrolled students to be
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33%. Formal surveys such as those using questionnaires and requiring signed consent
forms generally yield lower response rates than informal studies such as more casual
market research surveys (OECD 2001). The response rate for surveys targeted to specific
individuals is often considerably higher than surveys undertaken for organizations, and
whereas offering incentives may boost response rates when surveying individuals,
incentives have not been demonstrated to increase response rates from organizations
surveyed (Baruch 2008). Surveys undertaken face-to-face (which is of course not
practical for many studies including this research) have been shown to produce
substantially higher rates of response than indirect methods such as mail or email, and
paper-based surveys are often touted as yielding better results than online or email
surveys (Burton 2000; Nulty 2008).
In nearly every respect, the nature of this survey research aligned with those
studies traditionally characterized by lower response rates: external, formal---and
requiring consent documentation, indirect rather than face-to-face, email rather than
paper, and targeting organizations rather than individuals. Given the latter parameters, a
realistic minimum goal for a survey response rate with a study of this type may
commonly be set at approximately 10% (OECD 2001; Panel on a Research Agenda for
the Future of Social Sciences Data Collection 2013). It should also be noted that a
growing consensus in the literature stresses that higher response rates do not necessarily
guarantee data quality and conversely lower rates do not necessarily mean that data
obtained is in any way weak or biased (e.g. Groves 2006; Massey and Tourangeau 2013;
Peytchev 2013).
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In hindsight, it is possible that at least a slightly higher response rate could have
been achieved via use of a web-based survey, as many participants seemed to lack the
basic technical skills to scan documents or even open the questionnaire as a Word file.
Among those with basic computer proficiencies, a fully-online survey may have elicited
more response through convenience as a potentially quicker and easier way to participate.
However, the design and implementation of a functional web-based survey platform was
beyond my technical capabilities and such a format would still not absolve participants
from reading and following short, basic instructions related to completing and submitting
the survey. Also, the formal procedural requirement of a signed consent form may have
proven difficult to adequately address via an online survey as those with limited
computer skills would likely not be able to attach an electronic signature and those only
willing to provide feedback via a website for questionnaire items, may have been less
likely to print, sign, and scan or otherwise submit the consent form (which if
completed/submitted separately from the online questionnaire could also become difficult
to pair with the correct survey), meaning many questionnaires may have been unusable
without accompanying consent documentation.

Limitations
The first guiding hypothesis in its entirety and a portion of the third (participation
in UN meetings) are addressed via analysis of data for all NGOs in consultative status
and accordingly the study findings are generalizable. However, given the relatively large
number of NGOs, the percent needed for statistical significance, the focus upon only
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English-speaking NGOs, and the possibility of obtaining a small sample size (i.e. those
NGOs which have failed to participate in a prestigious UN program may not be inclined
to complete/submit a detailed questionnaire---either via the time commitment involved
and/or the reality/perception of self-reporting inadequate participation), a case study
approach is undertaken, the results of which are not necessarily generalizable to all NGOs
in consultative status with ECOSOC. Also regarding the second and third guiding
hypotheses, NGO participation may be curtailed by external factors beyond the
control/influence of the organizations such as the level of accreditation granted by the
UN (general, special, roster) which in effect restricts the type and extent of participation.

Summary
To the researcher’s knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of
macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part
of all NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. It may also be among the
first such studies which seeks to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement or
the lack thereof on the part of NGOs in consultative status. Lastly, the study will seek to
appraise the findings within the theoretical framework of political pluralism in assessing
the place and contributions of NGOs within the UN dynamic as either meaningful or as
more symbolic.
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II. CHAPTER TWO:
THEORIZING ON THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF CSOs/NGOs WITHIN
THE UNITED NATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Introduction
Speaking at the World Economic Forum in 1999, then UN Secretary Kofi Annan
famously suggested that a tripartite model of cooperation between the UN (and other
IGOs), civil society organizations such as NGOs and labor unions, and business was
needed to sufficiently address many pressing and complex international issues such as
environmental protection and human rights (Ottaway 2001). Externally, CSOs/NGOs
can serve useful purposes for transnational institutions as monitors of international law
and norms in areas such as human rights or environmental standards, as facilitators of
beneficial socio-economic programs, or as disseminators of aid among other roles.
Internally, although such organizations have little official authority at the UN or most
other IGOs, through their advocacy roles they can nonetheless allow additional voices to
be heard and exert influence and in recent years CSOs/NGOs have successfully promoted
new environmental agreements, helped to strengthen human rights, and helped achieve
arms control measures among other achievements (Paul 2000).
The UN is the primary forum for policy formulation and rule-making in the fields
in which most INGOs function and accordingly it stands to reason that CSOs/NGOs with
an international scope would seek to cultivate relationships with the UN and its bodies
(Paul 2000). By gaining knowledge of procedures and language used at the UN and other
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IGOs, elements of civil society including CSOs/NGOs may learn how to effectively use
international instruments associated with democratic traditions such as compliance
reporting to advance domestic or transnational agendas in various policy areas including
human or environmental rights (Riddell-Dixon 2008). Within democratic institutions
whether at the sub-state, state or transnational level, CSOs/NGOs can potentially foster
and reinforce democratic ideals and practices via aggregation and representation of
stakeholder interests and also via mitigating government power---i.e. civil society is
beneficial for democracy (Uhlin 2009). In short, stronger bonds between institutions of
governance and institutions related to civil society can in turn strengthen democratic
traditions.
By the late 20th century, NGOs were widely regarded as the most important
element of civil society, facilitating public services and heavily contributing to the
democratization trends sweeping much of the world, but in recent years the perception
concerning CSOs/NGOs internationally has begun to shift toward criticism, with
increasing calls that they may not be as effective as touted, many of them have little-no
relationship to any real public, and via competing with and potentially undermining state
actors they are undermining national sovereignty and democracy rather than reinforcing it
(Jordan and Tuijl 2006). This chapter examines existing literature to address the
theoretical underpinnings of the UN’s association with CSOs/NGOs, its evolution and
nature, and the potential shortcomings in the association.
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CSOs/NGOs within IR Theory
Within IR theory, the role of civil society as an agent of influence and change
within the international system has historically either been dismissed or downplayed. As
recently as the 1980s, CSOs/NGOs were omitted from theory formulations in IR, likely
as a reflection of state-centric theorizing and a dearth of information/understanding
concerning the organizations (Mingst and Muldoon 2015, 67). The latter state of affairs
has begun to change in recent decades as many international relations scholars have
increasingly moved toward the study of non-state actors including civil society (Barnett
and Sikkink 2008). Increasingly, academicians, as well as states and IOs are moving
away from the long-prevailing view of CSOs/NGOs as negligible actors on the global
stage (Liebert and Trenz 2013; Scholte 2011; Steffek and Hahn 2010).
The theoretical frameworks that do regard NGOs and civil society as having
relevance do not agree as to the nature or source of their influence. To gain insight into
variations in how CSOs/NGOs are perceived within the international framework, it is
necessary to briefly address often conflicting views concerning the latter within each of
several principle theoretical schools within IR: realism, Marxism, the English School,
(neo) liberal institutionalism, behaviorist approaches such as structural sociological
theories, and constructivism/pluralism. Particular attention is paid to pluralism, normally
considered a strand of constructivism, as it is arguably the IR theory which gives the most
consideration to the role of NGOs and civil society within the international system (Thiel
2010, 7117).
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Preoccupied with power and states as the almost exclusive purveyors of power
within the international system, realists (e.g. Walt) discount the importance of all nonstate actors including CSOs/NGOs. Realists discount the autonomous agency of NGOs
as only realized if allowed by states which weigh such decisions upon their own vested
national interests, meaning the impact of CSOs/NGOs or IOs in general is limited to their
role as instruments/surrogates of states’ interests (Andersen 2015, 45-46). Classical
realist perspectives ignore the expanding influence of CSOs/NGOs and other elements of
civil society in recent decades, yet within the UN structure, the vast majority of real
influence remains with member states and states have used their preeminence to
successfully limit the expansion of CSO/NGO influence into key areas such as the
General Assembly and Security Council.
If classical realism presents an oversimplified model of an international system
characterized by competition for power so does its chief theoretical opponent Marxism,
but with different agents vying for their own interests. Marxist theory regards class
conflict as the catalyst for competition and in turn as the primary vehicle for an
anarchical world system. Yet it conceives of transnational capitalist elites as maintaining
power within societies via maintaining control of the state and its organs of power
(Willetts 2011, 115). As in all major theories within international relations, different
internal strands exist, but Marxist theory like realism discounts the importance of
CSOs/NGOs or civil society, or views them as the extended arm of the state or possibly
corporate shills, rather than an impartial non-governmental . The agendas of
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CSOs/NGOs would not be viewed as distinct from the political or economic
environments which gave birth to or finance such organizations.
In some respects, the English School within IR theory mirrors realism in that the
former also sees an established society of states as the primary purveyor of structure
within the international system. However, the English School also sees at least the
potential for a broader, more diverse international society which at least potentially
transcends and competes with state actors. Hedley Bull (1977) viewed the emergence of
a more pluralistic international system with some degree of trepidation in that by
challenging the primacy of state actors and their sovereignty, new voices on the world
stage competing with states for influence may serve to undermine an already anarchical
international order (Bellamy and McDonald 2004). Such views are consistent with the
actions of many UN member states which have historically sought to prevent the
potential erosion of sovereignty or international influence by non-state actors.
Many aspects of neorealist and neoliberal theories are comparable including their
shared attitudes favoring free-market globalization as beneficial to the state, leading some
theorists to place both within the rubric of neo-utilitarianism (Willetts 2011, 116).
Neorealist and neoliberal theorists also have similar perspectives concerning the place of
CSOs/NGOs within the international dynamic. Both remain state-centered, as they
regard national governments as the principle actor on the international stage, though both
neorealists and neoliberals regard the state as less monopolistic in influence than do
classical realists. Both also allow for non-state actors including CSOs/NGOs to wield at
least some state-delimited influence within the international system. Neoliberal theorists
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regard IOs as mediums through which states may coordinate their interests, and
CSOs/NGOs as equivalent to interest groups, whose voices may be louder than ever, but
are still not central to norm-setting or functionality in the international arena (Andersen
2015, 46).
Liberal institutionalism, one of several variants within the liberal school, contends
that the spread of international institutions helps foster peace and cooperation. The latter
goals being achieved via dissemination of democratic ideals, increased economic
interdependence, and increased levels of intergovernmental collaboration---and they
regard all of the latter as largely the products of state actions (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015,
10). In other words, liberal institutionalists regard NGOs and international civil society
as a byproduct derived from larger international trends such as increasing levels of
economic and political interdependence, rather than as a catalyst for bringing such
transitions about. The latter theory would regard the expansion of the ECOSOC
consultative status program not as a catalyst for change or as a phenomenon of the CSO’s
doing but rather as a manifestation of institutional/societal expectation that transnational
civil society should be given more voice.
Analysis of the distribution of power and influence within a system and
understanding the nature of the power dynamic may entail behaviorist models and
approaches such as observing decision-making processes and competition among
competing agendas. Some such models are actor-centric such as rational-choice
institutionalism which entail some real or perceived benefit to be derived by transnational
actors or power-oriented institutionalism which regards transnational CSOs/NGOs as a
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reflection of the power and influence of states (Tallberg et al 2013). In contrast,
structural theories of sociological institutionalism stress that many elements of
transnational institutions are embedded in sociocultural norms (Giddens 1986; Hall and
Taylor 1996). The latter theories strive to explain the nature of changing institutional
practices by assessing the sociocultural legitimacy of the actors as opposed to rationalist
means-end calculation (Thiel 2017, 35). For example, CSOs/NGOs may be regarded as
the vehicle via which disenfranchised populations may be included in the decisionmaking process by IGOs or other institutions which value diversity and wish to become
more inclusive in elevating their status (Benhabib 2009).
Behaviorist concepts are commonly seen as having common ground with
pluralism. Within the scope of international politics, the concept of pluralism can refer to
a range of things, though some core ideas lie at the heart of the concept. In the broadest
of senses, constructivism in general denotes pluralism in that constructivism takes into
account a diverse, pluralistic range of considerations in examining how a complex social
dynamic impacts international politics. The emergence of constructivism began in
response to rationalist theories, including neorealism and neoliberalism, which perceive
actors and their motives as materialists which pursue resources or other forms of power.
Rationalists assume that the international system is driven by states which are rational
actors striving to maximize their own material advantages and that their actions can be
understood entirely by the conduct of individual actors (states), without regard to the
complex, diverse and frequently changing socio-cultural systems within which the
interactions occur (Ruggie 1998, 9).
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When constructivism emerged as a school of thought in the 1980s it facilitated a
larger focus on non-state actors, and it remains the sole mainstream IR theory which
emphasizes a significant role for CSOs/NGOs within the international political dynamic
(Andersen 2015, 46-47). Presently, most IR theorists regard constructivism as a
descendent of the idealist perspective in that it stresses the roles of ideas, values, and
discourses in shaping the political realm---taking a wider and more multifaceted view
than many previous theories which merely viewed the IR arena as a competition among
states to attain their vested interests (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 10-11). Unlike
conventional liberalism, constructivist thought deconstructs---rather than assuming as a
given---and effectively discounts the traditional views related to anarchy, power, and
state actors, all of which are regarded as products of many societal variables. The entire
international dynamic and the variables which influence it are social constructs that
frequently change and evolve (Wendt 1992, 422-424). Accordingly, NGOs and other
manifestations of civil society as reflections of the complex societal dynamic should have
some significance within the international system. Addressing how CSOs/NGOs factor
into the more nuanced and multifaceted theoretical framework of constructivism
Andersen (2015, 46-47) states:
Constructivism puts emphasis on the dynamics behind the spread of norms
and ideas in the international system, and NGOs play a central role in this…as
they embody values and act independently of governments. They function as
norm entrepreneurs/transmitters within what many see as an emerging global civil
society. Constructivism calls attention to the frequent interactions between
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NGOs and states…(but) the goal is not to replace the state-centrism of early
theorizing.
Within constructivism there are variations concerning the nature of CSOs/NGOs
within the international framework, essentially a dichotomy between the globalist and
pluralist camps. More narrowly, the plural(ist) school of liberal constructivism contends
that the social and ideational considerations flow from the bottom up, as opposed to the
globalist school within constructivism which sees norms and ideas as being more
hierarchical in nature and trickling down from states, IGOs and other macro-scale actors
(DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 11). This distinction is important in attempting to define the
role of NGOs, as pluralists see such manifestations of civil society as significant agents
of international influence. Exploring this, DeMars and Dijkzeul (2015, 11-12) state:
In the pluralist school of idealist constructivism, NGOs are understood as
the articulate and organized element of transnational civil society, acting largely
independent of government. Pluralists portray NGOs as servants of the poor in
grassroots development, or prophetic voices of the voiceless lobbying
governments and the UN, or transnational pilgrims in an emancipatory passage
from oppressive rule to self-regulating community. Pluralism reiterates, in
abstract theoretical terms, the representative claims articulated by the NGOs
themselves.
In contrast with the pluralist framework, within the globalist school of idealist
constructivism, international norms are “implemented” or “enforced” through the actions
of CSOs/NGOs collecting information and reporting on the norm compliance of states,
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IGOs, MNCs and other actors, a model that many observers argue is evident in how
CSOs/NGOs function within the framework of the UN and other IGOs (DeMars and
Dijkzeul 2015; Clark 2001; Martens 2000; Weiss and Gordenker 1996). Whereas realists
discount the influence of civil society and other non-state actors outright, liberal
institutionalists merely perceive CSO/NGO growth largely as a bi-product of increased
influence of international institutions and globalization rather than a significant source of
influence upon the international dynamic (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015). Such conflicting
views concerning the place of NGOs within the framework of IR theory is presented in
Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Perception of CSOs/NGOs in IR Theory

IR Theory

Perception of CSOs/NGOs

Realism

CSOs/NGOs are insignificant compared to states.

Liberal

CSOs/NGOs are largely symptoms of spreading international

Institutionalism

institutions, but do not comprise an important element of them or
significantly influence them.

Global

CSO/NGO power/influence flows primarily from

Constructivism

international norms downward to states.

Plural

CSO/NGO power/influence flows in a single direction from

Constructivism

societies upward to states
(adapted from DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015)
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Evolution and Growth of the CSO/NGO Phenomenon
While the concept of CSOs/NGOs and the perception of the latter as one element
of democratic society slowly emerged and expanded in the 19 th century, the most
substantial growth in the total number and transnational nature of civil society has
occurred since the mid-twentieth century. The postcolonial era in the decades following
WWII was an important time for the growth of NGOs and civil society globally, as in the
preceding colonial period, governments customarily did not encourage the growth of such
groups, seeing them as threats to the power structure (Kwesiga and Namisi 2006). In the
decades following decolonization, CSOs/NGOs acquired an increasingly prominent role
in developing countries in the provision of services and distribution of aid, as evidenced
in the tenfold increase in developmental aid dispersed by international organizations
between 1970-1985 (Jokic 2013). During the latter years of the Cold War in the 1980s
and early 1990s, a substantial expansion in the number and influence of CSOs/NGOs
occurred internationally and this upsurge, particularly in groups related to human and
political rights or free market economic reform are often credited with playing a role in
the decline in authoritarianism and movement toward democracy characteristic of the era.
Increasing numbers of CSOs/NGOs with international focus were founded in many areas
in an effort to meet community needs or promote interests, with one estimate claiming
that some 25,000 organizations could reasonably be classified as INGOs (those with
affiliates/programs in multiple countries) by the year 2000, up from less than 400 a
century earlier and 6,000 in 1990 (Paul 2000; Jokic 2013). As of 2016, the Union of
International Associations’ Yearbook of International Organizations lists over 38,000
active and some 30,000 dormant CSOs/NGOs that operated in 2 or more countries and
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obtained financial support from more than one state, their definitional criteria for being
an INGO (UIA 2016).
The type and degree of CSO/NGO involvement with the UN has evolved over
time, with the principle venue of interaction being the UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), a body established in 1946. Hundreds of organizations were in attendance at
the conference establishing the UN at the end of WWII, setting a precedent for
continuing cooperation and by 1950 formal consultative arrangements with CSOs/NGOs
and a framework of rules regulating the affiliations were established (Willetts 1996).
Article 71 of the UN Charter (see Appendix B) is the primary vehicle for UN-civil
society relations and serves as the basis of the formal consultative status program. It
states that ECOSOC “may make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.
Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate,
with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations
concerned.”
A highly diverse and ever-expanding range of CSOs/NGOs and policy areas
including those with a transnational, state-specific and even sub-state focus are
represented within the UN-ECOSOC consultative status program, reflecting a high
degree of flexibility on the part of the NGO Committee regarding matriculation into the
program. In fact, one source of criticism has been a lack of consistent admission
standards in that many CSOs/NGOs with an obscure focus or whose mission is otherwise
very tangentially related to the work of the UN. Examples of the latter include the
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International Federation of International Furniture Removers and the European Cyclists’
Federation both of which currently hold Roster consultative status (which is the level of
accreditation usually---though not always---held by organizations with a highly
narrow/specialized focus) and the International Federation of Psoriasis Associations
which holds Special consultative status, normally reserved for organizations with a
broader scope of mission relative to UN activities. Many examples exist of CSOs/NGOs
with similarly narrow focus, with at best indirect relevance to the UN’s work, being
awarded consultative status while others with a comparable or even far more relevant and
appropriate scope and mission are denied. Despite such controversies and the occasional
attempt on the part of state actors or other entities to limit the number of organizations
involved with the UN, Willetts (1996, 43) explains that the consultative status program
and the number of organizations involved in it has expanded rapidly in recent years for a
combination of reasons:
First, international NGOs that already existed when the UN was formed,
or that were established in the early years, often only had branches in
Western countries and have subsequently expanded to become truly global,
gained more resources and increased legitimacy. Second, groups that
previously saw no reason to work with the UN, or were suspicious that their
independence might be compromised, have seen how the system works and
decided that they could benefit from consultative status. Third, many new NGOs
are being formed, as new areas of economic activity develop or new issues move
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into the global agenda. Fourth, as existing groups gain greater resources,
experiences and skills, they may expand their scope of activities.

ECOSOC’s Formal Relations with CSOs/NGOs
ECOSOC formally accredits NGOs according to three gradations of influence
which determine degree of access and input: general consultative status, special
consultative status, and roster consultative status. The type of accreditation determines
the right and ability to circulate documents, access to informal preparatory meetings,
observation of various proceedings, and the opportunity to speak at certain functions (UN
1999). General status is afforded to the relatively small number of organizations that are
global in scope, directly involved with most areas of ECOSOC activities and are
perceived to be capable of making “substantive and sustained” contributions. As of
August 10, 2016, of 4,707 CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status only 147 or 3.1% held
this level of accreditation. General status allows organizations to submit written
statements of up to 2,000 words to ECOSOC bodies on subjects in which the
organization has specialized knowledge. Many of the organizations which hold General
status are among the world’s best known and most respected CSOs/NGOs including
Greenpeace, Oxfam International, Rotary International, Save the Children, and World
Vision International for example.
Organizations with special status are those with operations in multiple countries,
expertise in a less diverse range of issues with which ECOSOC is concerned, but are
potentially capable of making contributions in several such areas. Special status
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classification affords less influence than general status and CSOs/NGOs holding this
accreditation level may not propose items for the provisional agenda of ECOSOC or one
of its bodies but these NGOs are allowed to submit written statements of up to 500 words
(Cassese 1979). As noted in Table 3.1, Special status is by far the most common
accreditation level among organizations in consultation with ECOSOC, with 3,574
organizations or 75.9% holding the latter designation. Organizations holding General or
Special status are required by ECOSOC to submit a brief report every four years in which
organizations succinctly (maximum total of 700 words for all responses combined)
address each of eight items: (1) an introduction to the organization; (2) the CSO’s/NGO’s
aims and purposes; (3) any changes occurring during the period that significantly
impacted the CSO’s/NGO’s mission; (4) an overview of the organization’s contributions
to the work of the UN; (5) an overview of the CSO’s/NGO’s participation in UN
meetings; (6) examples of the CSO’s/NGO’s cooperation with UN bodies; (7) initiatives
taken by the CSO/NGO in support of Sustainable (formerly ‘Millennium’) Development
Goals; (8) any additional relevant information the organization wishes to share with the
United Nations Committee on NGOs which reviews the quadrennial reports. Failure to
submit the quadrennial report may result in loss of ECOSOC consultative status and
failure to remain active or provide adequate information in the report may result in the
downgrade of an organization’s status, information which at least as yet is not publicly
disclosed by the UN.
Roster status is for those organizations that are often less transnational in scope,
usually focused on a more narrow issue area and can make an occasional useful
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contribution in their area(s) of expertise. Organizations with Roster status may only
submit written statements if specifically invited to do so by the UN and the
CSO’s/NGO’s representatives may only attend public meetings directly relevant to their
field of specialization. Roster status is the second most common type of ECOSOC
consultative status with some 986 (20.9%) organizations holding this level of affiliation.
Just as CSOs/NGOs can be downgraded from inactivity or lose consultative status
entirely, they may also petition to upgrade their status to gain greater access within
ECOSOC and each year numerous organizations apply to transition from Roster to
Special (most commonly) or Special to General status.
An assumption underlying this study is that the degree of participation of
CSOs/NGOs will to at least some degree be impacted by the level of consultative status
they hold, i.e. presumably a higher percentage of those holding General status will be
active participants as opposed to those with Special status due to both the breadth of
operational scope and the increased opportunity to participate. Likewise, it may be that
the smallest participation rates will be among CSOs/NGOs holding Roster Status as theirs
is the narrowest scope of operations and the most restrictive type of ECOSOC status
wherein for example submission of written statements is not a right or a matter of routine.
However, such assumptions cannot be taken for granted. Also, the potential influence of
organizations holding Special or Roster status should not be entirely discounted, certainly
when weight of their numbers and proportional representation is taken into consideration.
While organizations with General status presumably have a greater degree of opportunity
to participate within the ECOSOC system, they constitute scarcely more than 3% of
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organizations holding consultative status at present (see Table 3.1). In contrast, those
organizations with Special status comprise nearly 76% and those with Roster status 21%,
meaning even with lower proportional rates of participation, CSOs/NGOs holding a
lower tier accreditation status within ECOSOC could nonetheless be better represented in
conferences than those with General status and could potentially be making meaningful
contributions.
While ECOSOC remains the primary venue for UN-civil society interaction, other
outlets also exist for formal interaction with other UN bodies. CSOs/NGOs may be
granted formal association with the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) which
facilitates access, but not participation in UN meetings. The number of organizations
with a DPI affiliation has increased markedly over time, from 200 in 1968 to over 1,300
in 2016 (Global Policy Forum 1999; DPI 2016). Informal dialog also occasionally exists
between the NGO Working Group of the UN Security Council with accredited NGOs
(UN 1999). Limited formalized NGO participation arrangements also exist with certain
other UN bodies and affiliated organizations including the International Labor
Organization; UN Conference on Trade and Development; UN Development Program;
UN International Children’s Fund; World Health Organization; UNAIDS; UN High
Commission for Refugees; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Food
and Agricultural Organization of the UN; and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (UN-CONGO 2006). With regard to such bodies, the UN may provide onetime, temporary accreditation for a specific meeting or other function which does not
equate to a permanent affiliation or consultative status.
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The United Nations is not the only prominent IGO to establish formal
relationships with civil society organizations. For example, the World Bank has for
many years prioritized associations with CSOs/NGOs, facilitated partnership
opportunities, disseminated CSO/NGO-related information, and hosted seminars and
discussion groups on the roles of CSOs/NGOs in international governance (Ottaway
2001). CSOs/NGOs played important roles in the establishment of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) as well as in many of its functions including providing information
for investigations and trials (Hill 2008). Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Trade Organization (WTO) have long maintained association with CSOs/NGOs
having expertise in economic/trade-related matters and both have held public
consultations and policy forums with CSOs/NGOs, and have often solicited their
feedback concerning IMF and WTO policies (IMF 2016; Vifell 2010; WTO 2016).
Some 1,300 international CSOs/NGOs were present for the WTOs infamous Seattle
conference in 1999 (Seters 2008). Most major regional IGOs such as the African Union,
Arab League, Commonwealth of Nations, European Union, and Organization of
American States have established formal programs that facilitate varied degrees of
cooperation and communication with CSOs/NGOs and most provide at least some form
of funding for such organizations in order to assist in performing certain functions such
as education or emergency relief. Some significant IGOs also have established an official
associative status for cultivating more formal standing relationships with CSOs/NGOs.
Prominent examples include the Council of Europe which implemented such a program
in 1993 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which via
its “researcher in residence” program grants archival access to representatives of
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approved organizations. Institutional culture in general, guidelines for CSO/NGO
participation, and opportunities for meaningful input can pose intervening obstacles for
those organizations which seek to cultivate relationships with the UN or other IGOs, and
one potential catalyst for overcoming such barriers and furthering policy agendas can be
constructive interaction (e.g. information sharing) and coalition-building among
CSOs/NGOs.

CSO/NGO Collaborations and Coalition-Building
Often civil society organizations are most effective when they engage in
collaborate efforts via formal coalitions with each other and with other entities such as
business, labor or governmental actors (Paul 2000). Collaborative efforts between
multiple CSOs/NGOs working in conjunction, particularly when there is also support
from state actors, have been cited in various studies as facilitating change with regard to
numerous international policy initiatives. Examples include the international movement
which led to the 2008 global treaty banning cluster munitions (Bolton and Nash 2010),
advocacy coalitions which have helped bring about action and accountability in health
initiatives for women and children in many world regions (WHO 2012), and the
successful efforts of CSOs/NGOs working with labor unions to ban sandblasting
processes in jeans manufacturing in Europe that were potentially harmful to workers’
health (Kryst 2012). CSOs/NGO coalitions working in collaborative effort behind a
common goal increasingly rival or even exceed the influence of state actors as evidenced
in relief efforts for Typhoon Haiyan wherein civil society fundraising coalitions outpaced
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the contributions of national governments in many wealthy industrialized countries (GHA
2014).
The phenomenon of INGO coalition-building has emerged over time. Coalition
building and collaborative efforts among civil society organizations is certainly not a new
phenomenon as evidenced by the founding of such organizations as the World Alliance
of Young Men’s Christian Associations in 1855, the International Veterinary Congress in
1863, the International Federation of Metal Workers Organizations in 1893 or perhaps
more famously the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in
1919 (Ritchie 1995). However, the scope and frequency of international cooperation
among CSOs/NGOs and between the latter and other elements of civil society, business
and government has expanded in recent decades.
Organizations with common interests and policy goals may find their level of
influence and the likelihood of success in influencing policy is greater if they undertake a
combined effort or at least present the public image of a united front. For example, in the
area of development CSO/NGO coalitions have been formulated behind the idea that
policy reforms are critical for increasing visibility and public access to the decisionmaking process and for promoting alternative strategies (Udall 1998). Variations exist
concerning the exact organization and structure of CSO/NGO coalitions, and they make
take the form of---ranging from most-to-least formally organized: umbrella organizations,
networks, or caucuses (Willetts 1996). Entities such as the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature, which counts over 1,000 individual CSOs/NGOs as members,
are referred to as umbrella organizations in order to denote the presence within one broad
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framework of a variety of different organizations in formal, long-term association that
nonetheless maintain distinct identities and governance. Issue-based CSO/NGO
networks such as the prototype International Baby Foods Action Network, made up of
nearly 300 autonomous groups in 168 countries, are less formal in their organizational
structure than umbrella organizations and may be organized behind the goal of
exchanging information, mobilizing supporters, or coordinating combined efforts (Ibid).
The least formally integrated variant among transnational CSO/NGO partnerships is a
caucus, wherein a group of organizations unite on a more short-term basis essentially as
lobbyists at a particular international event such as a UN conference in an effort to
achieve specific objectives at the event, after which the association will customarily
dissolve (Ibid). An example of the latter is the Youth Caucus at the 2016 UN DPI/NGO
Conference in Korea.
Balanced, egalitarian and harmonious partnerships within coalitions can be
difficult to establish and maintain given sometimes significant differences in agendas,
culture, influence, political and ideological background, and power that can exist and
serve as centrifugal forces between different organizations (Brown and Fox 1998). The
latter problems become compounded as the size, diversity and range of issues with which
an CSO/NGO coalition may be dealing expand. As the result of such complexities, such
coalitions can be fluid in terms of their dynamic and composition and they commonly
dissolve, with many never intended to be more than a temporary alliance for a common
cause.
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Concepts of Pluralism and Democratization
Within the context of analyzing democracy, the concept of pluralism is associated
with a school of thought in liberal political science that focused upon multiple sources of
political power/input and that regarded democracy as the internal regulation of society via
competition among various groups over power and social privileges (Dahl 1956).
Attempts to characterize pluralism usually share the core view that what is desirable and
egalitarian about democratic systems is that their functioning cannot be reduced to any
single hierarchy or idea (Karppinen 2013). The epistemological foundation of pluralism
within democratic institutions is the concept that diversity in all its forms is a social and
political good that safeguards against the dominance of one particular agenda (Smith
2006, 21–22). Karppinen (2013, 30) states that “premised on the impossibility of
unambiguously establishing truth, right or good, especially in social and political affairs,
pluralism has been widely celebrated as the cornerstone of the liberal conception of
democracy.” Pluralism within transnational civil society is also often regarded as a
potentially important vehicle for the transmission of global norms, including those related
to democracy and human rights (Edwards 2009).
Within pluralist concepts, a distinction exists between liberal pluralists who tend
to stress rights-oriented issues such as protection and inclusion of minorities and
participatory or deliberative democracy pluralists who emphasize public empowerment
through voting and other participative processes (Cohen and Arato 1997). Pluralism’s
importance to democracy may be viewed in slightly different terms by the two camps.
For liberal pluralists the “marketplace of ideas and individual choice” is sacrosanct,
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whereas for deliberative democrats pluralism is a catalyst for improving the “epistemic
quality of public deliberation and discursive reconciliation of disagreement” (Karppinen
2013, 29). Galston (2002, 3) notes that liberal pluralists support the minimum conditions
for maintenance of public order such as rule of law and authorities that can enforce it. As
he elaborates on some of the core tenants of liberal pluralism, it’s relevance to the UN
dynamic is clear…
Liberal pluralists…also endorse “minimal universalism”, the moral and
practical necessity of organizing public life so as to ward off, to the greatest
extent possible, the great evils of the human condition such as tyranny, genocide,
cruelty and humiliation, mass starvation and deadly epidemics. This overlaps
with contemporary movements for universal human rights and provision of basic
needs.
Political pluralism can be interpreted to mean different things in different
contexts. Some conceptions of pluralism on a global scale regard it essentially as an
egalitarian collaboration for mutual interest, such as---for the purposes of this research--diversifying voices which can be heard at the UN in pursuit of increased opportunity for
input and oversight within international governance. Exploring the latter perspective,
Verweij (2011, 201) states that “pluralism postulates that the world system is not made
up of dependencies between unequal parties, but rather of voluntarily created
interdependencies that are to the benefit of most actors involved.” As he further
elaborates, his vision of global pluralism as a cooperative framework evokes parallels to
the fundamental principles of neorealism:
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The enormous growth of transnational trade, services, investment, travel,
and education increasingly ties together the fortunes and interests of non-state, but
also of governmental actors. In the forever changing and partially interwoven
‘cobwebs’ of economic, financial, and social relations that are thus created,
political power is increasingly diffused among a multitude of state and non-state
actors (Verweij 2011, 201-202).

One of the core concepts important to pluralism and its relationship to democratic
institutions is the issue of power, specifically how power is distributed and shared. The
objective of egalitarian balance within democratic institutions is achieved via power and
influence being distributed among widely diverse and often competing interest groups
(Held 2006). Such a balance will not necessarily reflect perfect equilibrium or pluralism
in its ideal form, as certain elements within a polyarchical dynamic may often wield more
power and influence than others. In fact, it may be naïve to dismiss the existence of elites
within a political dynamic in favor of a purist vision of pluralism in that within even the
most democratic societies or institutions some elements (e.g. people, interest groups) will
always exert more influence and control than others (Lindblom 2002; Schattschneider
1975). The latter reality does not necessarily preclude the existence of pluralism as a
phenomenon, but instead potentially reframes the nature of pluralism (“elite pluralism”)
within democratic systems as a process wherein diverse elements are given voice and
opportunity to pursue equilibrium---even if perfect equilibrium within a power dynamic
is not achieved (Blokland 2016).
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Considerable differences of opinion exist as to the nature of power and how it is
distributed. While a constructivist perspective may regard power and its distribution
among various elements competing for it as being a more fluid process, the structuralist
perspective may contend that power distributions are resilient and long-term or
permanent in nature, possessing a tendency to remain at least largely with traditionally
dominant elements (e.g. states). Within pluralist traditions, no single source is regarded
as having a complete monopoly and concomitantly, some degree of distribution of power
must exist. Such a distribution could exist also in terms of the dichotomy of potential
power as opposed to actual power, as many pluralists contend that potential power
commonly transcends actual power wielded and that merely having the realistic potential
to exert power and influence reflects pluralistic, egalitarian distribution at least to some
degree. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 95) argue that CSOs within a transnational arena can
exhibit any of four distinct types of political power: information politics---the
supply/movement of information, symbolic politics---i.e. claim-making using symbols or
actions, leverage politics---ability to call upon influential political actors, and
accountability politics---i.e. ability to hold IOs accountable (Thiel 2017).
With regard to this research, the degree to which CSOs/NGOs in formal
association with the UN have actually contributed to pluralism and transnational
democracy is called into question. Within the UN-civil society dynamic, specifically the
ECOSOC consultative status program with CSOs/NGOs, there does not appear to be a
distribution of power (actual or potential) inclusive of CSOs as UN-member states retain
largely monopolistic control---agenda setting, policy formulation, oversight, etc. As
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noted in the study’s first research questions, uneven patterns of participation may exist in
terms of regional representation and also with regard to policy issues focus areas,
meaning not all regions or issue areas may be proportionally represented via civil society
presence within the UN framework. Specifically, the formal pathway between
CSOs/NGOs and UN-ECOSOC, the most meaningful manifestation of UN interaction
with transnational civil society thus far cultivated, may exist more in name and idea
rather than practice, in which case the program’s contribution to democratic pluralism at
the UN has fallen short of initial expectations.

Concepts of Transnational Democracy
Democracy has become a key concept among those who advocate increased
legitimacy for international political institutions, but defining a vision of transnational
democracy is a subjective process (Nasstrom 2010). As a concept or system, democracy
is not constrained to any one level of government, but is to be found in the juxtaposition
of a multiplicity of self-governing and self-organizing entities constituted on diverse
spatial scales from the local to the global (Agne 2010; McGrew 2002). Perhaps the
central idea underlying democracy is that it is rule by the people, or more narrowly---rule
by a polity, which poses difficulties in democratizing international governance
institutions such as the UN as there is no single polity or body of people from which to
establish a democracy (Nasstrom 2010). Echoing the latter sentiment, Bartelson (2010,
218) states that “global political authority is relatively weak and decentralized, and the
pluralistic makeup of global society has conspired against the formation of a global
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demos that could provide global institutions with the kind of legitimacy that derives from
popular consent.” Legitimacy within the context of political institutions, transnational or
otherwise, reflects the popular recognition as rightful by those over whom the institution
claims to possess authority (Bartelsen 2010; Reus-Smit 2007). Describing the efforts of
CSOs/NGOs to influence transnational development organizations and other IGOs,
potentially including roles as legitimizing agents, Udall (1998, 391) describes the primary
goal as the promotion of “democracy and development alternatives that are socially just
and environmentally sound.”
Whether or not IGOs such as the UN can or should be models of democratic
norms in every respect is one of the key political controversies in the current age of
globalism (Agne 2010). Some scholars have argued that expectations for democratic
traditions at the transnational level are a given and that they are intrinsically useful and
necessary in global politics and can help frame and reinforce democratic societal norms
and expectations for state-level democratic traditions (Bohman 2007). Archibugi (2008)
contends that while most benefits of democracy can perhaps be more readily experienced
at the national or local level, the principles of democracy should not stop at the level of
international governance, particularly in the loosely governed, yet increasingly
interconnected global society of today which impacts people’s lives to such a degree. He
argues that even if a perfectly democratic transnational system cannot be achieved, it is
possible to grant global public opinion a greater role---certainly extending beyond just
that of western nations---in order to increase the legitimacy of world political arenas, and
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potentially address many problems facing the world while still allowing for the selfdetermination and sovereignty of nations (Ibid).
While at face value the prospect of increased democracy within transnational
institutions sounds wholly positive, innocuous and free of controversy, the concept can be
problematic. Issues related to even the partial transfer of sovereignty from state to
transnational institutions remain highly controversial and politically charged, even
galvanizing public opinion as witnessed recently when a majority of British voters opted
out of the EU principally over the real or perceived process of national sovereignty
potentially being eroded via a transnational entity, with similar national-sovereignty
movements growing in other EU member states as well. Yet, eroding or replacing state
sovereignty in favor of some variation of a global liberal democratic body is not the only
pathway of furthering increased democratic pluralism within the international community
(Agne 2010). Addressing this, Agne (2010, 178) explains:
From a different perspective, democratization of global politics is neither
driven nor constituted by governments but by voluntary associations of
individuals who act within and beyond their national boundaries and with a
significant degree of independence from governments…Exactly what actors
should be regarded as fulfilling the criteria of voluntary association is a matter of
debate. All observers include NGOs and social movements. Some also include
private companies, labor unions, and philanthropic foundations.
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Shortcomings of CSOs/NGOs in Maintaining Productive Relationships with the
UN/IGOs
Sandel (2000) notes that if the increasingly globalized character of contemporary
world economics and politics needs more transnational forms of governance, it remains
unclear whether international forums, civil society or otherwise, can inspire the shared
identity, allegiance or commonality of perspectives upon which democratic transnational
governance would depend. The concept of a truly global civil society as opposed to a
patchwork of disparate, competing groups reflective of contrasting national and regional
agendas may in fact not be realizable in the short-term via the UN or other IGOs as
catalysts. Sandel (2000, 289) discusses the difficulty inherent in forging such a global
integration within the context of what is arguably the most successful supranationalistic
body to date, stating that “even the European Union, one of the most successful
experiments in supranational governance, has so far failed to cultivate a (true) common
European identity sufficient to fully support its mechanisms of economic and political
integration.” Similarly, Thiel (2011) concludes that the transnational political
space/culture of the EU is to a great degree limited, often containing significant
constraints such as nationalistic agendas that impede the emergence of a truly
consolidated and transnational European identity.
The roles to potentially be played by CSOs/NGOs within international institutions
and the justifications for such organizations to be given access remain subject to debate.
While a common perception exists within the arena of international governance that
states and IGOs can benefit from utilizing civil society in roles such as policy experts,
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providers of services, and compliance monitors, knowledge of the effectiveness of
CSOs/NGOs related to each of the latter and the complex variables related to such roles
remains tenuous at best (Tallberg 2010). Considerable question exists concerning the
legitimate, effective impact of CSOs/NGOs within the UN and other transnational bodies.
For example, in assessing the impact of civil society advocacy campaigns, including
some high profile initiatives, upon projects related to development within the World
Bank, Fox and Brown (1998, 534-535) concluded their collective impact was negligible
and amounted to little more than “window dressing.”
Rational-choice institutionalism and the proposition that institutions are created or
integrated to address shortcomings or improve functional efficiency within a system may
offer potential insight as to the possible motives of governments and IGOs in
collaborating with civil society institutions (Tallberg 2010). In offering a wellformulated rational functionalist account seeking to justify CSO/NGO involvement in
international or state governance, Raustiala (1997, 719) argues that “rather than
undermining state sovereignty, active NGO participation enhances the abilities of states
to regulate globally…(and) the empirical pattern of NGO participation has been
structured across time and policy areas to reap those gains.” Governments and IGOs that
potentially see benefit to be derived (whether real or perceived) from direct, formal
associations with CSOs/NGOs may pursue such arrangements out of self-interest rather
than altruism or ideological commitment. Accordingly, many government and IGOs may
not be engaging global civil society behind the goals of furthering pluralism or
democracy-building but because they regard such organizations as having something they
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need (O’Brien et al 2000). International institutions may be to a great degree the
outcomes of strategic choices made by state actors in response to needs/problems related
to issues such as transaction costs and problems of monitoring and enforcement
(Deitelhoff 2009; Kalm 2010).
Other theoretical perspectives regard emerging transnational norm conformity
rather than intrinsic self-interest as primary motivating factors for increased NGO and
civil society access to international governance. In short, more IGOs are in general
granting CSOs/NGOs access to their institutional processes out of the perception that this
is a newly standardized norm and expectation within the framework of transnational
politics that such actions bolster democratic legitimacy. Within the field of international
relations, such an approach is supported by sociological institutionalism and
constructivism which focus upon processes of norm diffusion and institutional replication
as catalysts for construction and spread of international norms. Addressing such
processes, Tallberg (2010, 50-51) explains:
This norm conceives of NGOs as representatives of an emerging global
civil society, whose organized participation can address the democratic deficits of
traditional international institutions. States and institutions have either come to
adopt this through socialization, or adapted strategically to it for purposes of
legitimizing existing governance structures. The norm originates from various
sources: international law, development ideology, normative democratic theory,
and domestic political structures. This approach predicts that practices of
transnational access will become increasingly homogeneous, with extant
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differences explained by variation in the spread and consolidation of the norm of
global participatory democracy.
It is likely that many different theoretical perspectives are at least partly
applicable in attempting to explain growing civil society influence within transnational
governance. As intergovernmental organizations have become more prevalent and have
grown in power and influence, many including the UN have arguably become
increasingly sensitive to perception and criticism related to the need for democratic
norms to be institutionalized and accordingly, the theories espoused by sociological
institutionalism and constructivism in terms of CSOs/NGOs at least partly addressing a
democratic deficit are not without merit. However, participation of civil society or other
non-state actors within IGOs is significantly older than relatively recent concerns
regarding the democratic traditions of global or regional governance (Charnovitz 1997;
White 1968). If the UN or other IGOs can more efficiently distribute aid or provide other
services, or receive worthwhile expertise or something else of potential benefit through
associations with CSOs/NGOS---which is almost certainly the case in at least many
instances---then rational-choice institutionalism is also at least partly applicable in
explaining the phenomenon.
A range of other considerations may also have played at least some role in the
trending associations between IGOs and civil society, some of which examine the
motivations of civil society rather than governments or IGOs. For example, if certain
political decisions are increasingly made and policy increasingly formulated in
transnational settings superseding the state, it is reasonable to expect CSOs/NGOs with
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vested interests to pursue status as transnational actors as well in order to have a voice at
that level of decision-making (Steffek 2010). Also, it has been theorized that under
certain circumstances CSOs/NGOs might seek to directly engage with IGOs to sidestep a
national government that is either repressive toward them or otherwise not responsive to
the needs or interests of the organization (Steffek 2010; Keck and Sikkink 1998). As an
additional example of processes driving CSOs/NGOs to seek standing in the transnational
arena, it has been suggested that many civil society actors are not necessarily autonomous
actors and are dependent upon their environments and actors within their orbits for
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Resource-dependency theory contends that NGOs
or other organizations depend upon economic, material or political resources which they
obtain from actors within their environment and thus interaction with actors is necessary,
as is the expansion of the parameters of the environment to the international arena in
order to pursue additional resources (Liese 2010).
Many observers believe that at present CSOs/NGOs may have grown their scope,
status and responsibilities beyond the realistic limits of their operational capabilities
(DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; Thompson 2008). Increasingly, questions have been raised
concerning the roles for which CSOs/NGOs are suited to play, to whom they should be
accountable and where they fit within the structures of governance locally, nationally and
internationally (Jordan and Tuijl 2006). One of the highest profile and harshest public
critics of the expanded role of CSOs/NGOs within the international arena is John Bolton,
former US Ambassador to the United Nations, who has expressed misgivings concerning
the “extra-national clout of NGOs” within global governance and concern that “civil
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society sees itself as beyond national politics”, which is one of the reasons its recent
successes have such profoundly anti-democratic implications (Bolton 2000; Charnovitz
2006). In analyzing Bolton’s staunch opposition to the integration of NGOs within
international governance, Charnovitz (2006, 24-25) notes that…
The problem as analyzed by Bolton is that NGO participation ‘provides a
second opportunity for intrastate advocates to reargue their positions, thus
advantaging them over their opponents who may be either unwilling or unable to
reargue their cases in international fora’. Moreover, he contended that ‘the civil
society idea actually suggests a “corporative” (authoritarian corporatism)
approach to international decision-making that is dramatically troubling for
democratic philosophy because it posits “interests” (whether NGOs or businesses)
as legitimate actors along with the popularly elected governments’…Bolton does
not advocate suppressing NGOs, but he seems to want government (and the UN)
to shut its eyes to them.

While few criticisms of the expanded role of CSOs/NGOs go as far as the latter
analogy to corporatist agendas, other critical appraisals have been offered. McKeon
(2009, 2) argues that the problem does not lie with the trend of growing influence of such
organizations within international governance---regarding the latter trend as a potentially
positive development for democratic traditions---but rather that such integration has
fallen short of expectations. She states that civil society’s influence within the UN and
other IGOs has “failed thus far to move from generic and often episodic participation to
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meaningful incorporation of these actors into global political process.” Thompson (2008)
notes that although the number of CSOs/NGOs active within the global arena including
the UN has expanded greatly in recent decades, it remains unclear that their ability to
actually influence agendas and outcomes is significant or has kept pace with their
expanding numbers.
The very success of the expanding numbers and diversity of NGOs and
international civil society is potentially creating a logistical dilemma. Just within the
framework of the United Nations, the presence of literally thousands of CSOs/NGOs with
consultative status and thousands more with less formal affiliations, each potentially
vying for influence and promoting its agendas, has brought diversity to the international
arena but simultaneously made many logistical considerations more cumbersome and
problematic including making it increasingly difficult for states, IGOs and other actors to
decide which voices they will listen to and making it more difficult for each CSO/NGO
to provide input (Thompson 2008).
Another issue receiving critical scrutiny from some observers is the inconsistent
and often contradictory manner in which different types of actors are treated within the
organizational dynamic. Exploring the harsher scrutiny faced by civil society in vetting
and regulatory processes as opposed to treatment afforded to commercial interests
McKeon (2009, 171) cites the following contrasting circumstances occurring during a
recent conference of the Rome-based UN Food and Agriculture Organization:
…Few absurdities in the way the UN works are more flagrant than the
zeal that is invested in vetting and policing CSOs as compared with the relative
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indifference to the antics of representatives of transnational corporations…A
delegation member of a highly respected NGO was carried off to be interrogated
by the Italian police for passing notes around inviting delegations to refrain from
electing the US to the FAO Council following the invasion of Iraq. At the same
time, the transnational sugar lobby conducted itself outrageously in a FAO
technical committee, attempting to purchase developing country votes and
intervening in a heavy-handed way in the discussions. Yet no disciplinary action
was taken.
The NGO consultative status program with ECOSOC has long been a politicized
process and many examples exist of political machinations and controversy within the
system. During the Cold War a number of international CSOs/NGOs including several
labor organizations became sympathetic to the Soviet Union leading to internal dissent
and to many pro-western elements within the groups to calve off and form their own rival
organizations with the backing of western governments (Willetts 1999). From the
inception, political problems have arisen with CSOs/NGOs that offer criticisms of the
governments of specific (often authoritarian) states, usually related to human rights
issues. Traditionally, the ensuing response of states to the latter has been to deny the
right of IOs or other external actors to interfere in their sovereign affairs and also to
denounce CSOs/NGOs and the UN’s NGO system in general (Willetts 1999). Currently,
the UN is caught between a past tradition of international governance by sovereign state
actors and the emerging need for transnational governance incorporating CSOs/NGOs
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and other non-state actors on an equitable basis and thus far it has been unable to
integrate the two competing paradigms cohesively (McKeon 2009).
The second and third research questions inquire as to why some organizations
with UN consultative status participate in the program and others do not, and what factors
account for participation or the lack thereof. The answers to the latter questions may
shed light on the processes regulating the association between CSOs/NGOs and the UN
and also the degree to which it is equitable, egalitarian and as such a catalyst for
democratic pluralism within international governance or conversely if obstacles to
meaningful participation are unevenly distributed among types of NGOs, policy areas, or
world regions. The survey component of the research in particular may shed light on
how and why many CSOs/NGOs fall short of making meaningful contributions through
their association with the UN.

Credibility Issues
An interesting dichotomy also exists concerning CSOs/NGOs and issues related
to legitimacy or trust. In one sense, CSOs/NGOs are held in high regard. For example,
the 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer found that such organizations were the most trusted
institutions globally, while confidence in elected officials, government institutions and
business was significantly lower and continuing to decline (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015;
ETB 2014). However, many scholars are calling for reappraisals and increasingly
challenging the status and legitimacy afforded to CSOs/NGOs which ostensibly hold
governments and other entities accountable within transnational regimes but often fall
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short of substantive accountability themselves (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; Peruzzotti
2006; Jordan and Tuijl 2006).
A curious dichotomy is also visible with the concept of CSOs/NGOs helping to
facilitate democratic norms within international organizations such as the UN. An
expanded and formalized presence of civil society allows a larger number and more
diverse array of voices to potentially be heard and hopefully adds to the perspectives
contributed by state actors and the commercial sector. This role of civil society as a
catalyst for democracy within international institutions is arguably its most important role
in that it at least potentially affords a voice to the grassroots and concomitantly
strengthens democracy and international policy formulation through advocacy (Clark
2008). However, NGOs and other manifestations of civil society pose governance
concerns in that many, possibly most, are not strictly democratic, have oligarchical,
charismatic, unelected (by popular vote) or largely unaccountable leadership with limited
membership and participatory rights---many of the same undemocratic characteristics
that civil society criticizes and seeks to reform if found within government (Albrow and
Holland 2008).
In the 1980s continuing into much of the 1990s, the burgeoning number and
strength of NGOs and civil society in general was lauded as symptomatic of the
advancement of democracy and strengthening of pluralism via the perception that voices
were being given to larger numbers and more diverse segments of populations and such a
view was especially true of regions such as Eastern Europe that had historically been
characterized by authoritarian rule. Many aid donors also started to view CSOs/NGOs as
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more reliable, capable and honest aid recipients than governmental entities, particularly
in regions associated with autocratic, unstable, or corrupt histories (Armstrong 2006).
Even if NGOs/CSOs did not have popularly elected leadership or otherwise had much if
any accountability their growth was initially equated with the advancement of pluralistic
democracy. Addressing this evolving perceptual trend and its eventual revision,
Peruzzotti (2006, 43) explains:
For many years, particularly when those organizations largely operated in
authoritarian environments, the issue of the representativeness and accountability
of civic actors could easily be brushed aside given the illegitimate nature of many
domestic governments and the continuous threat they presented to any form of
social activity that dared to challenge and expose their abuses of power and
human rights. However, the increased presence of democratically-elected
governments in developing countries makes it difficult to keep avoiding an
analysis of the relationship between civil society actors and representative
institutions.
By the late-1990s, among many nations that had long-established democratic
traditions and increasingly among emerging democracies constructing the institutional
frameworks of freedom, the perception that NGOs were hallmarks of democracy or that
they were the voices of the people was being increasingly challenged. Elected officials in
particular began to increasingly question the popular perception of CSOs/NGOs as
democratic institutions, as representatives of populations or even appreciable segments
thereof, and in the case being made by many NGOs and other civil society elements that
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their organizations should have voices comparable if not equal to that of elected national
governments within transnational institutions including the United Nations. Criticisms
centered upon the issues that the organizations are often led by groups of self-appointed
rather than popularly-elected leaders, many such organizations are not even membershipbased, and many are not often exposed to comparable levels of public scrutiny or
accountability as governmental bodies---i.e. the claims of NGOs and civil society to
reflect democratic trends fell short with regard to representation and accountability
(Peruzzotti 2006). Whereas within representative democracy elected officials are the
primary architects of policy formulation and decision-making, there is no real means of
ensuring that CSOs/NGOs represent their constituencies and as the result legitimacy
issues can be raised (Kroger 2013).

Democratic Representation
The study of representation within democratic institutions has primarily focused
upon the political input of individual citizen voters (e.g. Przeworski et al 1999).
However, the importance of civil society should not be discounted, as a representative
government presumes a meaningful interaction between the system of governance and
various manifestations of those represented (Peruzzotti 2006, 44-45). Peruzzotti (2006,
47) argues that both representation and accountability can be enhanced by civil society in
two respects:
First, civil society enhances representative government by adding new
voices and concerns to the political agenda, thematizing novel issues, and
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criticizing existing public policies and legislation. Second, civil society can also
contribute to improve the quality of representative arrangements by demanding
effective legal accountability.
Accountability can be thought of as the “ability to ensure that officials are
answerable for their behavior in the sense of being forced to inform and justify their
decisions and of being eventually sanctioned for those decisions (Peruzzotti 2006, 45).”
Similarly, Paul (1992, 1047) defines accountability as “holding individuals and
organizations responsible for performance.” Both definitions were framed principally
with public officials in mind, which begs the question as to how or if a private,
autonomous CSO/NGO can be subject to accountability standards deemed suitable for
public agencies.
If accountability is by its very nature an externality in that it requires a capacity
for control by elements not part of the body being held accountable, then improved
accountability and transparency on the part of CSOs/NGOs could perhaps best be
achieved via the vehicle of internal and external reporting requirements (Armstrong
2006; Mulgan 2000). In addition to heightened expectations for self-regulation, the
World Bank and other IGOs have supported the practice of CSOs/NGOs reporting to
government agencies and donors concerning their finances and activities, and also
extending the right for legitimate government inspectors to enter the premises of such an
organization or site(s) under its control to check conditions and inspect records, even at
random (Ibid). In many countries such as Uganda or the Philippines, both CSOs/NGOs
and governments are perceived to have roles in ensuring accountability via formal
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oversight (Okwaare and Chapman 2006). For example, an outcome of the inspection and
oversight process is that some form of official designation such as the certification of an
organization being in “good standing” may be conveyed, indicating the legitimate status
of the group and its conformity with accountability practices to donors and others (Golub
2006).
In addition to their own accountability, NGOs and other civil society
organizations can potentially make substantive contributions as agents of accountability
and change within government, including transnational institutions. By monitoring and
denouncing rights violations or the subvention of the law or due process, and also via
facilitating efforts to improve the procedures and agencies that frame and regulate the
conduct of government or the commercial sector, organs of civil society can strengthen
and often activate vehicles of legal accountability. Historically IGOs have asserted that
they derive accountability from the governments of member states, which at least in the
case of democratic nations have citizens which elect governments to represent their
interests at all levels including international forums and thus citizens are represented
indirectly with their national governments retaining ultimate control of representation
(Kovach 2006).

Theory and Reality
Many of the goals of democratic pluralism within the context of transnational
governance are potentially admirable. Such objectives include giving voices to
marginalized peoples, issues and regions that may not otherwise receive attention

75

internationally, the diversification of international agenda setting and discourse beyond
the traditionally state-centric approach, and the facilitation of communication and
collaborative effort within global civil society. The practical realization of such
objectives as theorized in the literature would indeed serve to democratize, diversify and
concomitantly lend additional legitimacy to transnational governance in general and the
operations of IGOs such as the United Nations.
However, it is my contention that such goals have not been fully realized. Despite
the commonly-held perception of the UN’s interaction with NGOs and global civil
society as a successful manifestation of the principles of democratic pluralism within
transnational governance, the realities of the relationship may in many respects fall short.
The guiding hypotheses of this research contend that: (1) imbalances (gaps) exist
regarding CSO/NGO participation with the UN both in terms of regional involvement
and with regard to policy areas; (2) a combination of various factors facilitate varied
degrees of participation or the lack thereof among different CSOs/NGOs; and (3)
although a formal association may exist officially, most organizations in consultative
status with UN-ECOSOC make little-no contribution to the UN’s goal of substantive
engagement with pluralist international civil society.
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III. CHAPTER 3:
MACRO-SCALE PATTERNS OF CSO/NGO PARTICIPATION WITHIN UNECOSOC

Introduction
The first 2 research questions inquire as to (1) the patterns of participation of
NGOs/CSOs in the UN-ECOSOC consultative status (CS) program in terms of the
proportionality of country and regional representation, and (2) the patterns of
participation and proportional representation in terms of policy issue/focus areas such as
human rights, development, etc. These questions led to the formulation of the first
guiding hypothesis which contends that imbalances exist in patterns of participation of
organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC with regard to country/regional
involvement (e.g. CSOs of developed states are proportionally better represented than
those of developing states) and regarding the policy issue areas with which the
organizations are concerned. The UN’s publicly available iCSO database provides
detailed statistics concerning the names and types of organizations in the CS program,
their locations, policy/focus areas, and level of CS accreditation. The latter datasets were
used to operationalize the first guiding hypothesis.
Between June-September 2016, the United Nation’s iCSO database was analyzed
to identify macro-scale patterns of participation on the part of civil society organizations
at the UN, with a focus upon CS organizations within ECOSOC. The following four
broad data categorizations were analyzed: (1) organization type; (2) geographical
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scope/scale of organizations; (3) types of formal UN accreditations held; and (4)
policy/focus areas primarily as evidenced via database categorizations of fields of
expertise. To identify spatial patterns such as geographical plurality, each of the latter
four categories was cross-referenced with six world regions: Africa, Anglo-America (the
US and Canada), Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania
(essentially-Australia and New Zealand). The iCSO database also has a category
indicating “no region specified”, but as the numbers for the latter appeared to in most
cases be negligible and in any event would not contribute to understanding spatial
patterns, data in the latter category was not analyzed. Each of the four categories was
also cross-referenced with the accreditation levels (General, Special, Roster) of NGOs
holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC as the latter organizations are in theory the
most important vehicle for formal UN interaction with civil society and as such the most
important focus of the research.
It is worth noting that the data provided in the UN iCSO database is fluid in that it
appears to be updated on at least a monthly basis, if not even more frequently in some
instances. This of course means that the statistics obtained from the database may vary
somewhat from month to month as some organizations are removed for inactivity or
perhaps more commonly, newly affiliated organizations are added on an ongoing basis
throughout the year. An example of the fluid and ever-changing nature of the
information provided by the database can be seen in terms of the breakdown of NGOs in
consultative status with ECOSOC. As reflected in Table 3.1, the number of NGOs by
accreditation level and in total varied over the three separate occasions (July, October,
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and November) in 2016 when the database was consulted, though the variations were not
great. Given the volume of information and the time-consuming nature of obtaining
these data, it was not possible that all data for each category could be extracted at the
same moment, but rather data was obtained progressively over the course of several
weeks---principally between July and October 2016. Accordingly, slight numerical
incongruities may exist among data sets gathered across categories from one month to the
next.
Such variations are not thought to have had any significant impact upon this
research, merely anchoring the findings or research procedures to the iCSO data
reflecting a particular month or other point in time as would also be the case in most any
other research-related undertaking. For example---with regard to sample selection, as
noted in Chapter 1, of 4,601 CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status in August 2016,
4,383 (95.3%) were identified within the iCSO database as speaking English at least as
one of several languages. In alphabetical order, all 4,383 organizations were numbered
consecutively in the same order as they were listed within the database. The online
resource www.stattrek.com was utilized to generate 439 random, non-duplicated numbers
which served as the basis for the 10% sample selection in the research. Beginning with
analysis of types of organizations, subsequent sections provide overviews of findings
with regard to those randomly selected CSOs/NGOs which returned survey
questionnaires.
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Table 3.1: Organizations in Consultative Status with UN ECOSOC, 2016

Accreditation Level

July

October

November

General Status

144 (3.2%)

147 (3.1%)

151 (3.2%)

Special Status

3437 (75.4%)

3572 (76%)

3595 (75.9%)

Roster Status

979 (21.5%)

986 (21%)

993 (20.9%)

Total

4560

4705

4739

Types of Organizations
The UN’s iCSO database establishes 15 organizational categories according to
typology, as listed in Table 3.2. At the time these data were tabulated for the research
(August-September 2016), a total of 39,329 entries existed for Organization Type within
the iCSO database. Many organizations were subjectively classified and cross-listed
among multiple, partially-overlapping categories. For example an NGO providing
university scholarships or otherwise promoting academic advancement for indigenous
people could potentially be categorized under the organizational typologies Academics,
Indigenous, and (the oddly broad category of) NGOs among others.
Adding to the subjective nature of organizational classification within the
database is the delimitation of what is or is not an NGO. While just over 72% of entries
were officially classified as being NGOs, it appears that the vast majority (in excess of
90%) of organizations listed by organizational type meet most definitional criteria as nongovernmental organizations. Of the 15 categories utilized for organization type, perhaps
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the best examples of non-NGO typologies include IGOs (0.9%), Local Government
(0.6%), Media (0.4%), and Private Sector (1.8%), which collectively only comprise 3.7%
of total entries listed. Most of the latter organizational classifications would also strain to
meet even the broadest and most inclusive definitional criteria as to what constitutes civil
society institutions despite being listed in the UN database of international civil society
organizations.
Considerable range existed in terms of numbers of entries corresponding to each
of the 15 organizational typologies. As reflected in Tables 3.2-3.4, the organizational
types with the largest number of entries were NGOs (28,361 entries or 72.2% of all
entries), Indigenous (2,385 or 6.1%), Associations (2,287 or 5.8%), Academics (1,389 or
3.5%), and Foundations (1,126 or 2.9%). Of the latter, the categories of NGOs,
Associations, and Foundations collectively make up nearly 81% of all entries yet due to
the lack of any clear definitional criteria used by the UN to distinguish between them
(and other categories as well), substantial overlap and subjectivity exists among
organizational typologies. The latter reality, in effect limits the potential usefulness of
the data/findings in this category, blurring the distinctions among different types of
organizations, and making it difficult to assess variations and possible unevenness among
types of organizations---e.g. most/all organizations classified as Ageing, Foundations,
Indigenous, are likely NGOs in scope. Classifications with the fewest number of entries
were Local Governments (225 or 0.6%), Media (172 or 0.4%), Cooperatives (128 or
0.3%), Ageing (118 or 0.3%), with Trade Unions having the least number of entries (88
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or 0.2%). Collectively, entries for the latter 5 categories constituted only 1.8% of
organizations classified by typology.
One of the more interesting patterns revealed from analysis of the iCSO database
is the relatively modest representation of NGOs/CSOs actually holding consultative
status (CS) with UN-ECOSOC among the total number of organizational entries. The
latter affiliation program is regarded as the most substantive and formal vehicle for UN
interaction with international civil society. However among organizational typology
entries, organizations with consultative status are disproportionately under-represented
and comprise only small fractions of the entries. As of October 2016, of 39,329
institutional entries according to organization type, only 4,705, slightly less than 12% of
the total entries, corresponded to those holding consultative status. In only 2 categories--NGOs and Foundations---did entries related to consultative status organizations reach
even low double digits as a percentage of total organizations listed in the iCSO database.
As reflected in the data provided in Table 3.2, in many individual categories NGOs/CSOs
holding CS comprised a negligible fraction of the total institutional entries by
organizational type: Cooperatives 3.1%, Academics 2.3%, Indigenous 2.3%, Institutions
1.3%, Private Sector 1.3%, IGOs 1.1%, Media 0.6%, and Local Government 0.0%. If the
assumption can be made that those NGOs with CS are customarily among the civil
society institutions most actively engaged with the UN (a perception furthered by the UN
itself), a possible implication of this numerical underrepresentation within the iCSO
database is that many of the nearly 40 thousand entries are for organizations that in
reality may not be engaged with the UN to any substantive degree contrary to what an
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organization’s listing within the database may imply. The latter perception is bolstered
by the presence within the iCSO database of many organizations that have previously
been stripped of CS due to inactivity, including several NGOs with which I am
personally familiar and that to the best of my knowledge have never had any substantive
form of interaction with the UN before or after removal of consultative status.

Table 3.2: iCSO Database Entries - Organizational Type and UN Consultative Status

Org.
Type

Overall
Total (%)

General
Status

Status

Roster
Status (CS Total/%)

Academics

1389 (3.5%)

1

31

0

(32/2.3%)

Associations 2287 (5.8%)

1

171

5

(177/7.7%)

Disability

731 (1.9%)

0

49

0

(49/6.7%)

Foundation

1126 (2.9%)

3

113

1

(117/10.4%)

Indigenous

2385 (6.1%)

1

53

0

(54/2.3%)

Institution

395 (1.0%)

0

5

0

(5/1.3%)

I.G.O.

355 (0.9%)

0

3

1

(4/1.1%)

Local Govt.

255 (0.6%)

0

0

0

(0/0%)

Media

172 (0.4%)

0

1

0

(1/0.6%)

N.G.O.

28361(72.2%)

138

3108

978

(4224/14.9%)

Others

819 (2.1%)

0

13

0

(13/1.6%)

Private Sector 720 (1.8%)

0

9

0

(9/1.3%)

Trade Union 88 (0.2%)

0

5

1

(6/6.8%)

Ageing

118 (0.3%)

1

9

0

(10/8.5%)

Cooperative

128 (0.3%)

2

2

0

(4/3.1%)

147

3572

986

(4705/12.0%)

Totals: 39329
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Table 3.3: iCSO Entries - Organizational Type by MDC (More Developed Countries)
Region
Org.
Type

Overall
Total (%)*

Europe

AngloAmerica**

(MDC
Oceania*** Total/%*)

Academics

1389 (3.5%)

260

405

44

(709/51.0%)

Associations

2287 (5.8%)

652

162

45

(859/37.6%)

Disability

731 (1.9%)

95

103

24

(222/30.4%)

Foundation

1126 (2.9%)

231

183

23

(437/38.8%)

Indigenous

2385 (6.1%)

116

430

135

(681/28.6%)

Institution

395 (1.0%)

73

50

9

(132/33.4%)

I.G.O.

355 (0.9%)

116

35

10

(161/45.4%)

Local Govt.

255 (0.6%)

29

21

4

(54/21.2%)

Media

172 (0.4%)

28

27

5

(60/34.9%)

N.G.O.

28361(72.2%)

4126

3922

558

(8606/30.3%)

Others

819 (2.1%)

161

158

18

(337/41.1%)

Private Sector 720 (1.8%)

135

147

21

(303/42.1%)

Trade Union

88 (0.2%)

28

7

4

(39/44.3%)

Ageing

118 (0.3%)

23

24

10

(57/48.3%)

Cooperative

128 (0.3%)

23

24

7

(54/42.2%)

Totals: 39329

6096 (15.5%)

5698 (14.5%)

917(2.3%)

(12711/32.3%)

*Overall totals and percentages include entries for which no region was specified.
**The UN iCSO Database denotes “North America” as 1 of 6 regional categories, but only
provides data for the 2-country region of Canada and the United States. The geographically
correct term for the Canada/U.S. sub-region of North America is “Anglo America”. The database
provides statistics for Mexico and the countries of the Caribbean and Central America---all of
which are located on the North American continent---within the regional category “Latin America
and the Caribbean”.
***The region known as Oceania is customarily regarded as being comprised of Australia, New
Zealand, and numerous Pacific Island microstates and dependencies. Nearly all NGOs identified
within the Oceania category of the iCSO database were in either Australia or New Zealand and
accordingly data for this region was regarded as representative of MDCs rather than LDCs.
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Table 3.4: iCSO Entries: Organizational Type by LDC* Region
Org.
Type

Overall
Total**

Africa

Asia

Lat. Am.
& Carib.

(LDC
Total/%**)

Academics

1389

5

233

238

(476/34.3%)

Associations

2287

753

300

375

(1428/62.4%)

Disability

731

171

217

67

(455/62.2%)

Foundation

1126

192

275

221

(688/61.1%)

Indigenous

2385

333

340

472

(1145/48.0%)

Institution

395

62

110

91

(263/66.6%)

I.G.O.

355

85

76

32

(193/54.4%)

Local Govt.

255

44

40

87

(171/67.1%)

Media

172

40

46

25

(111/64.5%)

N.G.O.

28361

7610

6111

1888

(15609/55.0%)

Others

819

132

158

134

(424/51.8%)

Pvt. Sector

720

137

103

169

(409/56.8%)

Trade Union

88

17

17

16

(50/56.8%)

Ageing

118

19

29

13

(61/51.7%)

Cooperative

128

24

28

22

(74/57.8%)

9524 (24.2%)

8083 (20.6%)

3850 (9.8%)

(21557/54.8%)

Totals: 39329

*The terms LDC (Less/Least Developed Countries) and MDC (More Developed Countries) are
used in this study to draw a basic distinction between regions characterized predominantly by
more highly developed economies as opposed to those primarily characterized by emerging
economies. It should be stressed that such distinctions may be at least partly subjective in nature
and that homogeneity does not exist within each region concerning development levels. Less
developed nations exist within MDC regions (e.g., Moldova in Europe) and many countries
within regions broadly classified as predominantly LDC/developing are highly developed (e.g.,
Japan in Asia). Also, given the rapid economic growth experienced in recent decades by many
emerging nations such as China and India, the development status of many historically LDC
nations has improved markedly and may be better characterized as gradations between such
dichotomous classifications such as MDC vs. LDC or developed vs. developing. However,
within regional studies it remains customary to classify Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the
Caribbean as (predominantly) LDC/developing regions and Anglo-America, Europe and
Australia/Oceania as (predominantly) MDC regions (e.g. Getis, Bjelland and Getis 2014;
Rubenstein 2014).
**Overall totals and percentages include entries for which no region was specified
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As reflected in Tables 3.3 through 3.5, the UN’s iCSO database contains
substantially more entries for organizations headquartered in LDC regions than for
historically economically and politically dominant MDC regions. Africa, Asia and Latin
America and the Caribbean had 9,524, 8,083 and 3,850 database entries respectively and
a collective total of 21,457 entries, meaning 62.8% of all region-specific entries (34,168
entries had a regional categorization, several thousand others were categorized as “no
region specified”) according to organizational type were for entities in predominantly
LDC regions. Europe, Anglo-America and Oceania had 6,096, 5,698, and 917 entries
respectively for a combined total of 12,711 entries or 37.2% of all regions according to
organizational type. It appears that both in terms of total number of entries and
percentage of all such entries, LDCs are better represented within the fabric of UN
relations with international civil society as reflected in the iCSO database than at any
prior point.
It is also worth noting that within the iCSO database categorizations by
organizational type, LDC regions have the largest total number of organizations listed in
11 of 15 categories. As reflected in Table 3.4, Asia leads in 6 categories: disability,
foundations, institutions, media, ageing, and cooperatives. Latin America and the
Caribbean leads in 3 categories: indigenous, local government, and private sector. Africa
has the largest number of entries in the 2 categories of associations and NGOs. As is
illustrated in Table 3.3, among MDC regions, Europe had the largest number of entries in
the categories of associations and IGOs and Anglo America led in number of entries for
academics. Oceania, with its comparatively small population, led no category in total
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number of entries. The remaining topical category “others” was fairly evenly divided
among most world regions.
While such statistics derived from the iCSO database do not address depth or
substance of participation, numerically they indicate record degrees of parity and
plurality between civil society organizations among developed and developing nations
and among most world regions. In short, the civil society organizations of developing
nations are at least on paper better represented within the UN framework than at any
point in history. However it must be noted that complete parity does not exist when
compared to proportion of world/regional population. As noted in Table 3.5, the three
MDC regions of Anglo-America, Europe and Oceania collectively constitute just 15.3%
of the world’s population in 2016 but they are headquarters to 37.2% of all institutional
entries by organizational type in the iCSO Database. Conversely, Asia, Africa and Latin
America and the Caribbean collectively comprise 84.7% of the world’s population but
are home to just 62.8% of institutional entries listed in the database. However the latter
disparity stems primarily from the acute underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from Asia.
Although Asia accounts for nearly 60% of the earth’s population it is the host region for
only 23.6% of entries listed in the iCSO database by organizational typology. Both
Africa and also Latin America and the Caribbean are home to a higher percentage of civil
society organizations listed in the iCSO database than they comprise of the world’s
population, a trait they share with MDC regions---though Anglo-America, Europe and
Oceania possess even more favorable balances of civil society representation in the
database relative to their proportion of global population. Such disproportional
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Table 3.5: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by World Region

World Region
Africa

Number of iCSO Database
Entries by Org. Type (%*)
9,524 (27.9%)

Population of World Region
(% of 2016 World Pop.)**
1,216.1 million (16.4%)

Asia

8,083 (23.6%)

4,436.2 million (59.7%)

Anglo America

5,698 (16.7%)

360.5 million (4.9%)

Europe

6,096 (17.8%)

738.8 million (9.9%)

Latin America & Caribbean

3,850 (11.3%)

641.0 million (8.6%)

Oceania

917 (2.7%)

39.9 million (0.5%)

Totals

34,168*

7,432.5 million
*(www.worldometers.info 2016)

*Total and percentages do not include entries for which no region was specified

representation was also found in other categories analyzed in the iCSO database
including areas/fields of CSO/NGO expertise.
Areas of Expertise and Fields of Activity
The iCSO database compiles statistics related to the expertise and specialized
fields of activity of organizations into 11 categories. Analysis of this dataset was
undertaken to help cultivate a clearer understanding of the variations within focus areas
of UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs and also as correlated to ECOSOC consultative status as
well as to obtain an overview of spatial patterns. The focus was upon identifying macroscale patterns for each of the 11 categories. Each category provided more specific data
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subsets ---for example, the category “Population” further breaks down CSO fields of
activity into subsets including international migration, morbidity and mortality,
population growth, reproduction among others. However, the large number of
subcategories (e.g. 68 specialties related to the category Economic and Social, and 50 for
Sustainable Development) associated with each area posed logistical issues in terms of
the practicality of the time commitment required for analysis, the inability to easily
display findings for all subcategories within the research findings, and the limited value
understanding subcategory patterns offered to a study, focused upon macro-scale
patterns.
As reflected in Table 3.6, among the 11 categories organized by fields of
activity/expertise, the Economic and Social category contained the most entries with 18,
939 or 23.5% of the total. Entries related to Social Development with 14,106 (17.5%),
Sustainable Development with 14,062 (17.5%), and Gender Issues/Women with 11,719
(14.6%) were also well represented within the categorizations, but outside the latter 4
fields, total numbers of entries were considerably more modest. As anticipated, the
smallest numbers of entries were associated with the region-specific categories of
Conflict Resolution in Africa (1,777/2.2%), New Partnership for Africa’s Development--NEPAD (2,041/2.5%), and Peace/Development in Africa (2,761/3.4%). The smallest
number of entries among non-region-specific categories were for Statistics with 2,797
(3.5%) and Financing for Development with 3,962 (4.9%), reflecting the highly
specialized nature of both areas of expertise.
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Largely repeating the pattern found with analysis by organizational type,
organizations with ECOSOC consultative status comprised small percentages of entries
sorted according to fields of activity/expertise. Of 80,440 entries only 11,785 or 14.7%
were associated with organizations holding ECOSOC consultative status (CS),
principally special status (84.7% of CS-related entries), as indicated in Table 3.6.
Representation of CS organizations varied substantially across the 11 categories with
entries related to Economic and Social issues having the largest---though meager--percentage at 20.2%, followed by Gender Issues/Women at 16.4%, and Sustainable
Development at 13.1%. The smallest percentages of entries associated with organizations
holding consultative status were in the region-specific categories Peace and Development
in Africa at 9.6%, Conflict Resolution in Africa at 9.6%, and NEPAD (New Partnership
for African Development) at 8.1%.
Analysis of iCSO data along regional lines revealed some interesting patterns
related to CSO/NGO fields of activity/expertise. As can be seen in Tables 3.7 and 3.8,
with 65.7% of the total, LDC regions had the largest number of overall entries and also
had the most entries in each of the 11 subcategories. Entries for Asian-based CSOs led in
the 4 subcategories Economic and Social, Public Administration, Social Development,
and Statistics, with entries for African-based CSOs leading in all 7 remaining areas.
Among both MDC and LDC regions, entries were most numerous for the 4 subcategories
of Economic and Social, Social Development, Sustainable Development, and Gender
Issues/Women. The subcategories with the smallest number of entries were also the same
for both MDC and LDC regions: Statistics, and the 3 region-specific subcategories of
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Peace/Development in Africa, Conflict Resolution in Africa, and NEPAD. Among MDC
regions, Europe had the most entries in 10 of 11 subcategories, with Anglo-America
leading in entries related to Gender Issues/Women as the lone exception. In all 11
subcategories, Latin America and the Caribbean was in 5th place and Oceania last among
the 6 world regions analyzed. Analysis of the scope and scale of organizational
operations revealed similar regional variations/disparities.

Table 3.6: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and
Correlated with ECOSOC Consultative Status (CS) Accreditation Levels
Field of
Activity/Expertise

Total #
Entries(%)

Economic and Social
Financing for Devt.

General
Status

Special
Status

Roster
Status (CS Total / %)

18939(23.5%) 144

2759

920 (3823 / 20.2%)

3962(4.9%)

416

24 (454 / 11.5%)

Gender Issues/Women 11719(14.6%) 74

1713

130 (1917 / 16.4%)

Population

14

4016(5.0%)

16

483

13 (512 / 12.7%)

Public Administration 4260(5.3%)

11

436

13 (460 / 10.8%)

Social Development

14106(17.5%) 56

1652

122 (1830 / 13.0%)

Statistics

2797(3.5%)

325

13 (348 / 12.4%)

Sustainable Devt.

14062(17.5%) 68

1632

141 (1841 / 13.1%)

Peace/Devt. in Africa

2761(3.4%)

8

246

10 (264 / 9.6%)

Conflict Res. in Africa 1777(2.2%)

4

161

6 (171 / 9.6%)

NEPAD

2041(2.5%)

4

158

3 (165 / 8.1%)

80440

409

9981

1395 (11785 / 14.7%)

Totals:

10
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Table 3.7: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and
Correlated by MDC Regions

Field of Activity/
Expertise (Totals)

Europe

AngloAmerica

Oceania

MDC
Totals (%)

Economic and Social (18939)

3643

3413

501

7557

Financing for Devt. (3962)

706

570

75

1351

Gender Issues/Women (11719) 1741

1743

251

3735

Population (4016)

708

510

73

1291

Public Administration (4260)

746

592

79

1417

Social Development (14106)

2270

1986

316

4572

Statistics (2797)

451

384

47

882

Sustainable Devt. (14062)

2352

2006

336

4694

Peace/Devt. in Africa (2761)

460

431

8

899

Conflict Res. in Africa (1777)

281

252

6

539

NEPAD (2041)

278

220

14

512

Totals: (80440)

13636(17.0%) 12107(15.1%) 1706(2.1%)

92

27449(34.2%)

Table 3.8: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and
Correlated by LDC Regions

Field of Activity/
Expertise (Totals)

Asia

Lat. Am.
& Carib.

LDC
Totals (%)

Africa

Economic and Social (18939)

4331

4689

2056

11076

Financing for Devt. (3962)

1219

1068

331

2618

Gender Issues/Women (11719) 3869

3280

865

8014

Population (4016)

1205

1152

379

2736

Public Administration (4260)

1092

1292

468

2852

Social Development (14106)

3860

4197

1499

9556

Statistics (2797)

728

928

260

1916

Sustainable Devt. (14062)

3959

3773

1643

9375

Peace/Devt. in Africa (2761)

1587

264

36

1887

Conflict Res. in Africa (1777)

1029

205

22

1256

NEPAD (2041)

940

524

83

1547

Totals: (80440)

23819(29.6%) 21372(26.6%) 7642(9.5%)

52833(65.7%)

Scope and Scale of Operations of Organizations within the iCSO Database
The iCSO database contained a total of 30,538 entries sorted by operational scope
and scale of UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs. Of those entries, 61.2% (18,694) were for
organizations headquartered in LDC regions and 38.8% (11,844) for those in MDC
regions, again reflecting strong representation of organizations based in LDCs, but lack
of parity relative to their proportion of the world’s population. Organizations were
categorized as to whether their scope of operations was international, regional, national,
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or local in character and the total numbers involved indicate some degree of overlap in
that a single organization may be listed in multiple regions and also under more than one
categorization as to scope of operations.
Given the nature of the iCSO database as providing information related to
international civil society organizations that ostensibly have some connection with the
UN, it was expected that entries for organizations which are international in scope would
be dominant, but that was not necessarily the case. Entries with an international
categorization totaled 10,620 or 34.8% of all entries categorized by operational scope, the
largest number of entries among the gradations of scope/scale, but not overwhelmingly
so. The second largest number of entries was for national organizations with 10,097 or
33.1% of entries. Somewhat surprisingly, organizations with only a local scope of
operations were well represented within the iCSO database with 5,844 or 19.1% of
entries overall. Organizations with a regional scope of operations (those with some form
of presence in or involvement with a small number of countries in the same geographical
vicinity) had 3,977 or 13% of entries.
Interestingly, considerable variations between organizations headquartered in
MDCs versus LDCs existed among the operational scope categories, as can be seen in
Tables 3.10 and 3.11. Among entries categorized as international in their scope of
operations which was the most common categorization with 10,620 total entries, Europe
with 3,364 (31.7% of total) and Anglo-America with 3,318 (31.2%) entries, dominated.
The latter reflecting the preponderance of externally-oriented organizations which are at
least in part established around the goal of delivery of aid or services to developing areas
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abroad. In all three remaining categories related to operational scope, (regional, national,
and local) entries for LDC-based organizations were overwhelmingly dominant, with
Africa having by far the most entries for regional (1,147 – 28.8% of total) and national
(3,665 – 36.3%) categories, followed by Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and in
distant 4th, 5th and 6th place, the MDC regions of Europe, Anglo-America and Oceania
respectively. Among entries categorized as local in their scope of operations, Asia had
the most (1,664 – 28.5%), followed by Africa (1,441 – 24.7%), with the remaining 4
regions in the same sequence as previously mentioned.
These findings might at first glance imply a dichotomous situation in which LDC
regions appear to be more commonly characterized by more bottom-up approaches to
NGO/civil society operations, whereas in MDCs a more top-down, hierarchical model
may often prevail in terms of the international dynamic. However, this dichotomy
between MDCs and LDCs may also be a reflection of the differences in funding realities
as more LDC-based organizations that are local, national or regional in scope may seek
external sources of financing and other forms of assistance internationally (funding from
MDCs, IGOs etc.) and pursue a presence within IGOs or transnational civil society to
better facilitate such a funding approach---and the latter conclusion is at least tacitly
supported by survey data discussed in Chapter 4 . In contrast, comparable organizations
(i.e., also local or national in scope with a bottom-up orientation) within MDCs may be
less intrinsically-motivated to pursue international relationships as the latter may appear
to be of less practical importance to them in terms of financial support, legitimacy or
otherwise.
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Table 3.9: Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by ECOSOC Consultative Status

Operational
Scope/Scale

General
Status

Special
Status

Roster
Status

Totals

International

121

1836

329

2286 (49.9%)

Regional

12

308

25

345 (7.5%)

National

6

1002

97

1105 (24.1%)

Local

8

327

513

848 (18.5%)

147 (3.2%)

3473 (75.8%) 964 (21.0%) 4584

Totals:

Table 3.10: Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by MDC Region
Operational
Scope/Scale

Europe

AngloAmerica

Oceania

MDC Total
(%/Overall Total)

International

3364

3318

251

6933 (22.7%)

Regional

543

516

227

1286 (4.2%)

National

885

647

258

1790 (5.9%)

Local

864

792

179

1835 (6.0%)

5273

915

11844 (38.8%)

MDC Totals: 5656
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Table 3.11: Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by LDC Region
Operational
Scope/Scale

Asia

Lat. Am.
& Carib.

LDC Total
(%/Overall Total)

Africa

International

1315

1722

650

3687 (12.1%)

Regional

1147

846

698

2691 (8.8%)

National

3665

3195

1447

8307 (27.2%)

Local

1441

1664

904

4009 (13.1%)

7568

7427

3699

18694 (61.2%)

LDC Totals:

Somewhat surprisingly, of all 30,538 organizational entries categorized according
to operational scope/scale, only 4,584 (15.0%) were for organizations which actually held
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. Among the latter, organizations with an
international scope of operations were prevalent with 2,286 entries or 49.9% of the total
as noted in Table 3.09. Organizations with a national or local operational scope followed
with 1,105 (24.1%) and 848 (18.5%) respectively and in turn only 345 (7.5%)
organizations with a regional scope. As expected, the level of consultative status most
common (75.8% overall) across all categories of operational scope was Special Status,
with Roster Status (21.0%) being the second-most common.
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Table 3.12: Organization Type by Operational Scope/Scale in iCSO Database

Organization
Type
International Regional

National

Local

Total

Academic

724

208

266

162

1360

Association

791

197

876

232

2096

Disability

175

67

273

81

596

Foundation

480

116

348

91

1035

Indigenous

587

463

628

773

2453

Institution

153

38

110

40

341

IGO

188

47

53

24

312

Local Govt.

39

13

42

106

200

Media

75

15

37

11

138

NGO

7000

1797

7166

7949

23912

Others

264

61

157

243

725

Private Sector 347

68

164

65

644

Trade Union 26

10

36

5

77

Ageing

25

9

55

15

104

Cooperative

42

7

41

27

117
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Several interesting patterns emerged from cross-referencing organizations in the
iCSO database by the 15 organizational typologies and the 4 gradations of operational
scope. As reflected in Table 3.12, in 8 of 15 organizational typology categories,
international scope of operation was the most common, often by a wide margin:
academic, foundations, institutions, IGOs, media, others, private sector, and cooperatives.
National operational scope was prevalent in 4 organizational typologies: associations,
disability, trade unions, and ageing. Local operational scope was the most common in 3
organizational typologies: indigenous, local government, and NGOs. Regional
operational scope did not have the largest or even second largest number of database
entries in any of the 15 organizational typologies.
Oddly, only 106 (53%) of 200 organizations with a typological classification of
local government within the database were categorized as having a local scope of
operations. Among local government entities, the iCSO database classified 39 as having
an international operational scope, 13 as regional and 42 as national. While it is perhaps
to be expected that some subjectivity be involved in the classification of international
civil society organizations into categories, scrutiny of the organizations actually listed in
the iCSO database raises questions as to how organizations came to be categorized as
having an international, regional, national or local scope of operations. Table 3.13
displays 33 of the 39 organizations classified by the iCSO database as being “Local
Government” entities that have an “international” scope of operations, concepts that
would seem to be self-contradictory. For example, it is difficult to comprehend how the
Guinea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Development Institute or the
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Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (Honduras) could be regarded as
local government entities. Likewise, it is not clear how the Central Bureau of Statistics
of Aruba, the Municipal District of Andoas (Peru), or the Provincial Council (of Kandy,
Sri Lanka) could be classified as having an international scope of operations. Table 3.13
also displays organizations classified by the iCSO database as being “Local Government”
entities that are “regional” in operational scope, many of which also do not appear to be
ideal examples of either of the latter categories---e.g. the National Association on Early
Childhood does not appear to be either a local government entity or regional in its scope
of operations. Such issues within the categorizations of operational scope are not unique
examples as unusual misclassifications and inconsistencies can be found throughout the
iCSO database.
Other examples of potential misclassification of organizations within the iCSO
database can be seen within the IGO organizational typology. While 188 (60.3%) of 312
entries were deemed to be international in terms of their operational scope, 47 (15.1%)
were classified as regional in scope. The latter categorization is logical in that IGOs
can/do exist for smaller or more regional or sub-regional groups of countries (e.g.
CARICOM, CARIFTA, and MERCOSUR) as well as existing at the global or macro
scale. More unusual is the categorization of 53 IGOs (17%) as national in operational
scope and 24 (7.7%) as local. Examples from the iCSO database of IGOs deemed to be
local in scope of mission include the Bureau of Normalization of Quebec, the New South
Wales Department of Family and Community Services, the Office of the Council of State
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Table 3.13: Organizations Classified in the ICSO Database as Being Local Government
Entities that are Alternatively International or Regional in Scope of Operations
Organizations Classified as both “Local
Govt.” and “International” in Scope

Organizations Classified as both “Local
Government and “Regional” in Scope

C40 Climate Leadership Group

Energie & Umweltagentur Niederosterreich

Camara Municipal de Bauru

Haryana Forest Department

Caucus de Femmes elues Locales du Mali

Hon. Governor Roel Ragay Degamo

Central Bureau of Statistics Aruba

ICLEI Africa

Climate Alliance

Instituto Natureza do Tocantins

Clinton Senior Center

Mashhad Municipality

Direct Email Marketing

Pauline Gregory-Lewis

Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians

Principalia di Mindanao

Empresas Publicas de Medellin

Regione Abruzzo

Governo do Estado do Acre

The National Assoc. on Early Childhood

Grand Duchy of Flandrensis

Undersecretariat of Treasury, Agric. Dept.

Guinea Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Urban Policy Unit, Govt. of KPK, Pakistan

International Development Institute
Ministry of Planning & Devt. Corporation
Municipalidad Distrital de Andoas
Oluyole Local Government
Prefeitura de Campinas
Principado Ilheu de Pontinha
Principality of Kaharagia
Principato di Burke Island
Provincial Council
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(Ghana), and the Pilipino United Party of the Philippines, Inc., none of which appear to
be either IGOs or local in their scope/scale of operations.

Proportional Representation among Regions/Countries within the ECOSOC
Consultative Status Program
Proportionality is an element of plurality important to this study in that
understanding the degree to which regions are proportionally represented is a reflection
of the degree of spatial parity in the relationship between the UN and transnational CSOs.
Earlier in this chapter study data as displayed in Table 3.5 illustrated that iCSO entries
organized by organizational type were proportionally imbalanced in that the number of
entries for all MDC regions were greater relative to their share of global population than
entries for LDC regions, with entries from Asia-based CSOs especially underrepresented.
Analysis of data specific to entries for organizations with consultative status revealed an
even greater degree of disproportionate dominance of MDC-based organizations as
reflected in Table 3.14.
While the predominantly MDC regions of Europe, Anglo America and Oceania
collectively comprise only 15.3% of the world’s 2016 population, they are the
headquarters of 61.2% of organizations that presently hold consultative status with UNECOSOC, reflecting MDC-based organizations are represented at a rate four times
greater than their proportion of the global population. Europe comprises 9.9% of the
global population yet is home to 32.5% of CSOs holding consultative status, Oceania
comprises 0.5% of the population yet hosts 2.2% of CSOs with consultative status (of 96
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Oceania-based organizations identified as having consultative status, 70 (73.0%) were in
Australia or New Zealand, a reflection as to why Oceania was regarded as a
predominantly MDC region in this study), but Anglo America was even more
disproportionately dominant as it constitutes only 4.9% of the global population but is
headquarters to 26.5% of CSOs holding consultative status.
LDC/developing regions comprise 84.7% of the world’s population yet are home
to only 38.7% of the organizations listed as holding consultative status. Africa
constitutes 16.4% of the global population yet is headquarters to a comparable, though
slightly smaller 15.3% of CSOs with consultative status. Latin America and the
Caribbean comprise 8.6% of the world’s population yet are home to just 5.4% of
organizations with consultative status. By far the largest proportional
underrepresentation among MDC regions is for Asia which constitutes 59.7% of the
global population yet was identified as headquarters to only 18.0% of CSOs presently
holding consultative status. Such findings clearly support the contention of the first
guiding hypothesis that imbalances exist within the CS program with regard to
proportional parity among countries and regions and also between developed and
developing areas.
It is worthy to note that disparities also exist among MDC versus LDC regions
with regard to the type/level of consultative status held. General consultative status is the
highest level of accreditation and affords the greatest degree of access and input as
discussed in Chapter 2. Of the 6 world regions delimited within the iCSO database the 3
with the smallest percentage of general status CSOs were all MDC/developing regions:
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only 1.2% of African-based CS organizations hold General Status, only 2.8% of Asiabased CS organizations, and 2.5% among those based in Latin America and the
Caribbean. While no general status organizations were identified as being based in
Oceania, 5.4% of Europe-based CSOs holding consultative status were accredited at the
general level and 3.2% for those headquartered in Anglo America. However, the largest
percentages by far among CS organizations for roster status, presumably the most
restrictive accreditation level in terms of opportunities to participate in ECOSOC
processes, were also for CSOs based in Europe (20.2% of CS organizations held Roster
Status) and Anglo America (19.1%), perhaps mitigating any real or perceived dominance
the latter regions potentially possess via having a greater proportion of CSOs in general
consultative status.
Table 3.14: Parity of ECOSOC Consultative Status Organizations by World Region
and Relative to Proportion of Global Population
General
Status

Special
Status

Roster
Status

Total / % of
all CS orgs

% of World
Population

Africa

8

624

42

674 / 15.3%

16.4%

Asia

22

704

68

794 / 18.0%

59.7%

Europe

78

1066

289

1433 / 32.5% 9.9%

LA/Carib.

6

198

34

238 / 5.4%

Anglo Am.

37

909

223

1169 / 26.5% 4.9%

Oceania

0

83

13

96 / 2.2%

Total

151

3584

669

*4404

8.6%

0.5%

*Number reflects those organizations holding consultative status identified by region
within the iCSO database. Over 300 organizations with consultative status were
classified as “no region specified” within the database.
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Table 3.15: Twenty Most Populous Countries by Number of ECOSOC consultative status
Organizations and Relative to Proportion of Global Population
Country

2016 Population /
% of World Total

Number of ECOSOC CS
Orgs. / % of Total CS Orgs.

China

1,382.3 million / 18.6%

54 / 1.2%

India

1,326.8 million / 17.9%

217 / 4.9%

U.S.

324.1 million / 4.4%

1026 / 23.3%

Indonesia

260.6 million / 3.5%

12 / 0.3%

Brazil

209.6 million / 2.8%

30 / 0.7%

Pakistan

192.8 million / 2.6%

76 / 1.7%

Nigeria

186.9 million / 2.5%

138 / 3.1%

Bangladesh

162.9 million / 2.2%

34 / 0.8%

Russia

143.4 million / 1.9%

63 / 1.4%

Mexico

128.6 million / 1.7%

36 / 0.8%

Japan

126.3 million / 1.7%

68 / 1.5%

Philippines

102.3 million / 1.4%

23 / 0.5%

Ethiopia

101.9 million / 1.4%

9 / 0.2%

Vietnam

94.4 million / 1.3%

3 / 0.07%

Egypt

93.4 million / 1.3%

30 / 0.7%

Germany

80.7 million / 1.1%

78 / 1.8%

Iran

80.0 million / 1.1%

46 / 1.0%

DR Congo

79.7 million / 1.1%

47 / 1.1%

Turkey

76.6 million / 1.1%

33 / 0.7%

Thailand

68.1 million / 0.9%

18 / 0.4%
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Using the iCSO database, a case study analysis was undertaken to glean variations
among countries in terms of degree of proportional representation/parity within the
ECOSOC consultative status program. Table 3.15 presents data from the case study of
the world’s 20 most populous countries---more logistically practical than examining all
of approximately 200 countries in the world---relative to the number of organizations
holding consultative status headquartered in each and the percentage of the latter relative
to the total (global) number of CS organizations for which a regional association was
specified in the iCSO database. Of the countries, 11 were in Asia, 4 in Africa, 2 each in
Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, and 1 in Anglo America. Many of the
same patterns related to proportional equity (or lack thereof) as previously presented in
Tables 3.5 and 3.14. Countries in LDC/developing regions were in general
underrepresented relative to the proportion of population they contain---with Asia-based
CS organizations the most underrepresented, and most countries in MDC regions
disproportionately overrepresented.
Of the 20 most populous countries, only 3 were in predominantly MDC regions:
Germany, Russia and the US. Among CSOs holding ECOSOC consultative status, those
based in the US were represented vastly out of proportion to the country’s percentage of
global population. While the US contains only 4.4% of the world’s population, 23.3% of
all organizations holding CS (for which a region was specified in the iCSO database) are
headquartered in the US. Germany was also disproportionately overrepresented though
by a more modest margin, constituting 1.1% of global population and hosting 1.8% of all
CS organizations. Russia, which for the purposes of this study was regarded as being in
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Europe, was the only country from a predominantly MDC region to be proportionally
underrepresented with 1.9% of global population but home to only 1.4% of all CS
organizations.
With the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which achieved parity
with 1.1% of global population and hosting 1.1% of all CS organizations, and Nigeria,
which was overrepresented among all CS organizations at 3.1% relative to its percentage
of global population at 2.5%, all other 15 countries from predominantly LDC/developing
regions were underrepresented in the consultative status program relative to their
proportion of global population, though to widely varying degrees. China, the world’s
most populous country was among the most proportionally underrepresented with 18.6%
of the world’s total population but home to a mere 1.4% of all organizations holding
consultative status. India, the second most populous state was also proportionally
underrepresented though not to the same degree with 17.9% of the world’s population but
headquarters to only 4.9% of CS organizations. The most underrepresented country by
far among the 20 most populous states was Vietnam, with a population of nearly 95
million---1.3% of the global total---yet home to only 3 CS organizations, or 0.07% of
CSOs in formal association with ECOSOC.
Another interesting pattern can be seen in the data collected for the most populous
countries. Of the 20 countries listed in Table 3.15, Freedom House (2016), which
annually evaluates all countries as to the degree of freedom/democracy present, classifies
10 as being “free” (democratic) and 10 as being either “not free” or only “partially free”
(undemocratic or quasi-democratic). Those regarded by the organization as being
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free/democratic include: Bangladesh, Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, and the US. Those deemed as being unfree/undemocratic include
China, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and
Vietnam. The latter breakdown presents an interesting opportunity to expand the brief
country case study in order to also compare proportional representation within the
consultative status program between democratic and non-democratic countries.
Much scholarship has been devoted to the issue of civil society within
authoritarian or quasi-democratic regimes including the reality that although it may exist
in some form, civil society may often be diminished or heavily “regulated” (e.g. Cosby
2012; Lewis 2013). Even as regimes may begin to transition toward democratic
processes and institutions, civil society institutions may often be weak and remain under
the auspices of state organs or merely a reflection of the wariness of a historicallysubjugated polity to be openly associated with often politically tinged civic activism in a
public sphere (Diamond 1994; Howard 2002). If domestic civil society may often be
stunted in non/quasi-democratic societies, it stands to reason that transnational civil
society may be muted to an even further degree as such regimes may not be willing to
permit alternative voices to have a forum within the international arena. The results of
the analysis largely support the latter perspectives and reflect a higher degree of
underrepresentation for most of the world’s 10 most populous countries deemed to be
non or partially-democratic.
As reflected in the right column of Table 3.15, of the 10 countries with the
lowest percentages of all CS organizations, 6 are non/quasi-democratic. Of the 5 lowest
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percentages, 4 are non/quasi-democratic countries: Ethiopia with 0.2%, the Philippines
with 0.5%, Thailand with 0.4%, and Vietnam with 0.07%. In an effort to objectively
compare degrees of parity among the 20 countries, the percentage of all CS organizations
headquartered in each country was divided by the percentage it comprises of the global
population, yielding a parity score. A parity score of 100% (DR Congo) indicates an
equal proportion of CS organizations based in the country relative to its share of global
population. Scores greater than 100% indicate overrepresentation within the CS program
relative to a country’s percentage of global population (US with 529.5%
overrepresentation proportional to population, Germany with 163.6% overrepresentation,
and Nigeria with 124.0% overrepresentation) and scores less than 100% denote
underrepresentation. Table 3.16 displays the parity scores in descending order and
compares results for democratic and non/quasi-democratic countries. All 3 parity scores
reflecting overrepresentation within the CS program were for democracies: the US,
Germany and Nigeria. While scores for many democratic countries also fell below 100%
parity, the average score for the 10 most populous democracies was 111.5%, indicating
overrepresentation in the CS program relative to population. Only 1 of the 10 most
populous non/quasi-democratic countries achieved parity (DR Congo) with the majority
of the rest falling far short. Of the 4 lowest parity scores, 3 were for non/quasidemocratic countries: Ethiopia with 14.3% parity, China with 6.5%, and Vietnam with
5.4%. One of the starkest contrasts was with the average parity score for the 10 most
populous non/quasi-democratic states: 48.8%, less than half the mean parity score for the
10 democratic states.
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Table 3.16: Parity Scores (Percentage of all CS Organizations Relative to Percentage of
Global Population) for 10 Democratic and 10 Non/Quasi-Democratic Countries

Democratic
Country

Parity
Score

Non/QuasiParity
Democratic Country Score

US

529.5%

DR Congo

100.0%

Germany

163.6%

Iran

91.0%

Nigeria

124.0%

Russia

73.7%

Japan

88.2%

Turkey

63.6%

Pakistan

65.4%

Egypt

53.8%

Mexico

47.1%

Thailand

44.4%

Bangladesh

36.4%

Philippines

35.7%

India

27.3%

Ethiopia

14.3%

Brazil

25.0%

China

6.5%

Indonesia

8.6%

Vietnam

5.4%

Average Score:

111.5%

Average Score:

48.8%
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The often substantial variations among countries and regions with regard to levels
of transnational civil society involvement with the UN found via the latter two analyses
closely mirrors the results of a case study undertaken as a test case in the early stages of
this research. In 2015 I used the iCSO database to gauge proportional representation of
countries and sub-regions of Europe with regard to UN associations. The method
involved identifying the number of entries in the iCSO database for each European
country corresponding to 13 of the 15 categories (all categories except “collectives” and
“other”) for organization type. In turn the total population for each country expressed in
millions was divided by the total number of entries specific to the country within the
iCSO database related to organizational typology (not specific to just organizations with
consultative status). For example, the iCSO database indicated 3 CSOs for Iceland which
has a population of 0.317 million, a number which divided by 3 (for the total
CSOs/NGOs listed in the database) yields 9.5 CSO entries per million people. The
resulting score---the number of iCSO database entries per million people in the country’s
population---is a different numerical approach than that used in the analysis illustrated in
Table 3.16 but nonetheless an effective means of objectively comparing parity among
countries regarding the degree to which their CSOs had any associations with the UN.
This case study of the 50 countries of Europe was inordinately time consuming, requiring
several weeks of data compilation and analysis, and thus was not repeated for all 200 or
so countries on earth as an element of the main research. However, as a case study it
lends insight into often substantial variations among countries and among sub-regions,
patterns that are likely to be found in other world regions outside Europe and the study

111

also revealed a noteworthy gap between EU and non-EU nations regarding indications of
CSO involvement with the UN.
Comparisons of the proportional representation (parity) of the CSOs of
countries/regions at the UN could potentially be approached in many different ways. For
example, it may prove interesting to undertake such a study of CSO parity at the UN via
weighting for various economic influences---i.e. to what degree do countries’ degree of
CSO representation reflect aspects of their economic size or influence? According to the
data presented in Tables 3.15 and 3.16, the United States is vastly overrepresented by
having large numbers of US-based CSOs involved with the UN, far out of proportion to
the US percentage of global population. If countries’ percentage of global GDP were
weighted rather than proportion of population, the results would diminish such an
appearance of overrepresentation at least to some degree---as the US accounts for
approximately 16% of global GDP and around 23% of CSOs which hold consultative
status with UN-ECOSOC are US-based. If countries were weighted based upon the
portion of the UN budget they funded, the US would essentially have parity within the
ECOSOC consultative status dynamic, as it finances approximately one-fourth of the UN
budget and is headquarters to a comparable share of the CSOs which hold consultative
status.
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Table 3.17: UN iCSO Database Entries by European Country/Sub-Region: Mediterranean,
Northern, and Western Europe
Region/
Country

N./iCSO entries (N./iCSO)
per million people (entries)

Region/
Country

N./entries per (N./iCSO)
million people (entries)

Northern Europe

Western Eur./British Isles

Denmark

13.8 (77)

Andorra

10.6 (32)

Finland

9.3 (49)

Austria

13.3 (109)

Iceland

9.5 (3)

Belgium

31.1 (325)

Norway

19.9 (102)

Britain

14.4 (915)

Sweden

13.3 (129)

France

9.4 (623)

Germany

3.8 (306)

Ireland

15.9 (77)

Mean: 13.1 (72)

Mediterranean Europe

Liechtenstein 54.1 (2)

Cyprus

13.7 (16)

Luxembourg

17.3 (9)

Greece

6.2 (67)

Netherlands

14.8 (250)

Italy

7.4 (455)

Switzerland

68.6 (553)

Malta

29.1 (12)

Mean: 23.0 (291)

Monaco

290.3 (9)

Mean w/o microstates: 21.4 (395)

Portugal

4.8 (52)

Mean w/o microstates/Switz.: 14.7 (372)

San Marino

90.0 (3)

Spain

6.4 (306)

Turkey

2.1 (169)

Vatican

1000.0 (1)

Mean: 145.1 (109)
Mean w/o Microstates: 6.8 (178)

113

Table 3.18: UN iCSO Database Entries by European Country/Sub-Region: Former
Soviet Eastern Europe and Non-Soviet Eastern Europe
Region/
Country

N./iCSO entries (N./iCSO)
per million people (entries)

Region/
Country

N./entries per (N./iCSO)
million people (entries)

Former Soviet Eastern Europe

Non-Soviet Eastern Europe

Armenia

9.2 (28)

Albania

10.6 (32)

Azerbaijan

7.0 (68)

Bosnia-Herz.

4.4 (17)

Belarus

0.6 (6)

Bulgaria

4.8 (33)

Estonia

7.2 (9)

Croatia

5.4 (24)

Georgia

14.0 (69)

Czech Rep.

2.7 (29)

Latvia

3.7 (8)

Hungary

3.2 (32)

Lithuania

4.0 (14)

Kosovo

0.5 (1)

Moldova

7.3 (26)

Macedonia

12.0 (25)

Russia

1.4 (200)

Montenegro

18.5 (12)

Ukraine

2.1 (92)

Poland

0.9 (33)

Romania

2.8 (60)

Serbia

4.9 (35)

Slovakia

1.7 (9)

Slovenia

3.0 (6)

Mean: 5.7 (52)

Mean: 5.4 (25)
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While this research did not explore proportional weights for economic
considerations it did seek to address variations in parity (proportional plurality) via case
studies of countries and regions and assess the degree to which their CSOs/NGOs were
represented within the UN framework, with proportion of population being the most
obvious means of weighting for influence and objectively appraising degrees of parity.
In this research, each of two case studies that were undertaken for analysis of
proportionality/parity among countries used distinct approaches. The approach taken to
examine degrees of parity for the 20 most populous countries weighted each based upon
their proportion of global population. The approach taken in examining European
countries and sub-regions did not account for proportion of world population, but rather
provided a score reflecting the number of iCSO database entries per million people in the
countries’ populations. An unforeseen outcome was that disproportionately high scores
could be yielded for many microstates and for certain other countries. For example, only
1 organization was identified in the database for Vatican City, yet given its population
(1,000), the resulting score of 1,000 CSO/NGO entries per million people in the national
population not only distorts the reality for that single country, but potentially distorts
averages for the sub-region in which the country is located and the entirety of Europe.
Additionally, certain other countries---Switzerland in particular---due to unique
circumstances as host to many IGOs and NGOs may also present an issue with distortion
of averages. For these reasons, distinction is made in Table 3.17 and in the discussion
between (1) overall averages (means) for sub-regions and (2) averages that exclude data
for microstates and/or Switzerland in order to present a more realistic average.
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As reflected in Tables 3.17 and 3.18 substantial variation existed between some
European sub-regions and often among countries within a single sub-region. Western
Europe (for purposes of this discussion Western Europe as a sub-region is comprised of
France, Germany, Andorra, the 3 Benelux nations and the 3 Alpine nations---Austria,
Liechtenstein, and Switzerland), Britain and Ireland had the highest averages for both
mean number of CSO entries in the database and CSO entries per million people. Even if
disproportionately high averages for Switzerland and the microstates are removed from
consideration, the remaining 7 countries of the sub-region had the highest mean number
of CSO entries at 372 and the highest mean of 14.7 entries per million people. Of the 7
remaining countries within the sub-region Britain with 915 and France with 623 had by
far the highest numbers of CSO entries in the database, but tempered by their large
populations, they averaged 14.4 and 9.4 entries per million people respectively.
Comparatively, Ireland had only 77 CSO entries in the database, but factored into its
relatively small population, it attained a score of 15.9 entries per million people.
Germany had the lowest number of CSO entries in the database per million people with
3.8, only around one-eighth that of Belgium, a prominent focal point for IGO and NGO
activity, with 31.1 CSO entries per million people.
The countries of Northern Europe (geographically defined as the Scandinavian
countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, plus the historically and otherwise
associated countries of Iceland and Finland) exhibited the second highest score for
number of CSO entries per million people at a mean of 13.1 for all 5 nations. The latter
statistic ranged from a low of 9.3 in Finland to a high of 13.8 in Denmark, a narrower
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range of fluctuation than found in most European sub-regions analyzed. The region was
third among the European sub-regions in terms of actual number of CSO entries with a
mean of 72, and a range of between 3 for Iceland and 129 for Sweden.
Excluding microstates, Mediterranean Europe had the second highest mean of 178
CSO entries per country and the third highest score per million people with a mean of 6.8
among the 6 non-microstates. As can be seen in Table 3.17, the latter statistic was
considerably inflated by the inclusion of the microstates, particularly the Vatican. Even
if data from microstates is excluded, like the findings for Western Europe, results for the
region demonstrated considerable variation, ranging from a low in 2.1 entries per million
people in Turkey (included as (a) a portion of Turkish territory lies northwest of the
straights connecting the Aegean and Black Seas---widely accepted as a boundary
between Europe and Asia, and (b) Turkey is pursuing EU membership and closely orbits
with the continent economically and otherwise) to 13.7 in Cyprus. Substantial
fluctuations also existed among total number of CSO entries per country ranging from
Cyprus with 16 to Italy with 455.
Data for Eastern European countries formerly a part of the Soviet Union and those
that were not was tabulated separately. My initial thought process was that since in
general more westernization and economic development (i.e., increases in most measures
of standard of development) has occurred in the areas of Eastern Europe that were never
part of the Soviet Union, the latter may exhibit stronger indications of transnational civil
society as measured by the iCSO database. However, this did not prove to be the case, as
only slight differences existed between these 2 classifications of Eastern Europe and both
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in terms of total CSO/NGO entries per country (mean of 52 for former Soviet areas, 25
for non-Soviet areas) and number of entries per million people (mean of 5.7 for former
Soviet areas, 5.4 for non-Soviet areas), the data collected favored former Soviet nations.
Within both categories of Eastern European countries, substantial variations
existed. Among formerly Soviet areas the average number of total entries per country
ranged from 6 in Belarus to 200 in Russia and number of entries per million people
ranged from 0.6 in Belarus to 14 in Georgia. Among countries never a part of the USSR,
Kosovo had the lowest score of any European nation in terms of number of CSO entries
per million people with 0.5 and with only 1 organization reported in the iCSO database,
tied with the Vatican for the lowest total number of CSO entries in Europe. Romania had
the largest number of total CSO entries with 60 and Montenegro with 18.5 had the largest
number per million people.
The statistical contrast between Eastern European countries versus that of other
parts of the continent was striking. If microstates are excluded, European countries had a
mean of 127 total CSO/NGO entries per country and 9.5 entries per million people of
population---if data from Switzerland is also excluded the numbers drop to 117 and 8.1
respectively. For purposes of comparison, if the latter numbers (those excluding all 7
microstates and Switzerland) are used, they dwarf the averages for all 24 Eastern
European countries: 36.2 mean total CSO/NGO entries per country and 5.5 entries per
million people of population. Clearly plurality in the form of equitable proportional
parity does not exist among Europe’s sub-regions and there is no reason to suspect that
this phenomenon of wide sub-regional variation is atypical.

118

In comparing data between countries that were EU members versus countries that
were not, substantial contrast was also found to exist. Among the 28 EU-member states
the mean number of iCSO database entries was 144 yielding a mean of 9.4 entries per
million people in population---excluding microstates yielded a mean of 154 entries and
8.3 per million people. Numbers for EU candidates (6 nations at the time: Albania,
Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) produced a comparable though
slightly higher score of 9.6 iCSO database entries per million people and a mean of 46
entries per country. The 16 European nations that were neither EU members nor
candidates for admission had a mean 99.6 iCSO database entries per million people and
74 entries per country, with both numbers substantially inflated by the inclusion of 5
microstates and Switzerland. Exclusion of the latter 6 nations from consideration yielded
a considerably lower mean of 6.7 entries per million people and 60.9 entries per country.
The exclusion of microstates from both tallies and of Switzerland from the results of the
non-EU states---likely reasonable steps given the statistical anomalies they represent,
gives the EU members a nearly 20% higher score of 8.3 database entries per million
people versus the non-EU states with 6.7.

Other Forms of UN Accreditation of CSOs/NGOs (Apart from ECOSOC
Consultative Status)
While the primary formal vehicle for UN affiliation with transnational civil
society is the consultative status program within ECOSOC, other venues also exist,
usually specific to a particular purpose or event. In some instances, CSOs/NGOs are
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accredited specifically so that they may participate in a special summit or symposium in
which case the accreditation is temporary, ending with the conclusion of the event. An
example of such a temporary accreditation regime was that associated with the World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) which took place in South Africa between
August and September 2002 and formally accredited over 700 participating
organizations. An additional and smaller-scale example of temporary accreditation
specific to a project or summit is the UN’s recurring conference related to Small Island
Developing States (SIDS). At the 3rd SIDS conference held in Samoa in 2014, in
addition to the representatives of states which were in attendance, 23 CSOs/NGOs were
formally accredited as participants.
Other more long-standing forms of UN accreditation of representatives of civil
society also exist, perhaps the best known of which are the programs related to the
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the Department of Public Information
(DPI) and the Financing for Development Office (FDO). Established by the General
Assembly in 1992, the CSD has since its inception sought to engage with as diverse a
range of stakeholders as possible, including the accreditation of hundreds of CSOs/NGOs
which have interest in its mission. The DPI was established in 1946 to promote
awareness of UN programs, often via establishing various constituencies internationally
including collaborations with over 1,500 CSOs/NGOs, many of which have a formal
accreditation with DPI. FDO (which is also variously referenced by the acronyms FFD
and FfDO) was established within the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs in
2003 to provide sustained support and follow-up for initiatives related to international
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development, one element of which is the NGO Committee on Financing for
Development which accredits organizations both as full and associate members.
As was expected, analysis of the numbers for other UN affiliation programs for
CSOs/NGOs revealed them to have only fractions of the involvement of the ECOSOC
consultative status program. To the best of my knowledge, the 5 programs analyzed are
the most viable alternatives to the CS regime for UN engagement with international civil
society, but each of the 5 deals with a more narrow policy niche than the flagship
ECOSOC forum which was intended to be more general in scope. As indicated in Table
3.19, the DPI program for CSOs/NGOs had by far the most region-specific (entries with
no region specified were not included in the data table and were generally negligible in
number) entries at 868, most of which were from organizations headquartered in AngloAmerica (404 or 46.5%) or Europe (222 or 25.6%). The DPI accreditation program for
CSOs/NGOs appears to present organizations with opportunities for engagement
throughout the year, whereas the other 4 programs, even if theoretically ongoing in a
couple of cases (CSD and FDO), seem to be primarily focused around periodic summits
or other special events, thus providing a more limited dynamic for interaction.
Of the remaining affiliation programs, the summit-specific civil society
accreditation regime of WSSD had the second-largest number of region-specific entries
with 603, most of which were from Anglo-America (142 or 23.5%), followed closely by
Asia (136 or 22.6%) and Europe (134 or 22.2%). The CSD program had the third-largest
number of entries at 425, the largest numbers of which were from Anglo-American (116
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Table 3.19: UN Accreditation/Affiliation Programs for CSOs Apart from ECOSOC
Consultative Status by World Regions

Region

CSD

DPI

FDO

WSSD

SIDS Totals

Africa

49

44

63

117

1

274

Asia

91

94

20

136

2

343

LA & Car

73

59

18

51

6

207

LDC Totals

213(50.1%)

197(22.7%)

101(57.1%)

304(50.4%)

9(60.0%)

Anglo Am

116

404

28

142

2

692

Europe

77

222

38

134

3

474

Oceania

19

45

10

23

1

98

MDC Totals 212(49.9%)

671(77.3%)

76(42.9%)

299(49.6%)

6(40.0%)

Totals:

868

177

603

15

425
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or 27.3%) or Asian (91 or 21.4%) organizations. The FDO program contained only 177
total entries, most commonly from African (63 or 35.6%) or European (38 or 21.5%)
organizations. The most narrow in geographical or circumstantial focus of any of the 5
programs, the iCSO Database only yielded 15 entries for SIDS, most commonly from
Latin America and the Caribbean (6 or 40.0%) reflecting the presence and influence of
Caribbean microstates and small states within the program.
While these 5 CSO affiliation programs are distinct from the ECOSOC
consultative status (ECOSOC-CS) regime, I was curious to see the degree of overlap
between organizations with consultative status and those participating in any of the
alternative affiliations. Although the initial expectation was that overlap would exist in
that most organizations participating in these 5 programs would also hold consultative
status with ECOSOC, this does not appear to be the case according to the data collected
from the iCSO website. As noted in Table 3.20, the largest number of entries for
ECOSOC-CS organizations was in the DPI program. The latter had 393 CS
organizations as affiliates, by far the highest ratio (393:868 or 45.3%) relative to the total
number of entries among any of the 5 CSO affiliate programs, but still not an indication
that most DPI organizations also hold ECOSOC-CS. Ratios of the number of ECOSOCCS organizations relative to total number of entries for each of the 4 other alternative
accreditations were much lower, seemingly confirming that most organizations within
each of these alternative CSO/NGO affiliation programs in fact do not also hold
ECOSOC consultative status simultaneously: CSD 114:425 (26.8%); FDO 32:177
(18.1%); WSSD 98:603 (16.3%); SIDS 1:15 (6.7%).

123

Whereas the ECOSOC consultative status program is broader and more diverse in
its range of policy foci, each of the 5 alternative accreditation programs is markedly
narrower in focus and in potential applicability to the operational parameters of civil
society organizations. However, the narrow focus of the 5 alternative programs may
actually appeal to certain CSOs with highly specialized interests to a greater degree than
the more general forums of ECOSOC-CS, to which such specialized (e.g. oriented toward
development financing) CSOs/NGOs may feel they have less to contribute. In short, the
ECOSOC-CS program may not be competing to a great degree with these 5 alternative
affiliation programs for the same civil society organizations as affiliates.

Table 3.20: Other UN Accreditation/Affiliation Programs for CSOs by ECOSOC
Consultative Status Level

Other UN
Accreditation

General
Status

Special
Status

Roster
Status

Totals

CSD

6

33

75

114

DPI

41

258

94

393

FDO

0

25

7

32

WSSD

2

77

19

98

SIDS

0

1

0

1

49

394

195

638

Totals:
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Evidence of this can also be seen in the data collected for the CSD program in
Table 3.20. In no other instance in this study did entries for ECOSOC affiliates with
Roster Status substantially outnumber those holding Special Status within a category. As
Special Status is by far the most common accreditation status within the ECOSOC
affiliation program (see Table 3.1 – as of November 2016, 75.6% held Special Status and
20.9% held Roster Status), organizations holding that level of accreditation would
presumably always outnumber those with other accreditation levels. Yet within the CSD
program 75 (65.8%) of 114 ECOSOC-CS organizations held Roster Status. Roster Status
is for organizations with a specialized and limited scope, circumstances which seem to
apply to each of these 5 programs to varying degrees at least in comparison to the
potentially broader parameters of the ECOSOC-CS regime. In 4 of the 5 alternative
affiliation programs, the percentage of Roster Status organizations is higher than the
ECOSOC-CS average of 20.9%, intimating that these alternative UN-accreditation
programs may appeal to CSOs/NGOs with more specialized parameters. The following
sections provide a summary overview of findings from analysis of the iCSO database and
their significance to relevant research questions and guiding hypotheses.

Overview of Analysis of iCSO Database
Throughout much of the 20th century what few examples existed of transnational
civil society were predominantly located in MDC/developed regions, but the explosive
growth of NGOs globally over the course of recent decades has facilitated more balance
in the number, distribution and influence of civil society organizations. Just as the
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governments of predominantly LDC/developing regions have become increasingly active
within transnational organizations in recent decades, civil society in the global south has
also become increasingly visible within the global arena (Tandon and Kak 2008). By the
1990s NGOs and civil society among LDCs were rapidly emerging and were becoming
comparable in numbers to their northern counterparts, yet sometimes continued to be
overshadowed politically within international forums by northern organizations which
were better organized and financed (Tandon and Kak 2008). Tandon and Kak (2008, 8081) elaborate on the challenges faced by global south NGOs in obtaining a voice in the
UN and international community:
Emerging civil society in Asia, Africa and Latin America (initially) had
weak capacity in the areas of intellectual material, institutional capacities, and
local/regional coordination, as well as a lack of regulatory frameworks in many
countries. Most governments of these southern countries had a “suspicious”
orientation toward CSOs and it was therefore necessary to create a modern
framework of regulation for government-NGO relations…In 1991, the idea of
strengthening civil society by uniting NGOs on a global stage manifested in
CIVICUS: the World Alliance for Citizen Participation which (facilitated)
unprecedented strength and global outreach for participating organizations.

While issues such as freedom to operate independently of government influence,
political parity (clout) domestically and abroad, and funding/resource availability may in
some instances continue to favor MDCs within contemporary transnational civil society,
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significant progress toward parity has been made and the CSOs/NGOs of the developing
world may be more vibrant than at any point in history. For example, in recent decades
communist China has witnessed substantial growth in the total number and variety of
NGOs, yet compared with counterparts in many other regions, Chinese NGOs have not
fully matured and many have a reputation for corruption or perhaps more commonly,
poor leadership and ineffectiveness (Xiaoguang and Li 2006). A further example can be
evidenced in Indonesia in which NGOs and civil society is vibrant and thriving today,
under decades of the Soeharto dictatorship civil society was viewed with suspicion by the
government which sought to control it rather than support or engage with it (Antlov,
Ibrahim and Tuijl 2006).
Rates of progress have not been uniform, particularly when comparing
circumstances in democratic versus non-democratic countries---which usually have a
regional correlation via the global north/south dichotomy. The prevalence of democracy
and other regime types can vary regionally and at least historically such patterns may
have correlated with the presence of NGOs and civil society or the lack thereof, as
customarily the latter have been more closely associated with democratic rather than
authoritarian traditions. For example, the dearth of democracy in much of the MENA
(Middle East and North Africa) has impeded the advance of organized civil society which
has struggled for the mere right of free association more so than working toward
achieving specific policy objectives such as human rights, and this situation has not been
helped by the breakdown or absence of popular movements such as organized labor,
often a catalyst for civil society elements in other world regions (Sayed-Said 2004). Not
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only have most states in the Middle East restricted the growth and expansion of civil
society internally, but such restrictions have also contributed to the isolation of groups in
the region from interacting with each other and at the international level (Samad and
Mohamadieh 2008). However, even under such circumstances an often more muted form
of civil society has played an increasingly important role in observing and reporting on
compliance with both human rights, environmental and other initiatives in many
countries around the world and accordingly such organizations are rightly regarded as
elements of the international contract helping to regulate behavior in those policy areas
(Lake 2000).
Interestingly, such uneven patterns of civil society development could be seen in
data gleaned from this research. Imbalances in representation and participation of
CSOs/NGOs were consistently visible in statistics derived from the database. Civil
society in developed/MDC regions was usually overrepresented to a substantial degree
relative to proportion of population, while that of developing/LDC areas---particularly
Asia---was consistently underrepresented proportionally. At least some of the latter
disparity can be attributed to contrasts in economic prowess between the global north and
south, as organizations in developing nations may often lack the financial resources to
fully participate in international conferences, etc. Other factors such as democratic
versus authoritarian political climate in the host country can also be seen within the data
presented in this research to impact the degree of participation of CSOs/NGOs within
international forums such as UN-ECOSOC. The following provides a summary
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overview of the findings revealed via analysis of the UN iCSO database as related to the
first two research questions and first guiding hypothesis.

Findings Relative to Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses
As has been previously discussed, the concept of pluralism within a political
dynamic is somewhat subjective and open to interpretation. For definitional clarity, this
study defined political pluralism succinctly in Chapter 1 as the sharing of influence
among and active engagement of a diverse group of stakeholders within a political
dynamic. Following the exploration of statistics gleaned from the iCSO database and
analysis of plurality within the UN dynamic with transnational civil society, perhaps a
slightly more detailed definition of political plurality can be framed: the equitable and (to
the greatest extent feasible) proportional distribution of influence among as many
segments of society as possible in order that broader input and participation in policy
issue areas be facilitated. As noted in Chapter 1, for the UN dynamic with transnational
civil society this means that the greater the diversity of representation among civil society
in terms of regional/geographical representation as well as representation of policy/issue
areas, the greater the degree of contribution from diverse sources, and the influence of
pluralism.
Relative to the relationship between the United Nations and transnational civil
society, an exploration of political pluralism entails assessments of the degree and nature
of actual CSO/NGO engagement (i.e. is the influence of civil society at the UN
actual/potential or largely symbolic?) and the degree of proportional and equitable civil
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society representation. Analysis of the UN iCSO database revealed clear answers to the
first research question and to the elements of the second research question and first
guiding hypothesis as related to proportional representation and regional/geographical
equity. In gauging proportional representation across policy/issue areas substantial
imbalances could also be seen among countries/regions.

Research Questions
1a – What are the patterns of participation of NGOs in UN-ECOSOC programs in terms
of country and regional representation and are world regions and countries proportionally
represented?
Much of the data derived from the iCSO database does not address depth or
substance of participation. However, the fact that in many categories (e.g., organizational
type) entries for LDC/developing regions outnumber those of MDC/developed regions
indicate notable improvement in degrees of parity and plurality within the UN-civil
society dynamic between developed and developing nations and among most world
regions. In short, the civil society organizations of LDC/developing nations are at least
on paper better represented within the UN framework than at any point in history, though
such improvement with regard to increased inclusion and participation of historically
underrepresented countries and world regions does not necessarily mean that plurality in
the form of proportional parity has been achieved.
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In analyzing the iCSO database, this research used a multifaceted approach in
exploring the first research question and gauging the degree of plurality in terms of
proportional representation among regions and countries within the UN dynamic with
transnational civil society. One element entailed analysis of parity among world regions
with regard to the spatial distribution of all organizations presently holding consultative
status with UN-ECOSOC. While sizable numbers of organizations from Africa, Asia and
Latin America and the Caribbean did have consultative status, in all three regions their
numbers were not equivalent to their proportions of global population---with Asian-based
CSOs being especially underrepresented within the ECOSOC program. Conversely
CSOs/NGOs based in the predominantly developed regions of Anglo America, Europe
and Oceania were overrepresented relative to those regions’ share of global population.
The latter findings were mirrored in a case study of the 20 most populous
countries in the world and the degree to which each was represented proportionate to its
share of global population within the ECOSOC consultative status program. Among the
17 countries located in predominantly developing/LDC regions all but 2 were
proportionally underrepresented, mostly by wide margins. All 3 of the countries in
predominantly developed/MDC regions were overrepresented within the consultative
status program relative to their percentages of global population. This case study also
afforded an opportunity to compare data between democratic and non-quasi-democratic
nations regarding CSO representation within the UN dynamic. Among the 10 most
populous countries deemed to be democratic, the mean parity score was 111.5%
(overrepresentation relative to population) while among the 10 countries deemed
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non/quasi-democratic, a substantially lower mean of 48.8% (underrepresentation)
contrasted sharply. The latter findings help illustrate that disparities between the
vibrancy of civil society in the global north and south could reflection a combination of
not just economic disadvantages in less developed areas, but also political considerations,
as the majority of non/quasi-democratic regimes are found in the global south.
An additional case study was undertaken in which the 50 countries of Europe and
the sub-regions in which they are located were examined for spatial patterns regarding
general entries (not specific to the ECOSOC consultative status program) in the iCSO
database. The analysis compared the total number of entries in the database as well as
scoring each on the number of database entries per million people in each country’s
population. The contrast between the 26 higher income countries of Mediterranean,
Northern and Western Europe---areas never under communist rule, with the 24 lowerincome, former communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe was stark with the former
far better represented within the CS program. Data within this region-specific case study
was also analyzed according to whether countries were (1) in the EU, (2) EU candidates--at the time, or (3) neither members nor candidates to join the EU. The 28 EU members
had the highest mean number of CSO entries with 154 and second-highest mean of 8.3
entries per million people. EU candidates had the highest mean CSO entries per million
people with 9.6 and the lowest mean of 46 entries per country. Non-EU
members/candidates had the lowest mean by far with 6.7 entries per million people, but
an average of 60.9 entries per country, a larger number than EU-candidate countries, but
less than half that of EU members.
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1b – What are the patterns of participation and proportional representation in terms of
policy/issue focus areas?
In undertaking analyses of policy/topical areas as represented within the UN
iCSO database, patterns of regional participation could usually be evidenced. The
database was analyzed for general entries (not just those NGOs/CSOs currently holding
ECOSOC consultative status) related to organizational type and fields of
activity/expertise as specified by the UN. Additionally, data was also examined
regarding NGO/CSO scope and scale of operations, and with regard to UN CSO
accreditation/affiliation programs outside ESOSOC-CS---programs that generally had
narrower policy/focus areas (e.g., Commission on Sustainable Development).
Consistently in each of the latter categories examined, data revealed overrepresentation of
CSOs based in predominantly MDC/developed world regions and underrepresentation of
those in predominantly LDC/developing regions with regard to the regions’ proportions
of global population.
The study did not identify any substantial deficiencies in the form of gaps in
broad policy/issue areas, but fluctuation was found across topical and policy areas in
terms of numbers of CSOs involved reflecting diversity of specializations and interest
areas. It was expected that greater numbers of CSOs would be connected to broader
policy areas such as economic/social development as opposed to more narrow and
specialized focus areas such as statistical analysis or finance and such patterns were
revealed in the study. Among organizations with CS analyzed by organizational type---if
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the oddly broad database category of “NGOs” is excluded, the most common categories
were indigenous at 6.1% followed by associations and academics with 5.8% and 3.5%,
respectively. The least common were ageing and cooperatives, each with 0.3% and trade
unions with 0.2%. Among entries sorted by fields of activity/expertise, the most common
were those related to economic and social with 23.5%, followed by social development
and sustainable development, each with 17.5%. The least common were entries related to
statistics with 3.5% and the region-specific categories of NEPAD and conflict resolution
in Africa with 2.5% and 2.2%, respectively.

Guiding Hypotheses
1. Imbalances exist in patterns of participation of NGOs in consultative status with the
UN Economic and Social Council with regard to country/regional involvement (e.g.
NGOs of developed/MDC states are proportionally better represented than those of
developing/LDC states) and regarding the policy issues with which the NGOs are
concerned.

Analysis of statistics obtained from the UN iCSO database via descriptive
statistics strongly supports the contention of the first guiding hypothesis that proportional
imbalances exist within the UN-civil society framework. Consistently, many distinct
case study elements of the research, drawing upon the iCSO database and using a variety
of comparative measures demonstrated that UN-affiliated NGOs/CSOs headquartered in
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the predominantly MDC/developed regions of Anglo America, Europe and Oceania are
disproportionately overrepresented relative to those regions’ percentage of global
population. Conversely, NGOs/CSOs based in the predominantly LDC/developing
regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, while often large in overall
numbers, are as a whole disproportionately underrepresented relative to their percentage
of global population. The latter inequity in proportional representation/parity was found
to be especially stark for Asian-based NGOs/CSOs.
Substantial imbalances were also found to exist across policy/focus areas with
which NGOs/CSOs within the CS program are concerned. For example, in examining
entries by organizational typology, NGOs/CSOs related to academics, indigenous issues,
or foundations were well represented, whereas those related to ageing, labor or media
were scarcely represented. Likewise, examination of database entries classified by fields
of expertise revealed certain fields such as economic and social, social development,
sustainable development, and women/gender issues to be represented to a considerably
greater degree than other ostensibly important fields such as finance, population/
demography, public administration, and statistics.
Accordingly both components of the first guiding hypothesis appear to have been
confirmed via analysis of the iCSO database in that imbalances clearly exist with regard
to both regional/country representation as well as policy issues. Chapter 4 analyzes
results of survey data to address the second and third guiding hypotheses, which assert
respectively that a range of factors in combination lead to some organizations to
participate more than others in the CS program and that due to such factors most
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organizations within the CS program do not participate/contribute in any meaningful
way.
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IV. CHAPTER FOUR:
APPRAISAL OF CSO/NGO PARTICIPATION AND BARRIERS TO
PARTICIPATION

Dahl (1982) famously opined that “like individuals, organizations ought to possess some
autonomy, and at the same time they should also be controlled. Crudely stated, this is the
fundamental problem of pluralist democracy.”

Introduction
The 3rd component of the initial research question inquires as to the type and
degree of participation which exists among organizations holding consultative status (CS)
with UN-ECOSOC, the primary vehicle for UN interaction with international civil
society. The final two research questions ask why some organizations within the CS
program participate and other do not, and also how many CS-accredited organizations
fail to participate in UN-ECOSOC functions? The latter research questions led to the
formulation of the first and second guiding hypotheses which respectively stipulate that a
variety of factors such as financial ability and time/personnel commitments contribute to
some CS-organizations being more active than others and that most organizations within
the CS program are inactive and thus do not contribute in any meaningful way to the UN
goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society. These guiding hypotheses
were operationalized via a detailed survey questionnaire (provided in Appendix A)
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mailed to a random selection of 10% of all CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with UNECOSOC.

Participant Self-De-Selection from Survey and Possible Bias
Some indication exists that many---possibly most---subjects randomly selected to
participate in the study may have opted out of participating in the survey due to
reluctance to report little-no activity within the UN consultative status program. During
the course of the study, it was not uncommon to receive questions from participants
addressing a range of issues. The most common single topic about which I was
approached related to NGO’s dearth of participation with the UN. Five participants
contacted me to ask for guidance or express concerns related to the latter, often framing
the comments as “many of the questions do not apply to us” as they had not participated
in any programs or otherwise communicated with or made any contribution to the UN.
Most of these participants also stated some variant to the effect that they did not want to
“bias” or “skew” the data by responding with consistent 0s or 1s to number line or other
survey items attempting to gauge levels of participation. Several made comments to the
effect that they had “done nothing” or “had nothing to report” and thus did not feel they
could/should participate in the research.
My responses always stressed that such responses were perfectly valid, made
positive contribution to the research, and also that if only the most active organizations
self-report their experiences, the results would be skewed from the other direction.
Participants were reassured that activity levels within the program appeared to vary
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widely and that they appeared to be many other NGOs with participation rates similar to
their own. Also, I always stressed that responses were totally anonymous and the
identities of respondents and the NGOs with which they are affiliated would always be
kept completely confidential, information which had also been provided in the
survey/consent documentation and in the introductory email. Those efforts were largely
in vain as only 1 of those 5 subjects returned the survey questionnaire and that
respondent---with whom I spent more time communicating than any other participant--left many survey items blank rather than provide scores so low as to indicate little-no
participation or communication within the consultative status program or little-no
benefits derived from the affiliation.
In addition to the latter experience, the average responses for survey items
attempting to gauge levels of participation in its various forms were in general higher
than I had initially expected at the start of the research. Among the 62 questionnaires
returned, most indicated high-moderate number-line scores in terms of networking,
perceptions as to UN valuation of CSO participation, and the degree to which
participation in the CS program is justified. Most respondents also reported via other
objective survey items participating in an NGO coalition (51.6%), and most reported
participating in at least 1 UN forum at the New York (78.2%) and Geneva (50.9%)
headquarters, though not at Vienna (20.0%) or the regional UN offices. Most (75.4%)
also reported communicating with the UN since being in the CS program with email and
telephone calls being the most common mediums. A majority (61.2%) of respondents
also indicated that they had presented a written statement at a UN venue, although only a

139

minority (40.3%) indicated they had presented a verbal statement, and smaller
percentages still indicated that they had actually been asked to present a written or verbal
statement.
The possibility must be considered that portions of the survey data compiled
during the course of this research could demonstrate bias favoring (over-representing) the
NGOs that are more active participants in the consultative status program. If true, actual
rates of participation on the part of NGOs within the UN-ECOSOC consultative status
program may be less than numbers derived from this study indicate. There is no known
reason why data bias favoring (via over-representation of) inactive NGOs would have
resulted in findings skewed in that direction as those organizations would logically be
less inclined than more active NGOs to submit a completed questionnaire and also among
those which did submit the survey, less active organizations may be more inclined to
omit responses to many individual survey items rather than report data they may regard
as unfavorable to them. Accordingly, if data generated in this survey are skewed, it is in
the overestimation rather than underestimation of activity levels of NGOs within the
consultative status program.

Operationalization
Most questions contained in the survey instrument were objective in nature and
allow for numerical appraisal and comparison in addition to allowing for ease of response
and minimal time commitment on the part of participants. Number lines were utilized for
most (32 of 48---or 67% of total) survey items, wherein respondents indicated their
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reaction/score along a range of between 10 (high) to 0 (none/no) applicability. The
number lines as printed in the survey utilized only whole numbers, but as many
respondents marked scores between 2 whole numbers, half scores were recorded---i.e. a
response circling, underlining, highlighting (etc.) only the number 5 was recorded as a
score of 5, but a marking/indication falling between 5 and 6 on the printed number line
was recorded as 5.5. The mean score for each number line item was tabulated and the
latter along with the graphed distribution of responses is provided in the analysis.
Additionally, in an effort to better understand and analyze responses to number line items
and the range of responses, a percentage breakdown of responses is provided according to
whether they were high, medium/moderate or low-range scores. The latter scoring was
undertaken via division of all 21 possible numerical scores into 3 equidistant ranges:
scores ranging from 10-7---high; 6.5-3.5---moderate/medium; 3-0 low.
In addition to number line items, 13 other questions (27%) included in the
survey were objective in nature, requiring responses that were either numerical or
otherwise quantifiable, allowing for objective analysis and comparison. As was also the
case with number-line items, these questions generally had a high rate of completion
among returned surveys, with the vast majority of respondents providing data for all 13
items. These survey items were analyzed according to numerical totals and on a
breakdown of percentage of responses.
Only 3 survey items were open-ended discussion questions. Given the overall
length of the survey and time commitment needed to complete and submit the
questionnaire, the number of subjective discussion-oriented questions---the most time-
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consuming items to complete, was minimized in an effort to avoid adversely impacting
response rate. The responses to the subjective, open-ended survey items were evaluated
via qualitative content analysis. All such responses were read to identify the nature of
feedback and what patterns existed among responses. Via coding of feedback, response
categories were created to aid in framing and analyzing content of discussions and also to
allow for some degree of objective comparison. For example, with regard to the initial
question as to ‘why did your organization seek consultative status with the UN?”,
responses were found to fall into 1 of 2 basic categories: reasons specific to the particular
mission/scope of the CSO; or reasons that were more general in scope. The follow up to
the latter question, asked if those goals had been achieved and why or why not.
Responses were found to fall into 1 of 4 types: yes---unqualified; yes---partly or
qualified; no; or unknown/TBD. The third open-ended item asked how the UN could
improve the experience for organizations in the CS program. The latter yielded a widely
diverse range of comments, but which could be sorted/organized around 10 distinct
themes---some more commonly cited in the feedback than others: access, bureaucracy,
communication, expertise, fairness/equity, funding, general guides, networking/capacitybuilding, meetings, specific to policy/focus areas of organization.

Profile of Survey Participants
As illustrated in Table 4.1, the number of questionnaires returned was roughly
proportionate to the overall percentage of CS organizations holding Special accreditation
status. However, among survey respondents, those with General status were
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disproportionately overrepresented and those with Roster status disproportionately
underrepresented---both to substantial degrees. The latter patterns cannot be attributed to
skewed sampling and survey participant selection as the proportion of CSOs randomly
selected for the survey closely mirrored the distribution of accreditation levels of the
general population, partial confirmation that the random sampling process yielded a
representative sample. As previously discussed, it is my belief that a self-(de)selection
occurred with the surveys wherein those CS organizations with higher levels of UN
activity/involvement (e.g. those holding General status) would be more likely to report
this and return the survey questionnaire, and conversely those with little-to-no UN
involvement (possibly disproportionately concentrated as a pattern among Roster status
organizations) would be less intrinsically motivated to complete the survey and in effect
self-incriminate.

Table 4.1: Levels of Consultative Status Accreditation of NGO Survey Respondents
versus Distribution of Accreditation Levels within CS Program Overall

Accreditation Levels of 439
Randomly Selected CSOs

Accreditation Levels of
Survey Respondents

Accreditation Levels of
all CSOs (Nov. 2016)

General

16 (3.6%)

14 (23.3%)

151 (3.2%)

Special

339 (77.2%)

43 (71.7%)

3595 (75.9%)

Roster

84 (19.1%)

3 (5%)

993 (20.9%)

Total

439

60*

4739

*Of 62 returned surveys, 2 respondents did not identify their level of accreditation

143

Table 4.2 presents a comparison of the spatial and MDC/LDC distribution
patterns of CSOs randomly selected to receive the survey questionnaire relative to
distribution of all CSOs with CS status and regional proportion of world population. The
regional distributions of those organizations randomly selected to receive the survey
questionnaire closely mirrors the regional distributions of all CSOs holding consultative
status with Un-ECOSOC, an indication of the validity and representative nature of the
sample selections. Overall, 33.9% of CSOs randomly selected were from predominantly
LDC/developing regions, while the latter constitute 38.7% of all organizations within the
CS program. Likewise 66.1% of CSOs randomly selected were from predominantly
MDC/developed areas, with the latter comprising 61.3% of all CS organizations.
Data obtained for this comparison illustrates the lack of regional parity within the
CS program overall. While the 3 predominantly LDC/developing regions of Africa, Asia
and Latin America and the Caribbean collectively constitute 84.7% of the world’s
population, as of November 2016 only 38.7% of CSOs holding consultative status with
UN-ECOSOC were headquartered in those regions. Although all 3 developing regions
were proportionally underrepresented within the program, the disparity was especially
great with regard to Asia, which comprises 59.7% of the world’s population yet is host to
only 18% of organizations within the CS program. Conversely, the 3 predominantly
MDC/developed regions of Anglo America, Europe and Oceania collectively make up
just 15.3% of the global population yet all 3 were proportionally overrepresented and
collectively host 61.3% of all CSOs holding consultative status.
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Table 4.2: Regional and LDC/MDC Distribution Patterns of (1) CSOs Randomly
Selected for Survey, (2) All CSOs with ECOSOC CS, and (3) Relative to
Proportion of Global Population

Regional Distribution of 439
of
Randomly Selected CSOs

Regional Distribution

Regional Proportion

of all CSOs w/ CS

Global Population

Predominantly LDC/Developing Regions
Africa

57 (13% of 439)

674 (15.3% of 4404)

16.4%

Asia

70 (15.9%)

794 (18.0%)

59.7%

238 (5.4%)

8.6%

1706 (38.7%)

84.7%

Latin Am/Car 22 (5%)
Totals: 149 (33.9%)

Predominantly MDC/Developed Regions
Anglo Amer 130 (29.6%)

1168 (26.5%)

4.9%

Europe

154 (35.1%)

1434 (32.6%)

9.9%

Oceania

6 (1.4%)

96 (2.2%)

0.5%

2698 (61.3%)

15.3%

Totals: 290 (66.1%)
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Survey Responses – General Background
The first 2 survey items were also 2 of the 3 open-ended discussion questions.
Respondents were asked why their organization sought consultative status with the UN
and in turn were asked if those goals had been achieved and why or why not. Of 62
survey questionnaires returned, the vast majority---57 (91.9%) provided feedback for one
or both of these items. In general responses for the first survey item related to why the
organization sought CS with the UN were more detailed than information provided for
the follow up question inquiring as to whether those goals had been realized. Responses
to the first question were organized into 2 basic categories: those that are specific to the
policy/focus area of a particular organization/respondent; and those that were more
general in scope.
Of the respondents addressing the first question, 18 (31.6%) cited reasons that
were specific to the policy/focus area of their specific CSO as motivating factors for
seeking consultative status. For example, a labor-related CSO responded that it sought to
represent workers and unions interests and protect their rights, stating that “it is
inconceivable that the UN or any other major international institution function without
direct involvement and input of trade union organizations.” Another highly specialized
CSO indicated their desire to contribute their expertise in risk governance/management
and identify collaboration opportunities and stay updated as to international
developments related to the latter. Development-related issues (economic or
human/social) were the most commonly cited policy/issue areas as drivers. Several
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responses also touched upon the organization’s desire to increase its profile specifically
within the policy/issue area(s) in which it specialized.
The majority of responses---39 (68.4%)---focused upon a diverse array of more
general motivating factors. Among the most common responses were those indicating a
desire to be involved in various respects with the UN including the ability to attend
conferences and obtain information about international issues. Others referenced the goal
of networking or otherwise interacting with other NGOs. Sharing of information or best
practices or international outreach in general were commonly cited motivating factors.
Several respondents were also quite candid in that they explained that no or few clear
goals for their participation in the CS program had ever been defined.
Overall, there seemed to be a roughly equal division between the number of
altruistic motivators (e.g., contribute expertise to the UN; collaborative research/projects)
as opposed to incentives of a more intrinsic nature (e.g., increased credibility or visibility
for the organization; new funding opportunities) revealed by respondents, with
altruistic/external motives being provided slightly more commonly. Interestingly,
respondents citing mostly or entirely altruistic/external motives for seeking consultative
status with the UN were somewhat more likely to indicate their goals for participating in
the CS program had been achieved than organizations which listed more intrinsic
motivations for participating. The implication of the latter is that the CSOs whose sole or
top priority was to contribute are perhaps more likely to find success and satisfaction than
those organizations which chiefly sought some form of tangible benefit from the
association.
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In some respects the follow-up question to the first survey item yielded more
interesting results, particularly with regard to measuring participation and the
considerations which promote or impede the latter---the focal points of the second and
third guiding hypotheses. Among the 56 respondents providing feedback as to whether
their goals for seeking CS with the UN had been realized, 26 (46.4%) indicated “yes”, a
2:1 margin over the 13 (23.2%) organizations which indicated “no”. In justifying their
responses, those organizations reporting that their goals had been realized had most
commonly sought to enhance their profile/visibility internationally, participate in UN
forums/functions, or to facilitate better networking, idea-sharing or other forms of
communication internationally. While some respondents indicating one or more of the
latter as goals, noted they had not been achieved, the majority of the organizations
indicating that no goals had been achieved via the CS program either (1) indicated lack of
clearly framed goals from the outset, or (2) had originally sought specific benefits for
their organization which at least in some cases (i.e., funding opportunities or “UN
training”) may have been unrealistic.
An additional 8 respondents gave feedback that could be best described as a
qualified or partial “yes”. Such a response would indicate realization of only some of
multiple objectives or only partial achievement of a stated objective. For example, one
respondent noted in the first question that their goal was to “obtain recognition via the
UN system as an exceptional NGO and also to use the forum to share thoughts and
ideas.” In the follow up question the same respondent noted that they had only partially
realized their goals in that they “welcome the recognition (via the CS accreditation) but
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find it difficult to share information or promote their organization’s expertise” due to
logistical barriers such as time, personnel and funding constraints. If such responses are
included with feedback equating to an unqualified “yes”, a total of 34 respondents
(60.7%) indicated they at least some of the goals which motivated their organization to
pursue CS affiliation.
A total of 9 respondents (16.1%) essentially indicated that they could not
effectively judge whether or not their goals for the CS program had been achieved. In
some cases respondents indicated that they have not held CS long enough yet to assess
whether their goals have been achieved, although in 2 such cases respondents have
possessed the accreditation for several years. In other cases, it appears the organizations
at least initially had intentions of participating but as yet have not due to logistical
constraints. One such respondent noted that the levels of attainment of their goals in the
CS program are as yet unclear as “the channels (for participation) are not convenient”.
Another indicated that they are still seeking “ways to contribute and work within the UN
system in ways that our finances and other limitations allow.” While not all respondents
elaborated specifically as to why they were unable to realize their initial goals relative to
the CS program, among those that did provide details, limited organizational resources
including financial constraints were the most commonly mentioned theme.
One of the more interesting patterns to emerge from analysis of the follow-up
question as to whether goals had been achieved and why/why not, was the dichotomy of
responses related to the organizational goal’s breadth of scope. As indicated in Table 4.3,
among the 56 respondents providing feedback for the survey item, 18 (32.1%) had
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indicated in the previous question that their organizational incentive for seeking CS
accreditation was linked to some specific aspect of the CSOs policy/issue area such as
development, labor, or human rights. The majority of respondents addressing this survey
item---38 or 67.9%---did not cite goals specific to their organization’s policy/focus area,
but indicated more general objectives such as participation in UN forums, have a voice in

Table 4.3: Responses to Whether CSO Goals for CS Program Had Been Achieved or
Not: A Comparison of Broad/General Goals versus Those Specific to a
Particular Aspect of Organization’s Policy/Issue Area

Responses from CS Organizations Indicating Highly Mission/Policy-Specific Goals for
CS Program Participation
Responses: N and Percentage of Total
Yes

No

Unknown

Partial or
Qualified Yes

7 (38.9%)

5 (27.8%)

5 (27.8%)

1 (5.6%)

Total Responses
18

Responses from CS Organizations Indicating Broader, More General Goals for CS
Program Participation

Responses: N and Percentage of Total
Yes

No

Unknown

Partial or
Qualified Yes

19 (50%)

8 (21.1%)

4 (10.6%)

7 (18.4%)
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Total Responses
38

international issues, interact with other NGOs, enhanced credibility, etc. Among those
respondents indicating goals specific to their organizational scope/focus, notably fewer
(38.9%) indicated “yes” or partially/qualified yes (5.6%) as to their goals within the CS
program being attained as opposed to responding organizations which had specified
broader, more general goals (50% - yes, 18.4% partially/qualified yes). More
respondents indicating CS program goals specific to their CSOs policy/focus areas also
indicated “no” (27.8%) or “unknown” (27.8%) regarding achievement of said goals than
was the case with those indicating more general goals (21.1% - no, 10.6% unknown). A
possible conclusion is that some organizations within the CS program may find it easier
to realize goals that are more general in focus rather than objectives specific to particular
aspects of their organizational mission and in turn may find the experience of
participation in the CS program more fulfilling.
Regardless of the breadth of goals which initially motivated the organizations’ to
pursue CS accreditation, the sometimes detailed and impassioned feedback of many of
the respondents indicating that they have not achieved their goals during their
experiences with the CS program contribute to understanding many obstacles within the
dynamic. For example, common themes in the survey findings were that many CSaccredited organizations lack the resources to participate and/or do not know how to
derive meaningful benefits from the program. One respondent indicated that “all we have
received (from the UN) are invitations to conferences, but our organization…lacks the
resources to attend. One time we were able to attend an ECOSOC conference, but the
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benefits to our organization were unclear…and nothing learned seemed immediately
relevant to our needs.”
Another potentially important issue for the CS organizations which hoped to
interact with representatives of foreign governments---for reasons such as impacting
policy formulation internationally---is the segregation of civil society venues from
country delegations and other UN bodies and the potentially inadequate space available
for NGOs to function effectively within the CS program. One respondent provided
detailed feedback concerning the latter trend, stating that “in the last decade we have seen
at the UN, the shrinking of physical and communication space and the NGOs are now
cordoned off into the ‘ghetto’ of the Church Centre, Salvation Army, Armenian Centre
and other venues for our meetings, called (by the UN) ‘parallel events’ either opposite the
UN Building or even further away.” The respondent continued: “This means that it is
very rare indeed for official government delegates ever to attend the parallel events where
very different messages and information…can be relayed, different from the formal
speeches in the UN Building.”
A different respondent noted that one potential solution to the shortage of
meeting/communication space for NGOs might exist in the form of coalitions: “The large
number of CS organizations means that all cannot speak at official meetings, but often
multiple views can be presented through a single speaker who represents a larger group
of organizations.” However, the survey results indicate only around one-half of
respondents have ever participated in an NGO coalition and among those which do it
seems unlikely that the views of each NGO could be heard on each issue of potential
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importance to them. No solution appears to be in sight in terms of the segregation of CS
organizations via the ‘parallel event’ approach. One respondent noted that although they
had been hosting events and otherwise actively participating at the UN for the past 18
years, “over the last decade (since the implementation of the ‘parallel events’ strategy) I
feel that no one making policy, i.e. government delegates, can hear us and so our issues
are ignored.” Among the organizations recently admitted to the CS program which
hoped to proactively influence international policy-making, but see no substantive
opportunity to do so, and among the long-time participants who have witnessed their
initial access to international delegations and UN bodies which contribute to policy
formulation progressively erode, it is understandable that some degree of disillusionment
may occur and that the latter and the combined realization of increasingly limited access
to corridors of power and influence could potentially undermine the ability or willingness
of organizations to fully participate in the CS program.
The third survey question inquired as to the level of CS accreditation of
participants and whether they felt the classification level was appropriate. Of the 45
responses to the latter portion of the question, the vast majority---39 or 86.7%---deemed
their organization’s classification/accreditation level within the CS program as
appropriate, including all respondents from General Status organizations. However 2 of
3 (66.7%) Roster Status organizations which submitted the completed survey indicated
they found their organizational classification/accreditation level inappropriate, as did 4 of
43 (9.3%) organizations with Special Status. While the questionnaire did not specifically
ask respondents to elaborate as to why, it can be inferred that in all 6 cases, the CSOs
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believed a higher level of CS accreditation was more suitable for their organizations. It is
worth noting that the question regarding appropriate accreditation level had among the
lowest response rates of any survey item, with only 45 (72.6%) of 62 respondents
answering, indicating that many participants were either unsure as to the appropriateness
of their CS accreditation level or were otherwise uncomfortable addressing the question
directly.
Participants were also asked via a number-line question to indicate the degree to
which their CS accreditation level/type impeded their ability to participate in UN
programs, with 10 denoting a very high degree of difficulty and 0 no difficulty. As
illustrated in Figure 4.1, a total of 56 respondents had a mean score of 3.7 indicate lowmoderate levels of difficulty posed by their CS status. 31 (55.4%) of 56 respondents
indicated a low score of 3 or less and 15 (26.8%) indicated a moderate-range score of
between 3.5 to 6.5. However, a substantial minority of 10 respondents (17.9%) indicated
a high score of between 7-10, conveying real or perceived difficulty posed by their
consultative status accreditation level in interacting with the UN---presumably the
restrictions placed on the ability to make formal statements. As was previously discussed
(see page __), CS organizations with General status have the most freedom and flexibility
in conveying positions on issues, with those holding Special status are more restricted,
followed by Roster status which imposes the greatest restrictions.
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Figure 4.1: Degree to which Level/Type of Consultative Status Impedes CSO’s Ability
to Participate in UN Programs

Another survey item asked respondents to indicate on number lines how they
would rate the importance of each of 5 specific considerations concerning their
organization’s desire to have UN consultative status. The factors specified were: (1)
general prestige/visibility, (2) credibility in fundraising, (3) networking with other
CSOs/organizations, (4) contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other
organizations, and (5) contributing written or verbal position statements on issues.
Figures 4.2-4.6 provide the total number, mean and range of number line responses for
each of the latter 5 items.
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Figure 4.2: Importance of General Prestige/Visibility Concerning CSO Desire to Have
UN Consultative Status

Figure 4.3: Importance of Credibility in Fundraising Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN
Consultative Status
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Figure 4.4: Importance of Networking with Other Organizations Concerning CSO Desire
to Have UN Consultative Status

Figure 4.5: Importance of Contributing/Exchanging Research with the UN and Other
Organizations Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status
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Figure 4.6: Importance of Contributing Written or Verbal Position Statements on Issues
Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status

The variation in mean scores across the 5 considerations was not substantial, with
general prestige/visibility scoring highest at 7.7, followed closely by networking with
other organizations, contributing written/verbal position statements, and
contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other organizations with means of 7.6,
7.4, and 7.2 respectively. All of the latter can be regarded as high-range scores and
reflect almost equally high importance afforded by most respondents for each of the latter
4 considerations. The remaining item, credibility in fundraising yielded a somewhat
lower mean score of 6.0, which although still moderately high, indicates fundraising was
not a primary concern for most and was of the least importance among the considerations
respondents were specifically asked to rate.
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Participants also had the option of specifying other considerations important to
their organization’s desire to obtain consultative status. A total of 15 respondents
specified a diverse range of other factors not addressed in the 5 number line options. All
of the additional considerations specified were rated high (7-10) in importance, and 7 of
the factors were rated 10 on the scale, denoting utmost importance. Table 4.4 presents a
comprehensive list of each of the additional considerations as specified by respondents.
Not all of the comments were detailed and some were not directly linked to the question
at hand (e.g. “our CS level impedes us”), but some of the comments were insightful. For
example, several related directly to the national circumstances in which the CSO was
based including participation in advocacy that would be limited in the home country.
Several organizations also specified considerations specific to their policy areas or scope
of mission.
In an effort to gauge the types of actual positive impacts (as opposed to initial
goals/incentives for obtaining CS addressed in a previous survey item) UN consultative
status has had upon CSOs within the program, as well as general patterns and motivations
for participation, participants were asked to use number line scores to rate the beneficial
impact of each of 6 areas specified in the questionnaire: (1) making meaningful
connections with other NGOs in the US; (2) making meaningful connections with other
NGOs internationally; (3) making meaningful contributions to the UN; (4) general
prestige/visibility; (5) media publicity; and (6) aiding in fundraising. Figures 4.7-4.12
provide the total number, mean and range of number line responses for each of the 6
survey items.
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Table 4.4: Range of Additional Considerations Specified by Survey Respondents as
Being Important to Their Decision to Obtain CS Accreditation

Recruiting for organization
Joining other UN organizations (UNFCCC)
Interaction with Other NGOs within our country
Create awareness of global interdependency among UN membership
Legitimize our work when lobbying the government
Participate in global advocacy processes that are limited by our own national government
Universal peace
New ideas
Media coverage of UN involvement
Raise awareness about needs/rights of people with intellectual disabilities
Submit accurate data/information about our country (Iran)
Political considerations in determining the status of our organization
Advance the cause of families globally
Discussion
Our level of (CS) accreditation impedes us
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Considerable variation in mean scores existed across the 6 areas, with 3 areas
achieving either high or moderate-high mean scores and 3 with moderate or lowmoderate scores. The highest mean and the only mean which would qualify as a highrange score in terms of benefits derived from the CS program was the 7.1 average for
prestige/legitimacy earned for your organization. A similar survey item asking
respondents why they initially sought consultative status also ranked prestige as the
highest consideration, seemingly indicating that this goal of enhanced status via official
association with the UN is both a top initial priority and one that has been largely realized
as a benefit by organizations within the program responding to the survey.
Making meaningful contributions to the UN and making meaningful connections
with other organizations internationally had the next highest mean scores of 6.4 and 6.1
respectively, both falling in the upper end of the moderate range for scores. Interestingly,
both of the latter survey items relating to benefits realized also had roughly equivalent
survey questions related to initial motivation for pursuing CS with the UN. In both cases
the mean scores for benefits realized were substantially lower (by a full point or more),
implying that although many CSOs feel an overall positive impact was experienced it
may have fallen short of initial expectations formulated at the onset of pursuing/obtaining
consultative status.
Substantially lower mean scores were obtained for the remaining 3 survey items
within the category. Media publicity for your organization and making meaningful
connections with other NGOs in the US had means of only 4.8 and 4.7 respectively,
denoting that neither were generally regarded as a primary benefit by respondents.
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Beyond initial press attention that may be derived upon first obtaining formal
accreditation with UN ECOSOC, it stands to reason that CSOs with little-no substantive
activity level within the program would not receive further media attention. Initially I did
not know what to expect in response to the item gauging connection with US-based civil
society. Given the prominence of US-based CSOs internationally in general and within
the CS program in particular and also given the importance of the US as a source of
funding and other support for initiatives related to international civil society, I had been
curious to see if non-US organizations specifically coveted building relationships with
US counterparts, but survey findings indicate that the latter clearly is not the case for
most respondents.
The lowest mean score for the series of items inquiring as to organizational
benefits derived from the CS program were for aid in fundraising for your organization,
with 3.9---the lowest mean score obtained for any number line item in the study. The
latter results parallel the mean score for credibility in fundraising, which also scored
lowest among items gauging initial motivation for obtaining CS accreditation. The
survey results related to fundraising were among the more surprising outcomes of the
study. Though I did not have a clear sense as to whether UN affiliation would actually
prove to be beneficial in fundraising (through prestige/credibility of association etc.) in
reality, I had initially assumed it would be among the top priorities or perceived
advantages among CSOs seeking to obtain CS. Survey results clearly indicated that at
least for the majority of respondents neither was the case.
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Figure 4.7: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Connections
with Other NGOs in the US

Figure 4.8: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Connections
with Other NGOs Internationally

163

Figure 4.9: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Contributions to
the UN

Figure 4.10: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Prestige/Legitimacy Derived for
Organization

164

Figure 4.11: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Media Publicity

Figure 4.12: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Aid in Fundraising
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Participants were also given the option of indicating “other” as a beneficial impact
of obtaining CS and were asked to specify. A total of 10 respondents volunteered such
information, with most of the comments being scored positively and 1 comment scored at
0: “no known/observable benefit derived”. A comprehensive summary of the comments
offered is provided in Table 4.5. The majority of the comments related to legitimacy or
credibility which had been represented as a number line item, though respondents often
elaborated as to how (or with what entity) credibility had been enhanced. In two
instances respondents noted how CS status had benefited their organization with regard to
its specific policy area or scope of mission---i.e., personal safety awareness, connections
with exchange students. One response centered upon benefitting from obtaining general
information stemming from the CS program.
Table 4.5: Range of Additional Considerations Specified by Survey Respondents as
Benefits Derived from Their Organization Obtaining CS Accreditation

Educational resources/materials and useful information
Shows our work has international respect & we may be able to influence international
policies
Awareness of personal safety issues
Credibility/legitimacy to participate in national processes
Credibility when offering consulting or collaborating
Beneficial impact with national government (Bangladesh)
Credibility/trust in relationship with government
Credibility with our beneficiaries (donors)
Legitimacy when lobbying government and political parties
Meaningful connections with US exchange students
No known/observable benefit derived
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Within the “general background” section of the questionnaire participants were
also asked which leader/position within their organization was chiefly responsible for
seeking CS with the UN. In constructing the survey, I hoped that this item may help shed
some light on why some CSOs within the CS program participate and some do not. For
example, if the goal of obtaining CS accreditation was in most cases initiated by a board
member or other person (e.g., donor or volunteer) other than a member of senior
leadership in charge of day-to-day operations, perhaps lack of managerial support for the
association with the UN could be inferred. However, the latter was not found to be the
case among respondents, with around two-thirds indicating it was senior management
within their organization that bore most responsibility for seeking CS accreditation.
Among the fixed-choice options the most common response was executive director with
34.4%, followed closely by CEO with 31.3%. 15.6% of respondents indicated that one or
more board members were primarily responsible. Participants also had the option of
indicating “other” and asked to specify the job title, an option chosen by 18.8% of
respondents. A fairly diverse range of titles/responses were provided with president,
secretary general, director of a specific division/program, or a committee or committee
chair the most common responses.
In a question also relatable to the questionnaire section regarding participation,
organizations receiving the survey were asked if their organization had ever
communicated with the UN since obtaining CS accreditation---excluding the routine
required submission of quadrennial reports. The goal of the latter survey item was
obviously to help gauge degrees and patterns of participation of CSOs within the CS
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program. Of 61 surveys answering the question, a large majority---75.4%---indicated
that they in fact had communicated with the UN. The manner in which organizations
communicated and the frequency of interactions are explored in the “participation” and
“networking/communications” sections of the survey, findings of which are discussed
beginning on page 173.

Survey Responses – Accreditation and Representation
UN offices are geographically dispersed throughout many world regions. The
largest---and via serving as the seat of the General Assembly, Security Council and many
other key UN bodies, the most important---UN presence is its primary headquarters in
New York. The Geneva headquarters is second in size and also in importance as it is
home to some 25 major UN divisions/programs including the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, and the World Health Organization. Third in size and significance is UN
headquarters in Vienna, host to several UN agencies/programs including the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, the UN maintains regional headquarters in 5
locations: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia---North Africa; Bangkok, Thailand---Asia and the
Pacific; Beirut, Lebanon---Mideast and Western Asia; Nairobi, Kenya---Sub-Saharan
Africa; and Santiago, Chile---Latin America and the Caribbean.
As part of the effort to discern patterns and degree of CSO participation with the
UN, the survey questionnaire contained items designed to gauge levels of participation at
different UN locations: each of the 3 UN headquarters in New York, Geneva and Vienna
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and also 4 of the 5 regional offices---in an oversight, reference to Nairobi was not
included in the survey, but as almost no respondents indicated any presence or history of
activity at the regional centers, the latter omission likely had little impact on the study
findings. The first such survey item asked participants to indicate if a representative of
their CSO has successfully obtained a UN grounds pass/ID (the latter is a higher standard
for the designated UN representative of a CSO---rather than merely submitting names of
intended representatives---as obtaining the grounds pass requires their physical presence
on site and often indicates the representative actually attended a function at the site) for
each of 7 locations. Those indicating that representatives had obtained passes/IDs were
asked to indicate the number of representatives obtaining passes/IDs for each site.
UN guidelines allow each organization holding consultative status to designate up
to 7 representatives for annual passes at each of the 3 UN headquarters locations (up to 9
temporary passes may also be requested which are valid for up to 3 months), and up to 2
representatives for each regional site. It was expected that CSO-designated
representatives would be concentrated in New York and the other 2 headquarters sites in
descending order of site importance with far fewer representatives designated at regional
offices and as illustrated in Table 4.6, this is precisely what the survey data reflected. 42
CSOs indicated their representatives had successfully obtained their credentials for New
York, followed by 26 for Geneva and 9 for Vienna. Only 2 organizations (both based in
the Mideast---one of these in Lebanon) reported credentialed representatives for Beirut,
and only 1 organization (based in Africa) reported credentialed representation for Addis
Ababa, with 0 reported for Bangkok or Santiago. The mean number of CSO
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representatives among organizations reporting representation at the sites was highest at
5.0 in New York, followed by Geneva with 2.5 and Vienna with 1.9. The 2 regional
offices each had a mean of 1 designated representative.
These distributions are logical in that organizations are designating
representatives where there are larger numbers of UN offices/programs, larger UN staffs
and consequently potentially more opportunities to participate in UN functions via their
consultative status. Many of the UN’s most important organs and conferences are based
in New York, as is ECOSOC itself, the parent organization of the CS program and chief
catalyst of the UN-civil society dynamic. Smaller numbers of other UN agencies/projects
are headquartered in Geneva and in turn Vienna and both sites are often host to
conferences though not at the size or frequency associated with New York. Regional UN
offices have considerably smaller staffs, more narrow scope of operations and are
principally host to projects or conferences that are specific to their respective
geographical areas such as regional economic commissions. The CSOs that via their CS
accreditation designate representatives to the regional UN offices likely are either
headquartered in that region or have a large proportion of their programs specific to the
region. The latter reality was reflected in the survey findings as the only respondents
reporting credentialed representatives at regional offices of the UN were headquartered in
the same region---if not even the same country.
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Table 4.6: Designation of UN Representatives by Location and Number of Grounds
Passes/IDs Reported Obtained per Site

UN Headquarters/
Regional Office

N of Respondents Designating
Representatives for Site

Mean N of Reps. Obtaining
ID/Grounds Pass for Site

New York

42

5.0

Geneva

26

2.5

Vienna

9

1.9

Regional Offices
Addis Ababa

1

1

Bangkok

0

0

Beirut

2

1

Santiago

0

0

In attempting to assess commitment to and participation in the CS program,
participants were asked what total number of UN representatives their organization will
have obtained a UN grounds pass/ID (for all sites combined) in a typical year. Among
the 55 respondents answering the question, 4.2 was the mean total. The latter was
perhaps slightly higher than anticipated, but the range of responses to the survey item was
considerable, with the majority of respondents indicating only 1 or 2 representatives
typically obtained credentials annually, and a minority of respondents indicating numbers
higher than the mean.
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Another survey item asked participants to indicate the UN site(s) at which they
have ever participated in meetings, conferences or other functions since obtaining
consultative status. As expected and indicated in Table 4.7, the responses closely
mirrored the data for accredited representatives by UN sites. The majority of respondents
(43 or 78.2% of responses) indicated participation at some form of event at the UN’s
New York headquarters, followed by Geneva (28/50.9%) and Vienna (11/20.0%)
respectively. Only small numbers of respondents indicated ever having participated in
any event at a UN regional site, with Santiago, Chile earning the smallest total (2/3.6%).

Table 4.7: CS-Accredited CSO Participation in Functions per UN Site

UN Headquarters/
Regional Office

N of Respondents Designating
Representatives for Site (% of Responses)

New York

43 (78.2%)

Geneva

28 (50.9%)

Vienna

11 (20.0%)
Regional Offices

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

3 (5.5%)

Bangkok, Thailand

4 (7.3%)

Beirut, Lebanon

4 (7.3%)

Santiago, Chile

2 (3.6%)
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Asked to assess the overall difficulty involved in the process of accrediting their
UN representatives, respondents were asked to rate the level of difficulty on a number
line with 10 indicating a very high level of difficulty and 0 indicating no difficulty. As
can be seen in Figure 4.13, the mean response among 57 answers was 4.9, which at face
value would seem to indicate that the designation and credentialing of UN representatives
does not pose a substantial challenge for most CS-accredited organizations. However,
among all responses, 20 or 35.1% were 7 or higher, regarded as a higher range score on
the number line as constructed. The exact same number of responses, 20 or 35.1%
denoted a low score of 0-3.5. In other words, for every organization which reported
little-no difficulty with the process of designating/credentialing their organizational
representatives to the UN, another organization reported high levels of difficulty. The
results of this survey item may serve as a good insight into barriers to participation. For
example, if more than one-third of CS program participants experience difficulty with
what should be a relatively straight-forward process---a process explained in detail in
both print and online literature made available to accredited CSOs---more complex
undertakings such as conference participation and understanding the process of providing
statements and engaging with coalitions/networks of other CSOs may prove daunting.
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Figure 4.13: Level of CSO Difficulty in Accrediting UN Representatives within the CS
Program

The final item in the accreditation/representation section asked respondents to
select from forced-choice options in order to best characterize the nature of their
organization’s UN representative(s). The strategy of including this survey item was that
it may lend insight into the nature and degree of CSO participation within the CS
program. Specifically, if very few board members or donors were designated as UN
representatives, that may possibly indicate lack of support/enthusiasm from the latter
segments for the CS program, potentially helping to explain low levels of organizational
participation. However, survey results indicated board members were commonly

174

appointed as CSO’s UN representatives with respondents indicating a total of 52 in the
role, the 2nd most common response. The most common characterization of the nature of
UN representatives was full-time employee, with 67 denoted in that role, with a tie for
the 3rd most common response between donors (indicating their appointment is not
uncommon) and part-time employees, each with 29 representatives in the roles. The
forced-choice options for this item did perhaps shed some light on what was likely not a
primary driver of lack of participation within the CS program as results showed board
members and donors were often designated as UN representatives, implying support and
interest in the program on their part. However, forced-choice responses to this survey
item did not identify issues related to designation of UN representatives that may impede
participation.
Participants also had the option to indicate “other unpaid supporter” of their
organization. Interestingly, the latter received the highest number of responses to the
survey item with 84 (32.2%) of 261 total responses. This level of response for “other”
had not been anticipated and consequently participants were not asked to specify the
title/nature of other UN representatives. However, some respondents did voluntarily
denote the title or background with the most common responses including former
employee (of various titles/responsibilities), former board member/chair, or the chair of
various types of advisory committees within the organization such as a governmental
affairs or public relations committee.
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Survey Responses – Participation, Networking and Communication
The questionnaire items addressing participation and networking/communication
(both forms of participation) are especially important to the contention of the third
guiding hypothesis that most organizations within the CS program do not participate in
the program in a meaningful way. These questionnaire items are also of foundational
importance to the second guiding hypothesis in that survey findings (e.g. absence of
communication) may help in understanding some of the factors responsible for lack of
participation on the part of many CS-accredited organizations and why some are more
likely to participate than others. While survey findings in general indicated somewhat
low to moderate levels of activity, the totality of data derived from these sections of the
questionnaire does not conclusively support the guiding hypothesis that most
organizations in the CS program do not participate in any meaningful way or fail to make
any substantive contribution within the UN-civil society dynamic. The findings do
however show minimal communication between most CSOs and the UN or secondary
entities (other UN-affiliated CSOs, foreign governments, other IGOs) and also indicate
that only a minority of respondents have ever hosted/organized a meeting or other event
at a UN forum and only slightly more than half have ever participated with other CSOs in
any UN-related network or coalition.
Participants were asked approximately how many UN-related conferences,
meetings or workshops their CSO has attended in 3 different time periods: 2005-present,
1995-2005, and pre-1995. The results for the most recent time period are potentially the
most useful as the majority of organizations holding CS have likely acquired the
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accreditation within the last decade, meaning most respondents likely did not have CS
prior to 2005. As can be seen in Table 4.8, 47 (75.8%) of 62 respondents reported their
organization had participated in a UN-related function since 2005. However the mean
number of UN functions attended was skewed by 5 organizations which reported
attending 100 or more functions---2 of these CSOs reported over 200. If data from these
5 organizations is omitted, the resulting mean number of UN functions attended drops to
13.6, a figure that likely more closely reflects the reality of most CSOs that do participate
in the CS program and a number that is more consistent and realistic in comparison with
the mean numbers reported for earlier time periods. The decline in number/mean of
responses almost certainly reflects that fewer survey respondents had attained CS prior to
2005 or 1995, rather than respondents becoming increasingly active over the time period,
as upon examination of the 47 CSOs indicating activity at some point since 2005, most
did not hold CS accreditation prior that that period. Interestingly, the considerably
smaller mean number of UN functions attended prior to 1995 would be consistent with
the more limited number of formal outlets/forums for UN interaction with civil society
that would have been available in the early 1990s and prior.
The second survey item related to participation, asked a short series of questions
as to whether organizations had made written or verbal statements at a UN forum and in
either case if they had been asked by the UN to do so. Perhaps the most important
contribution that CS organizations can make within the UN framework and the most
significant form of expression available to them is to present written or verbal statements
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related to their fields of expertise. Further, being asked by a UN body to present a
position statement on an issue implies a valuation of CSO input on the part of the UN and
also conveys that the organizations within the CS program are viewed by the UN as
relevant, competent and capable of making a worthwhile contribution to its body of work.
Accordingly, gauging the number of written or verbal statements and the degree to which
they were actually requested by the UN offers a meaningful glimpse into the nature and

Table 4.8: Participation in UN Conferences, Meetings and Workshops by
Organizations Holding Consultative Status

Time Period

N Respondents
Not Listing 0

Mean N per
Respondent*

2005-present

47

27.5* (19.4/13.6*)

1995-2005

16

14.7

Pre-1995

6

9.5

* The mean number of UN functions attended per respondent for the period 2005-present
is skewed by a small percentage of respondents who reported abnormally large numbers:
5 CSOs reported 100 or more, with 2 of those reporting 200 or more. If only data from
the latter 2 organizations is omitted, the mean drops to 19.4 and is further reduced to 13.6
if data from all 5 outliers is excluded. Such statistical outliers were not present in data
reported for the earlier time periods.
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degree of participation of CS organizations---the core issue in the third guiding
hypothesis.
A majority of respondents, 38 (61.2%), indicated that they had presented a written
statement. Of the latter, only 24 (38.7% of all survey respondents) had been asked by the
UN to do so. Less than half of all survey respondents, 25 (40.3%), indicated that they
had made a verbal statement at a UN forum. Only 18 respondents (29.0%) reported
having been asked by the UN to present a verbal statement. It is curious that only a small
percentage of respondents indicated ever being asked by the UN to present written or
verbal statements. Critical interpretations of the latter could include a variety of possible
conclusions including: (1) exponential growth of the CS program and the number of
CSOs participating means that there are more organizations within the dynamic than can
be effectively used/consulted as originally intended; (2) wide variations could exist in
terms of the real/perceived credibility and competence of CS organizations with many
CSOs not deemed by the UN to be as worthy of being solicited for input; (3) many of the
CSOs awarded CS have such a narrow or obscure focus that there is little they can
effectively contribute to the often broader issues with which the UN is concerned---which
in turn raises the question of why such organizations were admitted to the CS program;
(4) perhaps ECOSOC and other UN organs understand that many organizations in the CS
program---especially smaller CSOs---either cannot (e.g., financially) or will not
participate and thus does not bother with formal requests soliciting their participation. It
is worth noting that given the general wording of the survey item, respondents may have
broadly interpreted the wording inquiring if they had “been asked” to provide position
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statements to include general invitations sent out en masse to many organizations via
conference announcements, which means the number of organizations that have
specifically been approached by the UN to provide statements is potentially lower than
the survey data suggests.
Asked if their organization had ever organized or hosted a meeting or other event
at the UN, only 26 respondents (41.9%) of 62 to submit the survey questionnaire
indicated in the affirmative. Asked if their organization had ever participated in any way
with any NGO network(s)/coalition(s) active within the UN framework, the response rate
was only slightly better with 32 respondents (51.6%) indicating that they had done so in
the past. The latter survey item also asked respondents to provide the names of the
network(s) or coalition(s) with which they had participated. Table 4.9 provides a
comprehensive list of all such groups identified by the 18 respondents providing
feedback. A total of 43 networks/coalitions were listed across a diverse range of
policy/issue areas including human rights and social issues, democracy, development,
and environmental issues. While some of the networks/coalitions were temporary in
nature, intended to serve a purpose for a specific conference or that otherwise only
existed briefly, many are long-term in nature such as many of the standing UN groups for
which multiple respondents indicated an affiliation (e.g. NGO Major Group).
One of the survey items designed to determine how CSOs perceive the UN-civil
society dynamic asked participants to score on a number line the degree to which they
felt that the UN values the participation of their organization, the results of which are
provided in Figure 4.14. Among 57 respondents in total, the mean score was a somewhat
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mediocre 5.9, conveying that many of the CSOs do not feel valued to a great degree by
the UN. A large number of respondents did in fact feel that their participation was
valued, as among the responses, 23 or 40.4% scored 7 or higher on the number line,
indicating a high degree of valuation as perceived by the CSOs. The largest number of
Table 4.9: UN Civil Society Networks/Coalitions Identified by CSOs as Groups
with Which They Have Participated
Arab Forum for Environment/Devt.

NGO Committee on Social Devt.

Arab Network for Environment/Devt.

NGO Committee on CSW (3)

CEDAW

NGO Major Group (2)

Civil Society Network

The 3 Right-holder Group

Climate Change Network – Nigeria

Trade Union Organizations

Coalition for the Rights of the Child

UN DPI Office

CONGO

UN Interagency Network (2)

CONGO Committee on Child Rights

UN Women (2)

CRIN

UNAC Coalition

CSD Civil Society Forum

UNEP-TUNZA

CSW-GO

UNESCWA Beirut Office

ECE Forum – Geneva

UNFEM (2)

Equality Now

UNPFA

Equality without Reservation

VAWG

Global Campaign-Equal Nationality

Water Event - Geneva

Global Compact

Women in Conflict Environments

Human Settlements/UN Habitat

Women Learning Partnership

IANSA

Women’s NGOs

Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature

World Mission Foundation

KARAMA (End Violence…Arab Women)

World We Want PSG

National Endowment for Democracy

WWSF - Geneva

NGO COA
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Figure 4.14: Degree to Which CS Organizations Feel the UN Values Their Participation

responses, 24 or 42.1%, fell within the moderate range of a score of 3.5 to 6.5, with more
respondents selecting a mid-range score of 5 than any other point on the number line. A
total of 10 respondents or 17.6% of all surveys submitted indicated a score of 3 or less, 4
of which (7.0%) indicated a number line score of 1 or less.
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Using a number line to illicit responses, participants were asked to what degree
their organization networked with other organizations in the CS program. As noted in
Figure 4.15, among 60 responses, the mean score was a somewhat tepid 5.5 on a number
line scale of 10. Nearly half of respondents (28 or 46.7%) indicated a score of 7 or
higher, denoting a higher degree of networking with other CSOs. However, the majority
of responses fell within the moderate (13 or 21.7%) or low (19 or 31.7%) range, with 6
respondents indicating a score of 0, denoting no networking-related interaction
whatsoever.
Figure 4.15: Degree to Which CSOs/NGOs Reported Networking with Other
Organizations in the CS Program
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Several survey items sought to explore the nature and frequency of
communication among organizations related to the CS program. The goal of the later
was that such questions would serve as a means of assessing the nature and levels of CSO
participation and in general the findings showed minimal-no communication for most
organizations. The first such survey item asked participants if since obtaining
consultative status have (1) other CSOs affiliated with the United Nations, (2) foreign
governments, or (3) a UN agency/office initiated contact and if so, how many times in
total.
The findings, as displayed in Table 4.10, indicate that only a minority of
respondents had been directly contacted by any of the latter entities and in those cases,
the frequency of contact has in general not been. A total of 23 respondents indicated
their organization had been directly contacted by either UN-affiliated CSOs or by a UN
agency/office. The mean number of contacts by other UN-affiliated CSOs was 61.7, but
this number was skewed to a substantial degree by a single respondent claiming to have
been contacted more than 1,000 times. If the latter outlier is removed, the mean number
of contacts reported from other UN-affiliated CSOs is 19.0, likely more representative of
reality for those respondents reporting data for this survey item. The mean number of
times respondents reported being contacted by a UN agency/office was 17.3. A more
modest total of 14 respondents reported being contacted by foreign governments, a mean
total of 20.1 times.
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Table 4.10: Source and Frequency of Entities Contacting CS Accredited Organizations

Source of Contact

N Respondents
Reporting Contact

Mean N Contacts per
Respondent*

UN-affiliated NGOs

23

61.7* (19.0*)

Foreign Governments

14

20.1

UN Agency/Office

23

17.3

* The mean number of times contacted by UN-affiliated NGOs is skewed by one
respondent’s claim of having been contacted over 1,000 times. If data derived from this
single outlier is omitted, the mean drops to 19.0

In an effort to understand, the nature of communication that was occurring,
respondents indicating that their organization had been directly contacted by one of the
latter sources were asked to specify the purpose of the communication via forced-choice
options: (1) general information sharing/introductions, (2) collaboration/sharing of
research, (3) specific question about UN process, (4) specific question about the CSOs
organizational scope/mission. The most common responses were for general information
sharing/introductions and collaboration/sharing of research which received 34 and 28
responses, respectively. Specific question about UN processes or the CSO itself each
received a more modest 19 responses. Participants also had the option of indicating
“other” and were asked to briefly specify the nature/purpose of the communication. A
total of 7 respondents indicated “other” and those responses centered around the
following topics: coalition issues, donations/fundraising, joint statements/events, and
position papers.
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In an effort to gauge degree and patterns of participation with the UN, survey
participants were asked to indicate which of 4 forms of communication (if any) they had
used to pose a question/request to the UN and how many times they had used each
medium: email, telephone, fax, writing. Relatively small numbers of respondents
indicated that they had communicated with the UN using any of the mediums. Email was
the most commonly used method of communicating with the UN, with 34 respondents
(54.9% of those returning the survey) indicating its use for a mean of 7.1 times each.
Given that most respondents appear to have held CS accreditation for a number of years,
the frequency of email communication for most does not appear to be great and even
poorer for other mediums. Only 19 respondents (30.6%) reported having called the UN--a mean number of 5.4 times each. 15 respondents (24.2%) indicated having written to
the UN---a mean number of 5.9 times each. As expected, communication by fax machine
was the least common medium with only 8 respondents (12.9) indicated they had done
so---a mean of 4.9 times each.
This survey item also used number lines to ask participants to rate their level of
satisfaction with the speed and substance of the communication experience with the UN
for each of the 4 mediums with 10 denoting complete satisfaction and 0 complete lack of
satisfaction, the results of which are presented in Figures 4.16-4.19. Although a small
percentage of respondents indicated low scores denoting dissatisfaction, the mean
responses for each category were all mid-range and in each category there were more
scores denoting high satisfaction levels than the opposite. Mean scores were comparable
across all categories with satisfaction levels reported highest for fax (6.5), email (6.4),
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and writing (6.3) respectively, with telephone (5.6) the least satisfying medium for
communicating with the UN reported by the CSOs. Survey findings suggest that most
CSOs do not perceive major communication problems to exist with the UN and
accordingly, the latter issue is likely not a substantial barrier to participation with the CS
program.
The range and distribution of responses to most survey items related to
participation, networking and communication indicates that a small percentage of
organizations in the CS program are very active, most organizations are minimallymoderately active or active only occasionally, and a substantial minority do not appear to
participate. The latter observations may vary somewhat depending upon the measure
being utilized. For example, less than half of respondents had ever presented a verbal
statement at a UN function and only around one-third had ever been asked to provide
either a written or verbal statement. Less than half of organizations submitting the survey
reported ever having networked with other CS organizations and frequency of
communication and meeting attendance related to the CS program overall appear to be
minimal for most CSOs. However, other indications exist denoting at least moderate
levels of participation, such as the fact that more than half of CS organizations reported
participating in a UN-related network/coalition or presented a written statement at some
point (though both may be infrequent activities for most CSOs). Also, despite evidence
indicating a somewhat tepid degree of overall engagement, most CS organizations feel
that the UN values their participation to a moderate-high degree.

187

Figure 4.16: Level of CSO Satisfaction with Email Communication with the UN

Figure 4.17: Level of Satisfaction with Telephone Communication with the UN
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Figure 4.18: Level of Satisfaction with Fax Communications with the UN

Figure 4.19: Level of Satisfaction with Written Communication with the UN
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Survey Responses – Barriers
The second guiding hypothesis contended that a variety of factors including
financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding the process(es)
through which organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC can participate,
contribute to a disparity wherein some organizations participate in the CS program and
others do not. Accordingly a portion of the survey questionnaire was devoted to
identifying barriers and the degree to which they may be impeding some CSOs within the
program from participating. Participants were asked to use number lines to rate each of 9
considerations as barriers to their participation within UN programs, with a score of 10
denoting a substantial barrier, and 0 denoting no barrier. The responses and distributions
of the latter for each individual item are presented in Figures 4.20 through 4.28.
Only 4 of the 9 items yielded mean scores higher the midpoint of 5, denoting
more respondents than not viewed the items as barriers to participation. Financial
commitment/expense earned the highest mean response of 6.8. The distribution of
responses for the item was also telling in that 36 (61.0%) of 59 respondents scored the
item within the high range of 7-10, indicating that the clear majority found financial
expenses to be a substantial impediment to participating in the CS program. The second
highest mean score of 5.9 was for geographical proximity/distance of UN functions.
Again, the distribution of responses placed the majority, 31 (53.4%) of 58 respondents,
within the high range indicating this consideration is a barrier for most CSOs, and given
travel costs, this consideration is likely inexorably linked with financial commitment as
an obstacle. The other two items having yielded mean scores above midpoint were
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time/personnel commitment and understanding UN processes (clarity of opportunities to
participate) which earned 5.6 and 5.4 respectively. With both of the latter survey items
the distribution of responses was somewhat more even and although the largest number
of responses fell within the high range of 7-10 for both items---25 (41.7%) of 60
responses for understanding UN processes and 25 (43.1%) of 58 responses for
time/personnel commitment---responses indicate that most organizations providing
feedback do not regard either consideration as a substantial barrier.
Mean scores for the remaining 5 items related to barriers were comparable and
all within the lower end of the moderate range along the number line. The lowest mean
score of 4.0 was for UN restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal policy
statements. A brief overview of restrictions as related to the CS accreditation levels of
CSOs is provided in Chapter 2 on page 46. In short, organizations accredited with
General Status within the CS program have the least restrictions and most flexibility in
formally presenting positions to UN bodies, followed by those with Special Status which
have additional restrictions, and lastly those with Roster Status which have the most
restrictions. Responses to this survey item appeared to largely reflect the accreditation
level of respondents. Among the surveys examined with regard to this item, those
submitted by Roster Status organizations tended to score the item as being more of a
barrier, whereas surveys submitted by organizations accredited with General Status
universally indicated little-no concern with this item as a barrier to participation. Among
the 56 respondents providing feedback for this number line item, 25 (44.6%) scored
within the low range of 0-3, 17 (30.4%) fell within the moderate range, and the smallest
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number of 14 (25%)---though a sizeable minority---scored within the high range
indicating a perception of the issue as a substantial barrier to participation. It is likely
that had (1) CSOs with General Status not been overrepresented and (2) those with Roster
Status not been underrepresented in the numbers of surveys returned, the results for this
survey item would have been slanted at least somewhat more toward the issue being a
barrier to participation.
Conference registration and designation/credentialing of UN representatives tied
with a mean number line score of 4.1. Nearly half of all respondents in both categories
also scored in the low range of 0-3 (no-minimal barrier posed) on the number line with
most of the remainder scoring both items in the moderate/mid-range. While minorities of
respondents (24.6% and 24.1% respectively) did provide high scores indicating the areas
as barriers, the clear majority of respondents did not see either consideration as an
obstacle. The results of these survey items are not surprising as considerable effort has
been made by the UN in recent years to simplify and streamline both processes---e.g.
clarifying print and web-based guidelines and transitioning both to fully online processes.
However, it is clear from the survey responses that a substantial minority of CS
organizations still find the processes confusing and/or difficult.
The survey item quadrennial reports had a mean score of 4.2. As explained on
page 196, the completion and submission of quadrennial reports is at present a fairly
simple, streamlined, fully online process that should require minimal time commitment
and pose minimal difficulty for most CS organizations to complete. Interestingly
however, 9 (18.0%) of 50 respondents scored the item within the high range of 7 or above
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indicating they perceive it as a notable barrier, and 4 (8%) respondents scored the item at
10. While respondents were not given an opportunity to elaborate on their reasoning it is
possible that the infrequent nature of the report, perhaps combined with typically high
turnover of staff at many CSOs may combine to confuse organizations, straining their
institutional memories as to the procedure of completing such tasks only once every few
years. Adding to the confusion, the UN periodically changes paperwork requirements,
shifting submission of quadrennial reports from paper submission to an exclusively webbased process a few years ago for example.
The final number line item in the barriers section of the survey, support of
organization’s board and/or donors, had a mean score of 4.3. No preconceived notion
existed as to what the results may ultimately be for this item, but it was hoped that some
visible pattern may emerge to help understand why some CS organizations do not appear
to participate within the program. For example, if a substantial proportion of respondents
scored the issue within the high range as a barrier, it would be obvious that lack of donor
or board support was a key driver in minimal-no participation. However, the latter was
not the case. Only 14 (25%) of 56 respondents scored the item at 7 or higher, an
indication that a sizable minority of CS organizations are potentially experiencing
obstacles related to boards/donors, but not most. 25 (44.6%) respondents scored the item
3 or less, with 8 (14.3%) scoring it as 0 and 17 (30.4%) assigned a mid-range score
indicating only moderate barriers posed.
In examining the returned questionnaires it appears that a disproportionate
number of organizations indicating board/donor support as barriers to participation in the

193

CS program also indicated no-minimal activity in many respects. Most such
organizations appear to have fewer accredited UN representatives, have participated in
fewer UN conferences/forums and networking venues, and are less likely to have
presented a verbal or written statement at a UN function than CSOs reporting no barriers
posed by board members or donors. Several possibilities exist in terms of the minority of
CSOs that lack board or donor support for participation in the CS program and the
correlation with the latter findings. For example, upon initially seeking CS affiliation the
time/cost of active participation in the program may not have been readily apparent to
many CSOs’ boards/donors and upon matriculating into the program, as such
commitments became more obvious, support could have eroded with a commensurate
perception that funding and staff time could be better directed elsewhere. Political
considerations such as opposition to globalization or the UN in general may also serve to
taint the perspective of some donors and board members, preventing or diminishing their
support for the affiliation.
The survey questionnaire also provided participants an opportunity to indicate
“other” as a barrier to participation and asked them to specify those additional
considerations not addressed via other number line options. Only 3 respondents provided
such feedback, potentially indicating that barriers and potential barriers to participation
had been surmised adequately in the options provided in the questionnaire. Responses
included: “general (UN) bureaucracy”; “information about the community of NGOs with
consultative status and access to the organizations is difficult”, and “completing all
documentation online and writing reports is difficult”. Neither the first nor second
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response was surprising, as the UN is frequently perceived as a bureaucratic morass and
in particular it can be difficult to obtain detailed information including specific contact
information for CS organizations, even when consulting the iCSO database---which often
has missing or incomplete information. The third response concerning difficulty in
completing/submitting documentation is somewhat harder to understand given the
minimal paperwork requirements, detailed instructions provided and normally fullyonline processes (and this comment was made by a CSO in a MDC/developed region)
associated with the CS program.
Separate from the multi-part survey items which sought to asses barriers to
participation or benefits derived from CS accreditation, organizations were asked to use a
number line in addressing one of the single-most important questions posed by the
survey: to what degree is the cost and effort of obtaining and maintaining UN
consultative status justified by the benefits derived by your organization? In a sense, the
question gauges satisfaction levels of respondents based upon their experiences with the
CS program (which in turn potentially sheds light on CSO participation/contributions),
with a number line score of 10 indicating highly justified and 0 indicating not justified at
all. The key underlying implication is that if affiliated CSOs do not feel that the time,
effort or financial commitment is justifiable relative to any real or perceived benefit
derived, then it is understandable that the participation level of such organizations would
be minimal.
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Figure 4.20: Barriers: Understanding UN Processes (Clarity of Opportunities to
Participate)

Figure 4.21: Barriers: Conference Registration
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Figure 4.22: Barriers: Designation/Credentialing of UN Representatives

Figure 4.23: Barriers: Financial Commitment/Expenses
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Figure 4.24: Barriers: Time/Personnel Commitment

Figure 4.25: Barriers: Quadrennial Report
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Figure 4.26: Barriers: Geographical Proximity/Distance of UN Functions

Figure 4.27: Barriers: Support of Organization’s Board and/or Donors
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Figure 4.28: Barriers: UN Restrictions Concerning Presentation of Written/Verbal
Position Statements

Among the 55 respondents addressing the survey item, the response was largely
favorable, as by a nearly 4 to 1 margin, more respondents indicated high levels of
justification relative to benefits derived by their organization. As seen in Figure 4.29 the
mean number line score was 6.7. Over half of respondents, 31 or 56.4%, scored the item
7 or higher, with 16 or 29.1% indicating only moderate (or possibly---partial) levels of
justification with mid-range scores of between 3.5 to 6.5 on the number line. However, a
small minority of respondents, 8 or 14.5%, conveyed that in their experiences the effort
and cost of involvement with the CS program was largely not justified by any benefits
derived. As an alternative means of viewing patterns of responses, if the score
distribution is analyzed via midpoint, 16 respondents or 29.1% of the total---a more
substantial minority, indicated a score of 5 or less denoting marginal-no justification for
involvement in the CS program.
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Figure 4.29: Degree to Which Cost and Effort Associated with Consultative Status
is Justified by Benefits Derived by Organizations

How Could the UN Improve Experience for Consultative Status Organizations?
One of the last items included in the survey questionnaire was the third of three
open-ended discussion questions which asked participants to comment on how the UN
could improve the overall experience for organizations in the ECOSOC consultative
status program. Of 62 questionnaires returned, 49 (79.0%) respondents provided
feedback for this item. The entirety of the respondents’ diverse and often insightful
comments and suggestions can be correlated to ten different issue areas---among which
some overlap exists: access, bureaucracy, communication, elitism/fairness, expertise,
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funding, general guides/training, meetings, networking and capacity building, or issues
specific to the CSOs policy/focus area.
Of the latter topics, issues related to meetings and other UN forums were
mentioned most frequently with 14 respondents or 28.6% of those commenting on the
survey item offering feedback. The majority of the comments complained about the lack
of geographical diversity in scheduled UN meetings/conferences and suggested that
either key events should be rotated among world regions or that smaller, secondary
functions should be held in multiple world regions or even among CS organizations
within the same country in order to permit broader participation. Many comments also
suggested more functions specific in scope to policy/issue areas as a catalyst for
increased opportunities to participate. Respondents also commented as to the need for
more advance notice of functions, easier registration processes, more briefing of and
interaction between CSOs leading up to meetings, more time allotted for verbal
presentations, and the difficulty some CS organizations (principally those in the global
south with more limited internet infrastructure) experience with connecting to UN
webinars online.
Suggestions related to the need for assistance with funding for attending UN
functions were the second-most frequently cited issue. A total of 12 respondents,
principally from LDC/developing areas, noted financial difficulties as an obstacle to their
participation in UN forums. Most suggested that the UN should prioritize at least partial
subsidies for travel expenses for CS organizations attending sanctioned events. Several
noted that if funding directly from the UN was not available that efforts could be
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undertaken to help CSOs with limited financial means identify and network with
corporate sponsors or other donors in order that smaller grassroots organizations and
those from less affluent countries might be better empowered to participate in the UNcivil society dynamic.
Just behind money-related challenges, respondents also commonly called for
improvements in disseminating general guidelines/information or training CS
organizations so that they could better understand UN processes and how to participate.
A number of respondents suggested that better, clearer, more detailed, more userfriendly, and regularly updated print or online guidelines are needed, with several
specifically noting that such information should include information related to
expectations and best practices in order to better facilitate involvement from
organizations accredited within the CS program. Multiple respondents suggested that
more structured, formalized guidance is needed, especially for CSOs new to the CS
program---as the latter experience a steep learning curve, in order that they understand
how to contribute/function. Establishment of a UN-ECOSOC training department/staff
specific to the CS program or pairing newly accredited CS organizations with veteran
CSOs within the program in an informal mentorship were mentioned as possible
pathways to improve the participation levels within the CS program.
Many suggestions were also offered related to improving communication in
various respects. Several respondents expressed desire for the UN to be more proactive
in communicating opportunities for CSOs to contribute. Various specific means of
achieving the latter were suggested including the use of regular newsletters, regular
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updates of online documentation/information, and the use of comprehensive and detailed
calendars of upcoming UN forums---calendars which could also potentially be organized
to show opportunities to participate by geographical region or policy/issue areas. Some
respondents also stressed the need for better administrative contact information for UN
offices/bodies to be provided including the possibility of point of contact information for
each scheduled conference or other specific event open to CS organizations. One
respondent noted that “obtaining answers to even basic questions remains a challenge
beyond the ability of the current system.”
Issues related to access received feedback from multiple survey respondents, with
the most common criticism relating to inability to present verbal or written statements to
key organs such as the General Assembly or otherwise meet with the UN delegations of
member states. One respondent noted that “rarely do government delegates hear NGOs’
verbal statements---only other NGOs”, with another adding that “without access to or
communication with member states the input of NGOs is of limited effectiveness.” This
appears to be a somewhat common concern on the part of many organizations in the CS
program which may have at least initially seen their roles as potentially having impact
upon international policy and/or that of member states. Calls for improved access did not
exclusively center upon increasing access to UN organs and state delegations as multiple
respondents also noted that the original Major Groups (organizations/coalitions among
CSOs in the CS program) no longer incorporate new organizations and that it can be very
difficult for many CSOs outside the geographical areas of UN forums to participate---an
issue which could be at least partly addressed via increased use of video-teleconferencing
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and also more advance notice of meetings/events. While issues/recommendations related
to access were not the most frequently cited, many of the comments/suggestions received
were among the most fervent and impassioned received via the survey including the
observations of one respondent bemoaning inadequate access who states that “when
CSOs are at the UN we are merely tolerated, not really listened to.” Likewise, another
organization indicated that “CSOs and UN-civil society initiatives are referenced more
and more in UN literature, but in practice (CSOs) have less and less voice.”
Suggestions related to how the UN bureaucracy might be improved to benefit the
CS program were offered by many respondents. The majority of such comments
centered around certain processes/requirements being needlessly long and/or inordinately
time consuming. Several respondents mentioned reports in general, the procedural steps
involved in designating UN representatives and in obtaining grounds passes for them, and
multiple respondents specifically mentioned the need to improve the lengthy and timeconsuming process of processing NGO name changes within the UN bureaucracy.
Bureaucratic and procedural norms related to conferences may also be a source of
challenges for some CSOs, as one noted that “when making verbal statements you never
know when you might be called so you must be ready all day and not even leave to take a
break.” Two respondents, both from developing nations, also noted the difficulty
involved in obtaining visas for countries in which UN events were located. While the
latter issue falls outside the purview and control of the UN, the range and frequency of
comments related to institutional bureaucracy, clearly indicates opportunities for
improvement exist.
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Issues related to networking, advocacy and other forms of capacity building also
received suggestions for improvement from multiple respondents. Several comments
highlighted the need for an organized community management effort within the UN
wherein spaces could be provided for more interaction among NGOs which might
perhaps involve establishing more forums (if even electronic/online venues)---especially
as side venues at key conferences---so that organizations in the CS program might better
communicate. One such suggestion noted that to date, most networking or coalition
efforts were solely driven by the NGOs themselves within most UN venues and that the
UN should assume a more proactive role in facilitating such interactions. Specifically, it
was suggested that the UN could assist in putting NGOs in same/similar fields in contact
with each other, and even further, organizations could be paired with others in the CS
program to assist in completion of tasks such as carrying out research or implementing
initiatives on behalf of the UN in the field. Essentially, many respondents saw need and
opportunity for the UN to facilitate capacity-building programs to boost NGO
performance and participation.
A smaller number of comments related to suggestions for improvement within the
CS program were related to issues of fairness and elitism. More broadly, several
suggestions supported incorporating NGOs in agenda setting within the UN and its
various bodies so as to make the organization more egalitarian and less state-centric.
Multiple respondents also felt strongly that certain types of organizations tended to be
“left behind” and not included equitably even within the parameters of just the CS
program. For example, multiple comments touched upon the possibility of elitism in that
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greater participation is needed from the global south and also from smaller grassroots
organizations which may struggle to compete with well-funded multinational
organizations for an effective voice within the UN or otherwise. While respondents
offered no concrete solutions to such obstacles it is clear that many CS organizations
view the disparate power structure within the CS program as a continuing impediment.
Some respondents also offered suggestions related to CSO expertise and how it is
shared within the CS program. Much of the commentary essentially conveyed that many
CSOs feel under-utilized as a source of expertise in their policy focus areas. One
respondent suggested that expertise categories should be more clearly defined and in turn
NGOs in each area should be consulted as need arises by the UN and other entities.
NGOs could also be associated formally with specific UN offices/bodies related to their
scope of mission which could better utilize their expertise as a knowledge resource. It
was also suggested that a greater focus could be placed upon consultative work or that the
UN could involve CS organizations with field research or other projects which could
provide mutual benefit and also contribute to capacity building.
Lastly, some suggestions focused upon issues that were specific to the
policy/issues area(s) of the respondent’s organization. For example, a trade union
participating in the CS program suggested that the UN should recognize the role/mandate
of worker’s unions within the broader community of NGOs. An NGO focused upon drug
policies noted that efforts to support NGO participation in drug policy must be
maintained and expanded to include state members/delegations. An organization
specializing in the role of families stressed that the UN and its bodies must consider the
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significance of and impacts upon families in its deliberations. One respondent noted that
without regard to policy/issue area, many CS organizations are research-oriented and as
such could prove useful to the UN in both providing objective input and in analysis.

Overview of Survey Results
Indications exist that the 439 organizations in the CS program randomly chosen to
receive the survey questionnaire were a viable representative sample. As noted in Table
4.2 the regional distribution of participants randomly selected closely paralleled the
regional distributions of all organizations in the CS program. Also, the accreditation
levels of organizations randomly selected closely mirrored the distribution of
accreditation levels of all organizations in the program, as depicted in Table 4.1.
However, with regard to the latter, among CSOs actually returning the survey,
organizations holding General status were somewhat overrepresented and those with
Roster status underrepresented in what may have been self-selection by more active
organizations and self-deselection by those that are less active or inactive. Though the
surveys are believed to be a representative sample, due primarily to a modest response
rate of just over 14%, no claim is made that the results are generalizable to all CSOs in
the CS program or otherwise in association with the UN.
Many of the survey items yielded results that had been expected. For example, in
assessing motivations for seeking CS accreditation I assumed enhanced prestige/visibility
for the organization, networking with other CSOs or the UN, and contributing
written/verbal statements on issues were primary motives and this was confirmed via the
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responses. I had also expected the UN headquarters in New York to be the focal point of
accreditation of representatives and attendance of conferences, followed in distant second
place by Geneva with minimal-no participation at other UN sites and this precise pattern
was revealed by survey data. My initial impression was that substantive communication
was not occurring between organizations within the CS program and the UN, foreign
governments, or with other CS accredited CSOs and this was largely (though not
uniformly) evidenced in the survey results.
Other survey outcomes were unexpected. Respondents’ perceptions of UN
valuation of their contributions via the CS program were substantially higher than I had
anticipated. Organizations reported participating in NGO networks/coalitions and having
presented written statements to greater degrees than expected. More respondents
indicated that their participation in the CS program was justified by benefits derived than
I had anticipated. Among the comments offered in response to the open-ended,
subjective items, the degree to which many organizations expected tangible benefits--especially access to UN or other international funding---was somewhat surprising as were
the multiple references to difficulty in obtaining travel visas as a barrier to participation,
an obstacle I had not previously considered. Broadly, although levels of participation
within the CS program could be fairly described as anemic for many, possibly most,
CSOs/NGOs, survey results in general indicated somewhat higher levels of activity than I
had initially anticipated.
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Findings Relative to Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses
Research Question
1c. What types and degrees of participation exist among NGOs which hold consultative
status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council?
This question was partially addressed (or at least inferred) via the analysis of the
iCSO database as discussed in Chapter 3. As indicated in Table 3.2, a diverse range of
organizational types and topical/policy areas are represented among NGOs in the CS
program with indigenous organizations, associations, academic entities, foundations, and
disability organizations among the most common represented. Table 3.6 provides an
overview of the fields of activity and expertise of NGOs within the CS program, the
majority of which were related to the following areas: economic and social, gender
issues/women, sustainable development, social development, or population issues. As
illustrated in Table 3.15, less than one-half (49.9%) of NGOs in the CS program are
classified as international in their scope of operations, with the remainder being national
(24.1%), local (18.5%) or regional (7.5%) in scope. Analysis of the database also
confirmed that ECOSOC is by an overwhelming degree the principle vehicle for formal
NGO interaction with the UN, for although a range of accreditation options exist with
other UN organs including DPI or CSD, as can be seen in Table 3.21---ECOSOC’s
consultative status program for NGOs dwarfs all other UN-civil society partnerships in
terms of the number of organizations involved.
Analysis of the survey questionnaire results revealed additional details concerning
the type and degree of participation of NGOs in the CS program. The majority (75.4%)
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of respondents indicated they had communicated with the UN since admission to the CS
program though the survey results cannot speak to the frequency and substance of the
communication. The majority of respondents indicated the successful appointment of
one or more UN representative(s), and attendance at a minimum of 1 UN
conference/meeting, though both tend to be confined to either the UN’s New York or
Geneva headquarters and the frequency of credentialing representatives and attending UN
functions appears to be modest for the majority of CS organizations. While most
respondents (61.2%) reported having presented a written statement at the UN, the
frequency of the latter could not be judged and only a minority of respondents reported
ever having presented a verbal statement (40.3%) or having been asked by the UN to
present a written (38.7%) or verbal (29.0%) statement. Only slightly more than half
(51.6%) of respondents indicated their organization had ever participated in any NGO
network/coalition at the UN and less than half (41.9%) reported their organization ever
having organized/hosted a meeting or other event at a UN forum.
While the study did not provide a complete picture, the information it did yield
seems to indicate that a small minority of organizations in the CS program are involved
to a substantial degree and regularly participate in some way, a (perhaps larger) minority
of organizations are mostly to entirely disengaged---either never having participated in
the first place or withdrawing from active participation at some point, and a majority of
organizations are involved to a minimal-to-moderate degree or only sporadically
participate throughout the time they have held CS status. A range of possibilities exist in
potentially explaining the latter pattern: (1) some organizations were primarily concerned
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with prestige/credibility derived from an official association/accreditation with the UN
(as some survey data suggests) and never intended to make meaningful contributions; (2)
some organizations may have initially had the intention to participate but were unable to
realize any intrinsic benefit to their organization from the affiliation and consequently
either minimized or ceased their efforts to participate; (3) some may have had largely or
entirely extrinsic motives and at least initially sought to contribute expertise/perspective
rather than derive benefits, but a range of barriers such as financial or logistical hurdles as
identified in the survey findings impeded their ability to do so; (5) those organizations
that are larger, possess more resources financially and otherwise and that are truly
international in their scope of operations, are much better positioned to participate in
ECOSOC-CS or similar initiatives, than smaller organizations with less resources.

Research Question
2. Why do some NGOs in consultative status utilize the status to participate in UN
functions but others do not?
Guiding Hypothesis
2. A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of
understanding of the process through which NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC
can participate make some NGOs more active than others.
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In the early conceptualization stage of this research it was obvious that substantial
variations existed in terms of NGO participation levels within the CS program. Multiple
NGOs with which I was personally familiar had either lost their CS accreditation through
inactivity or were barely retaining the status via an occasional modicum of effort.
However, simultaneously it was clear that other organizations were active and successful
participants within the program. Prior to undertaking the research, I suspected that a
range of certain considerations in combination facilitated participation on the part of
some organizations and impeded it in others. Not all considerations would impact every
NGO within the program in the same way or to the same degree, but my initial thoughts
as to possible impediments gave rise to the 9 number-line items and certain other survey
questions designed to gauge barriers to participation. Given the reluctance of the UN to
directly address such issues (and potentially admit that its primary outreach effort to
international civil society may not be as vibrant as portrayed) and the scarcity of literature
and any previous studies directly addressing the phenomenon of lack of participation
within the CS program, not until the survey data was obtained and analyzed could the
impact of such factors be confirmed and at least partly understood.
The most important survey instrument for assessing impediments to participation
was the section in which participants used number lines to assess each of the 9 specified
factors as barriers. In analyzing mean scores, it was very clear that each of the factors
were barriers to at least some organizations, but they varied by degree of importance.
Financial commitment/resources was the most commonly identified impediment to
participation, closely followed in importance geographical proximity/distance of UN
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functions, time/personnel commitment, and understanding UN processes (clarity of
opportunities to participate, all of which yielded mean scores above the midpoint of the
number line. Fewer respondents identified lack of board/donor support, the quadrennial
report, designation/credentialing of representatives, conference registration or UN
restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal statements as substantial
impediments but each of the latter were identified as barriers by a minority of
organizations. Given the option of specifying other barriers, respondents also cited the
UN bureaucracy, completion/submission of reports and other documents, and lack of
access to information about other NGOs in the CS program as substantial impediments.
Other survey items were also incorporated to assess barriers to participation.
Asked to denote on a number line the degree to which their organization’s CS
accreditation level impedes participation, over 41% of respondents indicated a score at
the midpoint or higher on the number line indicating a moderate to high degree of
difficulty posed. Participants were similarly asked to assess the difficulty of designating
and accrediting their organization’s UN representatives, with over 59% denoting a score
at the midpoint or higher indicating most organizations saw the process as posing
moderate to high degrees of difficulty. Survey items addressing communication levels
demonstrated moderate to minimal contact between most NGOs and the UN with a
minority of NGOs conveying dissatisfaction with the speed/substance of the
communication with the UN. Only a minority of respondents reported ever having been
asked by the UN to present a verbal or written statement and a substantial minority
conveyed that they feel the UN does not value the participation of their organization
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within the CS program. The final survey item contained in the questionnaire asked
respondents to use a number line to assess the degree to which the cost and effort of
obtaining and maintaining CS is justified by the benefits derived, wherein a sizeable
minority of over 29% provided a number line score ranging from 0, denoting not justified
at all) to a midline score of 5, denoting only somewhat justified.
Responses to subjective, open-ended survey items mirrored the findings of the
fixed-choice questions. A wide range of factors were cited in response to why the
organization sought CS accreditation, why organizational goals within the CS program
had or had not been achieved and how could the UN improve the experience in the CS
program. Among the more common impediments to participation cited by respondents
were financial considerations and difficulties related to understanding and managing the
UN bureaucracy, both of which were referenced in the second guiding hypothesis. Other
commonly cited barriers included logistical and other difficulties related to attending
meetings, difficulties in communicating and networking with other CSOs, lack of access
or ability to share expertise, fairness issues such as limitations on CSOs in the global
south, and general lack of clarity regarding mission or how to contribute within the
dynamic---the latter also being cited as an example of a possible barrier in the second
guiding hypothesis. Interestingly, it seemed that CSOs with narrow goals that were
specific to their policy/issue area and that were more intrinsic in nature were more likely
to report those goals having been achieved within the CS program than counterparts
which had formulated broader and more extrinsic goals---e.g. seeking to contribute to the
work of the UN rather than derive funding or other benefits. Organizations within the CS
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program also seemed more likely to participate and report successful experiences if they
were larger with more employees and better funding. The CS accreditation level of
organizations also appeared to factor into their participation level and experiences with
those holding General status (somewhat over-represented among survey respondents)
being on average more likely to participate and cite fewer barriers to participation, while
those holding Roster status (under-represented among survey respondents), appearing
less likely to participate and more likely to cite certain issues as barriers, such as ability
to provide input. The content of the survey feedback appears to clearly confirm the
second guiding hypothesis in that: A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity
of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding of the process through which NGOs in
consultative status with ECOSOC can participate make some NGOs more active than
others.

Research Question
3. How many NGOs holding consultative status fail to participate in any meaningful way
in ECOSOC functions?
Guiding Hypothesis
3. Given such constraints, most NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not
participate in any meaningful way in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive
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contribution (providing input at conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN
goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society.
The 3rd research question may prove difficult to definitively answer in an
objective fashion short of the UN tracking and releasing such data. Based upon my own
experiences and anecdotal information, it appears that a large percentage of NGOs lose
their consultative status within a few years of obtaining the status (submitting examples
of participation is a requirement of the mandatory quadrennial report) via inactivity.
However, statistics related to such attrition do not appear to be made publically available
by UN-ECOSOC which touts the CS program as the pinnacle achievement in the
international governance-civil society dynamic. External research and tracking of such
attrition would prove extraordinarily tedious in that currently nearly 5,000 organizations
are in the CS program and would also require long-term effort as a 1-year grace period is
offered for quadrennial report submission and it is possible to stave off ejection from the
CS program for at least 1 cycle via citing justification of non-participation---meaning
some CSOs might be inactive for 5 or even 10 years prior to losing their accreditation.
The manner in which the third research question and third guiding hypothesis are
framed may also pose difficulties in that appraising what does or does not constitute
“meaningful” participation is likely subject to a wide range of interpretation. For
example, does the designation/credentialing of UN representatives, timely submission of
quadrennial reports and informal communication with other CSOs within the CS program
constitute “meaningful” participation or should a requirement for formal involvement
such as attendance at a UN venue be the standard? Does attending 1 UN
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conference/event per quadrennial report cycle (4 years) constitute “meaningful”
participation or should the standard be attendance at one event per calendar year? Is
mere attendance at a UN conference/event sufficient for attaining “meaningful”
participation or should an expectation exist that a verbal or written statement be presented
or some other substantive contribution be made beyond merely a periodic physical
presence at a UN venue? In retrospect, this research could have established specific
parameters as to the minimum criteria for “meaningful” participation---e.g. “once per
calendar year, the organization either officially attends a UN conference/event or
otherwise makes a substantive contribution via submission of a written statement,
submission of research/data, formal collaboration in the field, etc.” However, even with
benefit of such a demarcation, debate could ensue as to the standard established for
“meaningful”.
Perhaps of greater importance is the reference in the third guiding hypothesis to
“most” organizations in the CS program not participating. To a large degree, the survey
findings were mixed in this regard. Most survey respondents did not indicate that they
had credentialed representatives or participated at UN functions in Geneva, Vienna or
any of the regional offices of the UN, though most had done both relative to the primary
UN headquarters in New York. Most respondents indicated they had not ever presented a
verbal statement or been asked by the UN to present a verbal or written statement, but
most did indicate that they had presented a written statement (with many apparently
doing so of their own accord without invitation) at some point. Less than half reported
ever having organized/hosted a meeting or other event at a UN forum, but slightly more
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than half reported that their organization had participated in an NGO network/coalition at
some point during their tenure in the CS program. Most noted that they had never been
contacted by UN-affiliated NGOs, foreign governments, or a UN body, but most
indicated having contacted the UN at some point via email or telephone (though not fax
or writing) with questions at some point. While many organizations within the CS
program do not appear to be active, and most respondents may not have engaged in any
one of several specific types of activities, the contention of the third guiding hypothesis
as worded---that most organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not
participate in any meaningful way or make any substantive contribution---is not
supported by the survey findings and is therefore not supported.
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V. CHAPTER FIVE:
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Introduction
A diverse range of civil society organizations has increasingly been involved with
the United Nations (UN). This includes record numbers of civil society organizations
(CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which hold formal consultative
status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the main organ for UN
interaction with international civil society. A primary goal of the UN has been to
cultivate a more effective, diverse and democratic institutional culture via the active
inclusion of and interaction among international organizations and civil society to
augment the traditional role of states as the primary transnational actors within the
organization. This study identified patterns of participation and effectiveness of civil
society organizations within the UN, with a particular focus on participation within
ECOSOC.
This study is significant for three reasons. Firstly, the UN practice of cultivating
formal association with reputable international civil society organizations has expanded
markedly in recent years and has been described as the most dynamic area of growth and
change within the UN framework (Alger 2002). In 1946 when the practice was initiated,
only 41 CSOs/NGOs held formal consultative status with the UN, but currently the status
is afforded to nearly 5,000 organizations of various types, representing a wide range of
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issues across the globe (United Nations 2016, 2). However, it has been largely unclear
what patterns of participation exist among the diverse range of CSOs/NGOs which have
formal status with the UN. Analysis of geographical, topical and other patterns of
participation among NGOs is important in cultivating a general understanding of the
inter-organizational dynamic. Importantly, most previous attempts to study such issues
have focused upon one or very limited numbers of CSOs/NGOs or have been specific to
a particular issue area such as human rights or development rather than seeking to
understand overall patterns of civil society participation within an IGO (Tallberg et al
2013).
Secondly, the number of CSOs/NGOs with formal standing at the UN has grown
exponentially, theoretically allowing non-state actors an unprecedented level of access
and input. Proponents of the trend see it as a catalyst for global justice and democracy in
which more populations and issues are afforded a voice and in which CSO expertise on
specific issues may be contributed, but it is also viewed as a means for the UN to research
and implement many multilateral initiatives such as the Sustainable (formerly
“Millennium”) Development Goals, (Grady 2005; Pubantz 2005). Large-scale
participation of civil society organizations within IGOs particularly in policy formulation
roles also potentially enhances the legitimacy of the IGO in that it contributes to the
appearance of pluralistic and democratic approaches (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010). Yet, a
preliminary assessment of CSO/NGO participation in UN forums suggests minimal-to-no
actual participation by most of the organizations which have attained formal consultative
status. A large number, possibly the majority, of CSOs/NGOs which have obtained
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formal status within the UN may never have engaged in any meaningful way with the
organization, which would presumably diminish the claims related to a dramatically
expanded role of civil society and democratic pluralism within the UN (Mowell 2015).
To understand the effectiveness of civil society organizations within the UN framework,
it is necessary to determine their degree of participation within the UN and also to
understand the factors which encourage participation and barriers which may prevent
participation.
Thirdly, analysis of patterns and the degree of participation may serve as a
foundation for further research related to civil society at the United Nations such as
understanding the political, fiscal or other reasons for CSO/NGO participation or the lack
thereof. Impediment to CSO/NGO participation identified in this research, can serve as
the focus for future analyses designed to explore ways to introduce CSOs/NGOs to the
UN bureaucracy, streamline their matriculation into the consultative status program, or
otherwise facilitate greater degrees of participation. More profoundly, if many NGOs
fundamentally lack the organizational or fiscal ability or sincere commitment to engage
with the UN via the program perhaps the consultative status program or its admission
criteria for NGOs should be scrutinized for viability.
To the best of my knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of
macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part
of organizations holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. It may also be among
the first studies which endeavors to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement
or the lack thereof on the part of organizations in consultative status. Lastly, the study
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appraises the findings within the theoretical framework of political pluralism in assessing
the place and contributions of CSOs/NGOs within the UN dynamic.
The research findings yielded mixed results in terms of the three guiding
hypotheses. The first guiding hypothesis contended that imbalances exist in patterns of
participation of organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC with regard to
country/regional involvement (e.g. NGOs of developed states/regions are proportionally
better represented than those of developing states/regions) and also regarding the
policy/issues areas with which the organizations are concerned. Exhaustive analysis of
data contained in the UN’s publicly available iCSO (integrated Civil Society
Organizations) database, designed to illustrate the degree and nature of UN involvement
with international civil society, conclusively proves a disproportionate
underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from developing regions (relative to their
composition of world population) and overrepresentation of those headquartered in
developed regions. The database also revealed substantial variations in the degrees to
which policy/issue areas were represented, confirming the second element of the guiding
hypothesis.
The second guiding hypothesis alleged that a variety of factors including financial
ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding of the process through
which CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC can participate collectively
contribute to some organizations within the CS program being more active/engaged than
others. Both the second and third guiding hypotheses were operationalized via use of a
detailed survey questionnaire emailed to a randomly selected pool of 439 organizations
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(10% of the total) identified as currently holding consultative status and as speaking
English as at least one of several languages. A total of 62 CSOs/NGOs (over 14% of
those receiving the questionnaire) submitted the survey and those respondents revealed a
diverse and complex range of factors that account for wide variations in participation
within the program, including a number of considerations that had not been anticipated
such as difficulty experienced by representatives of organizations in obtaining visas to
travel to UN functions. The information yielded by the survey clearly supports the
second guiding hypothesis in that a diverse range of considerations collectively serve as
barriers to participation in the consultative status program for many organizations.
The third guiding hypothesis contended that given such diverse obstacles, most
NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not participate in any meaningful way
in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive contribution (providing input at
conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN goal of engaging with pluralist
international civil society. While survey data as well as certain types of data revealed in
the iCSO database analysis both paint a somewhat anemic picture of CSO/NGO
participation within the CS program, the findings do not conclusively support the third
guiding hypothesis, in part due to the subjective manner in which it was worded. What
does or does not constitute “meaningful” participation or a “substantive” contribution is
subject to individual interpretation and not prone to objective measurement as worded. In
hindsight, this guiding hypothesis could have been framed more narrowly with definitive
and measureable parameters such as establishing a minimum threshold of attendance at
one UN event per year on average for meeting standards for “meaningful” or
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“substantive” involvement. Yet clear indications do exist of a lack of substantive
participation on the part of many organizations in the CS program. The study indicates
that only a small minority of organizations within the CS program appear to be
actively/regularly engaged, with a larger number of CSOs/NGOs making only minimal or
infrequent contributions, while a large number appear to be mostly-to-completely
disengaged. Details concerning the latter and the research findings related to the first and
second guiding hypotheses, including summations of the most interesting and important
findings stemming from the study are provided in the next sections.

Summary Overview of iCSO Database Analysis
Analysis of the iCSO database yielded a range of interesting findings, one of the
first of which was that CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC comprised
only a small minority of the organizations listed in the iCSO database. For example,
among all entries categorized by organizational type, only 12% were in the CS program.
If the assumption can be made that the CS program is comprised of the international civil
society organizations most actively engaged with the UN, a perception furthered by the
UN itself, a possible implication of this numerical underrepresentation within the iCSO
database is that many of the nearly 40 thousand database entries are for organizations that
in reality may not be engaged with the UN to any real degree contrary to what an
organization’s listing within the database may imply. The latter perception is bolstered
by the presence within the iCSO database of many organizations that have previously
been stripped of CS due to inactivity, including several NGOs with which I am
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personally familiar and that to the best of my knowledge never had any substantive form
of interaction with the UN before or after removal of consultative status.
There also appear to be irregularities and inconsistencies with how certain
organizations and other data are classified within the iCSO database, though whether
through error in data input (the frequency of odd classifications implies the latter is not
the case), or capriciousness or arbitrariness on the part of the UN’s NGO committee or
others designating categories for organizations. The most glaring examples of odd
(miss)classification of organizations were evidenced via analysis of the scope/scale of
CSOs. Surprisingly, only 34.8% of all organizational entries were classified as
international CSOs/NGOs in scope of operations, with 33.1% classified as national,
19.1% as local, and 13% as national in scope. Odd inconsistencies were visible in terms
of which types of organizations were deemed to have which scope/scale of operations.
For example, only 53% of organizations with the typological classification of “local
government” were also classified as having a local scope of operations, with many
instead categorized as having international or national scope when that is apparently not
the case. Such incongruities cause concern as to the reliability of the data and its
classification within the iCSO system.
In addition to drawing attention to possible misclassification of organizations,
analysis of the scope/scale data revealed an interesting contrast in that substantially larger
percentages of organizations in LDC/developing regions were classified as being local,
national or regional in scope rather than international. For example, only 6% of
organizations in MDCs were classified as local in scope, but 13.1% in LDCs. Only 5.9%
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of organizations in MDCs were classified as national in scope, but 27.2% in LDCs. If the
latter data can be believed it may indicate (1) greater inclinations on the part of
CSOs/NGOs in developing regions to look externally/internationally (to the UN or other
IGOs) for potential sources of support, and/or (2) that civil society in developing regions
is more bottom-up rather than hierarchical in its orientation as has been suggested in the
literature.
Proportionality is a component of plurality of critical importance to this study in
that understanding the degree to which regions are proportionally represented is a
reflection of the degree of spatial parity and equitable pluralism in appraising the
relationship between the UN and transnational CSOs. Analysis of data specific to entries
for organizations with consultative status revealed a disproportionate dominance of
MDC-based organizations. In most categories, there are more CS organizations
headquartered in LDC/developing regions than MDC/developed regions, but LDCs are
proportionally underrepresented relative to the portion of global population that they
comprise. The predominantly MDC regions of Europe, Anglo America and Oceania
collectively comprise only 15.3% of the global 2016 population, but are headquarters to
61.2% of organizations that presently hold consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.
Among MDC regions, Anglo America was the most disproportionately overrepresented
as it constitutes only 4.9% of the global population but is headquarters to 26.5% of CSOs
holding consultative status.
LDC/developing regions comprise 84.7% of the world’s population yet are
headquarters to only 38.7% of the civil society organizations listed as holding
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consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. By far, the largest proportional
underrepresentation among LDC regions is for Asia which constitutes 59.7% of the
global population yet was identified as headquarters to only 18.0% of organizations in the
CS program. Interestingly, LDC/developing regions are also severely underrepresented
proportionally among organizations holding General Status, the highest accreditation
level within the CS program, and the level which provides the greatest degree of access
and least restrictions within the UN framework. Of the 6 world regions delimited within
the iCSO database, the 3 with the smallest percentage of General Status CSOs were all
LDC/developing regions: only 1.2% of African-based CS organizations hold General
Status, only 2.8% of Asia-based CS organizations, and 2.5% among those based in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
A case study of the world’s 20 most populous countries was also undertaken as a
gauge of proportional plurality/representation. The findings not only reinforced the
conclusion that CSOs based in LDC regions/countries were proportionally
underrepresented but also allowed for a new type of comparative analysis related to
proportionality, the representation of democratic versus nondemocratic countries within
the CS program. Of the 20 most populous countries, 10 were deemed by most recent
FreedomHouse analysis to be democratic and 10 quasi/non-democratic. Of the 10
countries with the lowest percentages of all CS organizations, 6 were non/quasidemocratic and 4 of the 5 countries that were the most underrepresented proportionally
were non/quasi-democratic. Only 1 of the 10 most populous non/quasi-democratic
countries (DR Congo) was deemed to be represented in the CS program proportionally to
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its population. The underlying implication of the findings is that regime type and level of
freedom may be important factors in determining degree of civil society representation
within international forums.
An additional case study sought to determine degrees of variation (in
representation of CSOs/NGOs in the CS program) among countries and sub-regions of
the same geographical region. Europe was selected as this regional case study because
(1) it is home to approximately one-quarter of the world’s countries---providing a large
pool of countries to analyze, and (2) CSOs/NGOs headquartered on the continent
appeared to be well-represented within the consultative status program. As expected, the
degree of representation within the CS program varied widely among countries and also
among sub-regions. Proportional to population, the least represented countries by wide
margins were those of Eastern Europe, likely reflecting a combination of both financial
limitations (reflecting the East’s status as the least wealthy region of Europe) and also the
political reality that scarcely one generation has passed since the end of authoritarian rule
and the gradual and ongoing emergence of civil society. The case study also revealed
that CSOs from EU member states, or states which were EU candidates were
proportionally far better represented within the CS program than those headquartered in
non-EU/non-candidate countries, indicating the supportive role that the EU plays for
European CSOs/NGOs (Thiel 2017).
Proportionality is also a potentially important consideration with regard to
policy/issue areas in that it is desirable for some degree of equity to exist in the
representation of different issues and policy areas. The first guiding hypothesis
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specifically addressed issues of proportionality and imbalanced representation both in
regard to country/regional involvement and the policy/issues areas with which the
CSOs/NGOs are concerned. Widely varied and uneven degrees of representation of
policy issue areas were found to exist within the UN-civil society framework. Among
classifications according to organizational typologies within the iCSO database, the
organizational types specific to the CS program with the largest number of entries were
Foundations (10.4%), Ageing (8.5%), Associations (7.7%), Labor (6.8%), and Disability
(6.7%). The organizational types specific to the CS program with the least representation
were Institutions (1.3%), Private Sector (1.3%), IGOs (1.1%), Media 0.6%), and Local
Governments (0.0%).
Database classifications according to fields of expertise also varied widely by
degree of representation across policy issue areas. Representation of CS organizations
varied substantially across the 11 categories organized by fields of expertise with entries
related to Economic and Social issues having the largest percentage at 20.2%, followed
by Gender Issues/Women at 16.4%, Sustainable Development at 13.1%, and Social
Development at 13%. Outside the latter fields, total numbers of entries were more
modest, with the smallest degrees of representation associated with 3 fields specific to
Africa, each of which remained in single digits. Outside the CS program, iCSO database
listings related to both organizational typology and field of expertise showed even greater
degrees of imbalance. These findings support the contention of the first guiding
hypothesis that imbalances exist regarding the representation of policy/issue areas within
the CS program.
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A final element of the iCSO database analysis sought to determine the degree to
which the ECOSOC-CS program was the primary outlet for civil society participation at
the UN in comparison to several other UN accreditation/affiliation programs for
CSOs/NGOs. Five such programs were evaluated including those of the Commission on
Sustainable Development, Department of Public Information, Financing for Development
Office, Small Island Developing States, and the World Summit on Sustainable
Development. Analysis of the numbers for the other five UN affiliation programs for
CSOs/NGOs revealed them to have only small fractions of the involvement of the
ECOSOC consultative status program. The DPI accreditation program had the largest
number of accredited organizations with 868 (compared to nearly 5,000 organizations in
the ECOSOC-CS program) and it appears to present organizations with opportunities for
engagement throughout the year, whereas the other 4 programs---even if two (CSD and
FDO) are theoretically ongoing---seem to be focused around periodic summits or other
special events, thus providing a more limited dynamic for participation with the UN.

Summary Overview of Survey Findings
The survey questionnaire was designed to operationalize the second and third
guiding hypotheses. As discussed in some detail at the beginning of Chapter 4, there is
evidence to suggest that to at least some degree participant self-(de)selection occurred
contributing to possible bias in the survey results. Those organizations which are more
active were perhaps in turn more likely to complete/submit the survey and those more
inactive less inclined to do so. In short, a disproportionately high survey response rate
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among organizations which hold General status---likely the most engaged organizations
within the CS program, a disproportionately low response rate for organizations which
hold Roster status---the most restrictive accreditation status and likely the least engaged
organizations within the CS program, combined with survey results that in some respects
indicated somewhat higher levels of engagement than anticipated are the basis of the
latter perception. In the event such bias does exist, it does not invalidate the survey
results as no known impact would have occurred regarding the operationalization of the
second guiding hypothesis and with regard to the third guiding hypothesis, the findings
revealed CSO/NGO participation levels that could at best be described as tepid, a level of
involvement that would likely only be reduced further if any such bias could have been
controlled. The latter issues aside, the survey likely contributes to better understanding
of the UN-civil society dynamic and yielded a range of interesting results---some of
which were unexpected, an overview of which is provided in the following section.
One of the more important components of the survey and the first of three openended questions asked participants why their organization sought consultative status and
whether those goals had been realized. Slightly less than one-third of responses (31.6%)
were reasons specific to the policy/issues areas of the CSO, such as a labor organization
seeking to bring international attention to workers’ issues. The majority (68.4%) of
responses were a diverse range of more general considerations, many of which were
extrinsic in nature. Interestingly, those respondents indicating more general or extrinsic
goals such as “contributing to the UN” or “networking with other NGOs” were more
likely to indicate having at least partly achieved those goals and also report higher levels
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of satisfaction with the CS program. Among respondents addressing whether the goals
had been achieved, 46.4% indicated “yes”, with an additional 24.3% providing a partial
or qualified “yes” in response, for a combined (at least partial) success rate of 60.7%. A
substantial minority of 23.2% indicated that their initial organizational goals for the CS
program had not been achieved and another 16.1% of respondents indicated that they
could not determine whether goals had been realized or not, with the most common
accompanying reason being they had not been in the CS program long enough to have
seen any impact---though nearly all such comments were from organizations which had
been in the program for at least several years, a sufficient time to have participated in
some way.
Many obstacles to achieving organizational goals and participating in the CS
program were reported via the survey, among the most commonly cited of which were
lack of financial resources, not understanding how to effectively participate or derive
benefit from the program, segregation from the UN and member governments, and
feeling ignored/powerless with little opportunity. Accreditation level was not cited as an
impediment by any organizations holding General consultative status (the highest
accreditation level with the least restrictions) and only by a minority holding Special
status. However, a notable minority of 17.9% of all respondents did indicate that their
accreditation level posed an impediment to participating, including the majority of the
small number of Roster status (the most restrictive status) organizations responding.
To better understand the UN-civil society dynamic, participants were asked to
indicate on number lines how they would rate the importance of each of 5 specific
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considerations concerning their organization’s desire to obtain UN consultative status.
The highest mean response (7.7) response was for prestige/visibility, followed by
networking with other organizations (7.6), contributing written or verbal statements (7.4),
and contributing/exchanging research (7.2), with credibility in fundraising (6.0) the least
important consideration. To gauge how outcomes compared to initial expectations,
participants were also asked to use number line scores to rate the beneficial impact of
each of 6 areas specified in the questionnaire. Indicating successful alignment with many
initial objectives, mean responses were highest for prestige/legitimacy (7.1), making
meaningful contributions to the UN (6.4), and establishing connections with other
NGOs/organizations (6.1). The areas reported as yielding the least benefits were media
publicity (4.8), making connections with NGOs/organizations in the US (4.7), and--consistent with the low mean scores in the responses to initial goals for the CS program--aid in fundraising (3.9) for the organization.
In exploring the contention of the second guiding hypothesis that a diverse range
of factors impeded participation in the CS program, participants were asked a series of
questions related to barriers, the first of which used a series of number lines to assess the
importance of each of 9 potential obstacles. Of the latter, 4 of 9 items yielded mean
scores higher than midpoint, indicating most respondents viewed them as moderate-tosubstantial barriers. The highest among these with a mean score of 6.8 (on a scale of 010) was financial commitment, with the somewhat interrelated issues of geographical
proximity/distance (5.9) and time/personnel commitment (5.6) following closely behind,
and understanding UN processes (5.4) rounding out the 4 highest scoring items. Only a
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minority of respondents indicated lack of board/donor support as a barrier but
interestingly, in examining the returned questionnaires it appears that a disproportionate
number of organizations indicating board/donor support as barriers to participation in the
CS program also indicated no-minimal activity in many respects. Most such
organizations appear to have designated fewer UN representatives, have participated in
fewer UN forums, and are less likely to have presented verbal or written statements at a
UN function than organizations indicating no barriers posed by board members or
donors. Several possibilities exist in terms of the minority of organizations that lack
board or donor support for participation in the CS program and the correlation with the
latter findings. For example, upon initially seeking CS affiliation the time/cost of active
participation in the program may not have been apparent to many boards/donors and
upon entering the CS program---as such commitments became more obvious, support
could have eroded with a commensurate perception that funding and staff time could be
better directed elsewhere. Political considerations such as opposition to globalization or
the UN in general may also serve to taint the perspective of some donors and board
members, preventing or diminishing their support.
Other barrier-related questions also yielded insight. One of the more telling
questions contained in the survey asked participants to denote the degree to which they
felt that the cost/effort of obtaining consultative status is justified by the benefits their
organization has derived from the affiliation. The majority of responses were at least
marginally favorable but a substantial minority (29.1%) scored the number line item at
mid-point or less, indicating they perceive the intrinsic worth of their participation to be
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in question. In an open-ended question, participants were also asked how the UN might
improve the experience for organizations within the CS program. Respondents’ diverse
and often insightful comments and suggestions were analyzed and correlated to ten
distinct issue areas---among which some overlap exists: access, bureaucracy,
communication, elitism/fairness, expertise, funding, general guides/training, meetings,
networking and capacity building, or issues specific to the CSOs policy/focus area.
Among the latter, issues related to meetings and other UN forums (28.6%), funding
(24.5%) were the most commonly cited, followed by the need for general guides/training,
improvement in communication, and increased access were mentioned most frequently
with the majority of respondents commenting on some combination of the latter 5 issues.
Smaller numbers of respondents touched upon other issues such as fairness/elitism.
Principally, to test the third guiding hypothesis that most organizations do not
participate in the CS program, but also to potentially shed light on the range of obstacles
to participation as addressed in the second guiding hypothesis, survey respondents were
asked to provide details concerning their designated UN representatives. Most (78.2%)
indicated that their organization had designated representatives at UN headquarters in
New York, which also had the highest mean number (5.0) of representatives obtaining
grounds passes. Only slightly more than half (50.9%) of respondents indicated
representatives had been designated in Geneva, and a small minority (20.0%) reported
representatives accredited to Vienna. Almost no organizations reported designating
representatives at UN regional offices. While most respondents did not indicate the
process of designating and credentialing their UN representatives as problematic at least
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to some degree, the process did appear to be an issue for some. A large minority (35.1%)
indicated difficulty experienced during the process, a large enough number that the issue
should be regarded as a potentially important barrier to participation. Respondents were
also asked to characterize the nature/background of their UN representatives with the
most common being full-time employees and board members of the CSOs/NGOs
followed in frequency by donors and part-time employees.
In seeking to get at the core premise of the third guiding hypothesis, participants
were asked a range of questions related to participation including networking and
communication. The vast majority (75.8%) of respondents indicated having attended at
least 1 UN function since 2005. If a small number of abnormal outliers among responses
are excluded, the mean total number of events respondents reported attending during the
period is 13.6 or slightly more than 1 per year. Most organizations (75.4%) also
indicated that they had communicated with the UN at least once since obtaining
consultative status, ordinarily via email or phone---with most reporting somewhat tepid
satisfaction levels with the speed and substance of the communication experience with
the UN. Less than half (40.3%) indicated that their organization had ever hosted or
organized a meeting/event at the UN and only slightly more than half (51.6%) reported
ever having participated in an NGO coalition/network.
Most (61.2%) reported having presented a written statement at least once but only
38.7% reported ever having been asked to do so. Less than half reported having
presented a written statement with only 29.0% indicated they had ever been asked to do
so. Critical interpretations of the latter could include a variety of possible conclusions
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including: (1) exponential growth of the CS program and the number of CSOs/NGOs
participating means that there are more organizations within the dynamic than can be
effectively used/consulted; (2) wide variations could exist in terms of the real/perceived
credibility and competence of CS organizations with many CSOs/NGOs not deemed by
the UN to be as worthy of being solicited for input; (3) many of the CSOs/NGOs awarded
CS have such a narrow or obscure focus that there is little they can effectively contribute
to the often broader issues with which the UN is concerned---which in turn raises the
question of why such organizations were admitted to the CS program; (4) perhaps
ECOSOC and other UN organs understand that many organizations in the CS program--especially smaller organizations---either cannot (e.g., financially) or will not participate
and thus does not solicit their participation. Only a minority of respondents report ever
having been contacted by other organizations in the CS program, foreign governments, or
the UN and those that did indicated it was usually related to general information
sharing/introductions or collaboration opportunities. Asked to what degree they feel the
United Nations values the participation of their organization, a tepid mean response of
5.9 was yielded for a number line range of 1-10, conveying that a substantial number of
organizations in the CS program feel alienated or underappreciated regarding the UN.

Suggestions for Future Research

Although several rounds of editing and trimming ultimately reduced the length of
the survey questionnaire to a considerable degree, the final version was 10 pages in

238

length and contained approximately 48 items depending upon how one may count some
multi-part questions. Given the in-depth nature of the questionnaire, I was largely
pleased to have obtained a completion/return rate approaching 15% and invested
significant effort (e.g., via follow-up emails/reminders) in order to attain that rate of
return. Accordingly, adding additional items to the survey questionnaire would likely not
have been prudent and would have almost certainly reduced the response rate
substantially. If the latter reality did not serve as an impediment and survey length were
no option, as can be evidenced in the following 7 examples---there are a number of
additional survey questions that with benefit of hindsight may have yielded useful
insights into the research and should potentially be considered for incorporation in any
future follow-up study.
In retrospect, exploration of certain issues would have been useful additions to the survey
(were it not for the limiting factor of the economy of space)---e.g.:


Ideally, one or more survey items could attempt to assess the learning curve
concerning how and over what period of time an organization ultimately learned
to participate/contribute after obtaining consultative status.



Although the survey did not directly address the issue of agenda setting either in
terms of gauging its frequency/prevalence or levels of (dis)satisfaction among
CSOs/NGOs with regard to the latter, the issue surfaced in the comments of
multiple respondents and is potentially a substantial issue related to engagement
in the CS program. The average organization in the CS program appears to have
little-no input as to selecting the times or locations of civil society
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meetings/functions or perhaps even more importantly in the planning of the
agendas of such events.


Degree of access also appears to be an issue of concern based upon the feedback
provided by multiple respondents, but the survey did not attempt to directly
explore the latter. It is apparent that many organizations in the CS program feel
limited access exists to UN organs, national delegations/representatives, and even
other CSOs/NGOs and NGO coalitions such as original major groups, a situation
which may foster alienation and limited participation.

Minor questionnaire tweaks/additions aside, there are numerous examples of
research that should be explored in any future study of a similar nature. It is perhaps not
unusual that research can generate new questions as it simultaneously provides answers
to others and this study was no exception, as additional research is needed to fully
understand many of the study findings both related to analysis of the iCSO database and
the survey. Having served on the boards of directors of multiple nonprofit organizations,
I am particularly interested in the role of directors in supporting or opposing an
organizations association with the UN and although the study sought to at least in part
address the issue, many questions remain. For example, why in 25% of cases is there
such inadequate support on the part of a CS organization’s board and/or donors that
respondents reported this as a substantial barrier to participation in the program? Does
lack of board/donor support reflect financial concerns---travel/participation costs funds
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that could be better spent elsewhere? Is it a reflection of political animosity on the part of
donors or board members toward the UN and globalization in general?
The research has raised numerous other questions as well. For example, many
survey respondents reported contributing verbal or written statements to the UN or in
some way contributing/exchanging research with the UN and/or other CSOs/NGOs since
matriculation into the ECOSOC CS program. However, it remains unclear how often and
to what degree this activity has manifested into effectual policy change or formulation at
the UN or otherwise at the international level. Finding some means of objectively
assessing the latter would permit a more meaningful appraisal of the tangible benefit
derived from the primary collaboration between the UN and international civil society
and could do much in addressing whether the CS program is as yet a viable catalyst for
effective partnership or mere window dressing.
The survey findings indicated that only a minority of respondents had ever been
asked by the United Nations to present a written (38.7%) or verbal statement (29.0%) at a
UN venue, likely a reflection of the large and ever increasing numbers of CSOs/NGOs in
the CS program. It would be interesting to obtain more data related to such requests and
the organizations that received them in an effort to glean patterns related to participation
and UN interests related to consultations with civil society. For example, are there
specific policy/issue areas such as human rights or development that are far more (or less)
likely to receive input requests from the UN? Do such requests favor CSOs/NGOs from
certain world regions or of certain sizes (i.e. capacities) or organizational typologies?
Have patterns related to the latter questions varied over time or remained largely
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consistent---e.g., are trends visible in policy/issues areas in which the UN is willing to
consult civil society?
This research suggests that a sharp dichotomy exists between CS organizations
accredited at the General level versus the Roster level. While a definitive or
generalizable conclusion cannot be made due mainly to the disproportionately low rate of
surveys returned from Roster status CSOs/NGOs, the questionnaire data that was
submitted indicates far higher levels of both participation and satisfaction on the part of
General status organizations within the CS program, whereas organizations with Roster
status were both least likely to be active participants and most likely to indicate
substantial barriers to participation (with Special status CSOs/NGOs positioned between
the two extremes). The question of how to better engage Roster status organizations
within the CS program so they feel less marginalized and might be better empowered to
contribute in meaningful ways would appear to be a potentially important area for future
research to explore. The implication also exists that reforms are potentially needed in the
process by which CSOs/NGOs are accredited and classified within the CS program in
order to better screen organizations less likely to participate.
Not all suggestions for future research stem directly from the findings of this
research. The UN iCSO database is updated frequently and often expanded to include
new or expanded datasets. At the time this research was being undertaken a new dataset
addressing meeting participation of UN-affiliated CSOs was in the initial stages of being
added to the database. At the time of writing no data as yet populated the system, but it
was organized by meeting type (policy/topic) and session/year according to 8 categories:
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Financing for Development; Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; Public
Administration; Social Development; Status of Women; Sustainable Development; UN
Forum on Forests; and the Conference on States Parties to the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities. Depending upon the category, when available data options
will ultimately span up to 20 years or more, going as far back as 1992. As this research
progressed throughout 2016, I continually checked this dataset to determine if it had
become functional in the hope of incorporating it into the study, but at the time the study
concluded it had still not been populated with data. As no data was available to examine,
it is unclear whether statistics provided will be specific to organizations within the CS
program or (more likely) reflective of all UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs---the latter is
standard for most datasets within the system. In either case such data would prove
invaluable in formulating a detailed understanding of the nature and degree of
participation within the UN-civil society dynamic. Accordingly, one of the strongest
recommendations for any future research related to the scope of this study and seeking to
expand upon its findings is to comprehensively analyze statistics related to meeting
participation on the part of UN-affiliated CSOs at such time in the future that the latter
dataset is functionally available. Such an analysis would allow more detailed picture and
objective determination as to the degree of participation of organizations within the UNcivil society dynamic.
The UN dynamic with civil society is perpetually changing both in terms of
policy/issue areas and also with regard to the degree of pluralism UN involvement with
civil society. Had this study been undertaken several decades ago it would have found

243

much more modest levels of interaction across all policy/issue areas and of course due to
a combination of factors including changing societal norms and evolving technology
some areas in which there is collaborative effort between the UN and civil society today
had yet to attain a status of universal acceptance/importance or even be conceived as
focal areas or opportunities for collaboration---e.g. human (LBGT) rights, sustainable
development, cyber-crime. Also, although this study confirmed that perfect pluralism
such as proportional representation of all world regions in general or developing areas in
particular as yet does not exist within the UN-civil society relationship, far lower degrees
of proportionality and pluralism would have existed in the past. Accordingly, a longevity
or otherwise future study mirroring the goals and parameters of this research will be
necessary in coming years if the nature and degree of the continually evolving dynamic
between the UN and international civil society is to be adequately understood in the
future.
Opportunities also exist to expand upon research into proportional plurality. This
research undertook case studies of Europe (approximately 25% of the world’s countries)
and also the 20 most populous countries on earth to determine the degree to which
patterns of participation within the UN-CSO dynamic varied across sub-regional lines
and from country to country. Regional and sub-regional comparative analyses of other
areas of the world would be useful in cultivating a more complete understanding of
spatial variations in parity/pluralism within the dynamic. For example, at the time the
research was being conceptualized and planned, the degree to which Asian CSOs/NGOs
were underrepresented within the framework was not fully understood. Also, depending
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somewhat on what one accepts as the boundaries of the continent, Asia is home to
approximately the same percentage of the world’s states as Europe. The latter reality
combined with the aforementioned lack of proportional plurality within the UN-civil
society dynamic would seem to necessitate that any future geographical case studies of
this phenomenon include Asia and its sub-regions.
It may be especially useful to understand detailed patterns in terms of the types
and numbers of CSOs/NGOs which have lost their consultative status. This remains
something of a mystery as the UN does not draw attention to or release data related to the
phenomenon, but based upon personal observations and anecdotal evidence it appears
that fairly substantial numbers of organizations that matriculate into the CS program lose
the status by the time their first or second quadrennial report is due. The latter implies
programs are subject to attrition via inactivity, as the primary purpose of the quadrennial
report is to ascertain the type and frequency of CSO/NGO participation in the CS
program. If appreciable percentages of organizations given CS accreditation are washing
out after a few years due to non-participation, the legitimacy of the ECOSOC-CS
program as a forum for global civil society would lose credibility, and it is likely for that
very reason that the UN---likely the only realistic source of obtaining or tracking such
data---will not be readily forthcoming with such statistics, making such a study difficult
at best.
The processes wherein applicant organizations are either selected or rejected for
admission to the CS program as well as the manner in which successful applicants are
designated with an accreditation level of General, Special or Roster appear to be
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potentially interesting areas for future research. The degree to which both of the latter
may be politically charged and may reflect possible biases on the part of the NGO
committee and its decision-making processes was well beyond the scope of this research
but would be interesting areas to explore in a future study. For example, to what degree
has the cultural pendulum swung away from organizations that are pro-Israel/Judaism,
Christian or socially conservative in theme or mission? To what degree do international
political rivalries surface in the process---e.g. are CSOs/NGOs in Ukraine, or the Baltic
States blocked or scrutinized as applicants to a greater degree due to the influence of
Russia within the UN? Rather than a political agenda, can inconsistencies be shown to
exist in the CS screening/accreditation process stemming more simply from arbitrariness,
capriciousness or poor judgement?
In a potentially related matter, further effort should be made to explore
correlations between regime type (democratic vs. not) and levels of
representation/participation of CSOs/NGOs within the UN framework. By way of a case
study comparing 10 countries that were democratic to 10 that were not, this research
demonstrated a substantial gap in civil society involvement at the UN between the
typologies. A broader analysis exploring levels of participation among all non/quasidemocratic states and the reasons and mechanics which account for their proportional
underrepresentation could shed light not just on the inner dynamic of the ECOSOC-CS
program, but more broadly on transnational democracy and civil society. How
commonly do national governments, the primary focal point and source of influence
within the UN, use their influence to block the UN ascension of CSOs/NGOs from their
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own countries that may have a contrasting agenda with the regime? Is the latter scenario
the primary factor in the underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from nondemocratic
countries or is much of the phenomenon merely a reflection of civil society not being as
vibrant or commonplace in such countries as opposed to democratic regimes?
More broadly, a comparative analysis of many of the particular circumstances of
CSOs/NGOs in different countries and regime types could be useful in gleaning patterns
and understanding imbalances in levels of civil society participation with the UN
internationally. For example, it would be interesting to assess levels of and variations in
government funding and support for CSOs/NGOs as correlated to representation and
participation of those organizations at the UN---e.g. are countries in which QUANGOs or
otherwise state-affiliated/founded CSOs represented to a greater or to a lesser degree
within UN-ECOSOC. Such research would be a monumental undertaking, but would
perhaps be attainable via a case study approach of select countries as illustrative of
typologies.
The issue of access and more broadly, the degree to which UN-affiliated
CSOs/NGOs have utilized that forum to actually impact policy formulation or research
agendas of member states would be fertile ground for future studies. Any such research
would likely need to explore case studies of geographical areas (sub-regions) and or issue
areas such as development or human rights in order to be manageable in scope, but would
likely prove useful in further elucidating the degree to which the UN-civil society
partnerships have potentially born fruitful outcomes rather than merely existing as an
illusory or idealistic nod to global civil society on the part of the world’s preeminent
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IGO. If such research indicates that UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs do contribute to policy
formulation among member states via the UN forum, then the UN-civil society dynamic
would be vindicated to a great degree, but it remains unclear that the latter is the case and
such an exploration was beyond the scope of this study.
It may prove useful to better understand patterns of civil society involvement and
participation at each UN headquarters and regional office and cultivate a more detailed
picture of how/why variations exist. For example, it would be relatively easy to construct
a survey instrument to determine the specific types of programs/conferences
organizations participate in at each UN location along with the frequency of participation.
In turn, correlations could potentially be made between types of CSOs/NGOs
(accreditation level, MDC/LDC background, policy/issue areas, etc.) and which UN
locations they are most and least likely to have involvement with as a part of civil society
outreach programs---e.g. are organizations headquartered in (certain) predominantly
LDC/developing regions more likely to participate in UN forums in Geneva, Vienna or at
UN regional sites and if so, due to what factors (e.g. easier to obtain travel visas)?
Information yielded from research into the latter areas might potentially shed light
as to how greater participation and greater degrees of plurality/proportionality might be
achieved within the UN-civil society dynamic. Such findings could help to address
which other UN environments (UN programs based in Geneva, Vienna or regional
offices) might be conducive to formal associations with civil society similar to the CS
program within ECOSOC, a potentially valuable area to explore in future studies
assessing ways to expand participation. For example, if regions such as Asia are
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proportionally underrepresented at forums in New York, the seat and focal point of
ECOSOC and the CS program, perhaps it is justified via the desire for pluralism within
the UN-civil society framework for additional linkages either via expansion of ECOSOC
programs or creating new non-ECOSOC civil society partnerships at other UN locations
including regional offices. Research into the justification and feasibility of such
strategies may prove beneficial as a catalyst for reforming and improving pluralism and
proportionality within the system.

Concluding Observations
To the researcher’s knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of
macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part
of all CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. It may also be among
the first such studies which seeks to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement
or the lack thereof on the part of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status. Most empirical
studies of civil society at the UN have focused upon a limited number of organizations
within a single issue area (Clark et al, 1998). A strength of this study is that its breadth of
scope in seeking to analyze patterns of participation of all CSOs/NGOs holding
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC did reveal macro-scale patterns within the
institutional dynamic including uneven regional and policy/issue representation and
relatively modest levels of participation on the part of most UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs
attributable to a diverse range of factors. The study proposed that the expansion of the
number of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with the UN (ECOSOC) has not
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necessarily equated to meaningful collaboration between the United Nations and
transnational civil society, and accordingly the ideals of democratic pluralism are not
being fully realized via this dynamic and the study findings to a great degree support the
latter perspective.
As Foucault famously stated in exploring the concept of why power and influence
should ideally be widely diffused throughout many political constellations, “I don’t want
to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and
hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the
state (Foucault 1980, 122).” A central theme underlying this study was the balance of
power and influence (and whether or not the latter exists in reality) between the UN and
transnational civil society as manifested in the ECOSOC consultative status program. If
for example CSOs/NGOs in consultative status contribute power to the UN, it is likely in
the form of legitimacy in that the relationship at least cultivates an impression of
engagement with civil society and effort being made to implement pluralist democratic
norms. Likewise, the CSOs/NGOs in formal association with the UN appear to derive a
real or perceived legitimacy and increase in status from the relationship. In exploring the
status and influence of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status, this research found little
indication of power diffusion or that the traditional authority and influence of non-state is
in danger of being eroded by transnational civil society within the UN dynamic.
International civil society can make positive contributions and serve useful
purposes for transnational institutions as a vehicle for achieving myriad goals including
monitoring human rights and international law, facilitating research in the field,
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disseminating aid and services to those in need, providing council and expertise in
specialized fields. Potentially one of the most critical contributions international civil
society can make is to serve as a catalyst for democratic norms in that establishing
stronger bonds between democratic governance (at all levels including transnational
governance) and institutions of civil society can in turn help to strengthen and engrain
democratic traditions. In many respects a strong civil society is beneficial for democratic
traditions in that, for example, if integrated within democratic institutions whether at the
sub-state, state or transnational level, civil society may potentially foster and reinforce
democratic ideals and practices via the aggregation and representation of stakeholder
interests and also via the mitigation of government authority (Uhlin 2009). Likewise, by
gaining knowledge of procedures and language used at the UN and other IGOs, elements
of civil society may learn how to effectively use international instruments associated with
democratic traditions such as compliance reporting to advance domestic or transnational
agendas in various policy areas including human or environmental rights (Riddell-Dixon
2008).
It would be difficult to study the phenomenon of transnational civil society
without concepts related to pluralism being central considerations and an appraisal of
pluralism within the UN-civil society dynamic hinges upon how the concept is perceived
and defined. In the broadest of senses, pluralism refers to inclusiveness in the
incorporation of diverse voices within any process of deliberation or decision/policymaking. Dahl (1956) perhaps most famously encapsulated this broad concept of
pluralism as being associated with a school of thought within classical liberalism that
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focused upon multiple sources of political influence and that regarded democracy as the
internal regulation of society through competition among many varied types of groups
over power and social privileges. Karppinen (2013) stressed that efforts to characterize
pluralism usually share the core view that what is desirable and egalitarian about
democratic systems is that their functioning cannot be reduced to any single hierarchy or
idea, which for the purposes of the UN or other IGOs may mean that state-centric
representation could potentially be broadened to in some capacity include civil society,
business, sub-state actors/governments and other diverse interests.
In the latter broad sense, the UN has made commendable progress in achieving
levels of pluralism unprecedented in its history. The UN advocates diversity in
representation, and the increasingly heterogeneous (geographical, policy issue areas
represented, etc.) mixture of NGOs within ECOSOC reflects a strong institutional
commitment to pursuing pluralism. The UN has assumed a direct role in attempting to
facilitate such pluralism within the consultative status framework via encouraging
organizations representing the historically marginalized (e.g., the global south,
human/indigenous rights-related organizations) and providing at least some funding and
other support to empower more CSOs/NGOs from developing nations to participate in
UN forums. More civil society organizations are currently listed as being in formal
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC than at any point in history. There is better
representation of total numbers of organizations from LDC/developing regions than at
any point as is also likely the case in terms of the range and diversity of policy/issue areas
represented by civil society organizations in association with the UN.
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However, significant question exists as to whether such efforts favoring plurality
have yielded genuine improvements in the diversity of representation/ participation or
whether they are largely symbolic (Kymlicka 2007, 3-25). CSO/NGO representation at
the UN may be more symbolic than substantive in terms of degree of active engagement
of civil society within the UN dynamic, as the number and diversity of CSOs/NGOs in
theoretical affiliation with the UN is not meaningful without active engagement. Also, as
discussed at some length in the research, proportional plurality---representation
commensurate to the proportion comprised of a population---as yet does not truly exist
with CSOs/NGOs headquartered in predominantly MDC/developed regions
overrepresented proportionally at the UN and those based in principally LDC/developing
regions proportionally underrepresented, grossly so in the case of Asia.
The concept of pluralism as espoused in Kantian classical liberalism and liberal
institutionalism contends that ideally democratic systems have decentralized power
structures and substantial influence and participation from diverse sources, rather than a
limited segment of a polity. The latter has been described as the most compelling
argument on behalf of UN involvement with civil society organizations in that it
facilitates a multi-actor framework and contributes additional voices, perspectives and
expertise to international forums/regimes which have traditionally been the almost
exclusive domain of state actors (Mingst and Muldoon 2015; Whaites 1996; Willetts
2006). However, virtually all substantive influence within the UN remains with member
states and states have used their preeminence to successfully limit the expansion of
CSO/NGO influence into key areas such as the General Assembly and Security Council
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and to in effect segregate representatives of civil society via the practice of “parallel”
venues.
The concept of pluralism within the framework of international politics can be
narrowly defined. Pluralist perspectives within constructivism potentially give the most
consideration to the role of NGOs and civil society within the international system (Thiel
2010, 7117). Constructivist ideals in general denote pluralism in that constructivism
takes into account a diverse, pluralistic range of considerations in examining how a
complex dynamic of societal and other factors can impact transnational politics. The
transnational dynamic and the factors which influence it are social constructs that
routinely change and evolve and accordingly, CSOs/NGOs as increasingly common
manifestations of the complex societal dynamic should have some significance within the
international system (Wendt 1992, 422-424). Pluralists within the constructivist tradition
see the manifestation and expansion of transnational civil society organizations as the
growth of significant elements of bottom-up transformative influence upon international
politics.
Succinctly, if vibrant civil society participation helps to foster democratic
processes, increased roles of civil society within the UN and other IGOs will help
facilitate democratic processes within such organizations. Within the pluralist tradition
of constructivism, CSOs/NGOs are regarded as the principle organizing element and the
voice of transnational civil society, and as representing the interests of people and
grassroots movements, separate from and diffusing the power of states (DeMars and
Dijkzeul 2015, 11). Pluralism also contends that the actions of IOs/IGOs and states may
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become increasingly subject to the oversight of transnational civil society organizations
and that such an outcome reflects democratic institutional trends (Keohane 1998). This
research revealed no evidence that organizations within the consultative status program
were diffusing the authority of member states or exercising any form of oversight over
state or institutional authority within the UN.
Furthermore, while many participants in the ECOSOC consultative status
program may well be grassroots, non-hierarchical organizations in nature, many others
are funded or otherwise heavily influenced by state actors. In at least some instances
state-financed or otherwise heavily state-influenced CSOs/NGOs have established a
visible presence (if perhaps not a substantial impact) within the UN via the ECOSOC
consultative status program. However, whatever presence/voice these and other CSaffiliated CSOs possess is primarily the result of the willingness of UN member states to
permit their acceptance into the consultative status program. The latter reality appears
reflective of both neorealist and neoliberal theories related to the transnational dynamic in
that non-state actors are being allowed only as much influence or attention on the global
stage as state actors are willing to cede to them, rather than cultivating power or influence
in their own right.
Transnational CSOs/NGOs are diverse in terms of their origins and functionality
in that some appear to fit the global model of constructivism wherein power and
influence flows downward to civil society from state or supra-state sources (e.g.
QUANGOs) and other CSOs/NGOs better exemplify the plural(ist) constructivist model
wherein they may originate at the local/grassroots level and ultimately influence policy at
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the state-level and beyond. Liberal institutionalism, an additional theoretical framework,
views debates as to whether influence is hierarchical (top-down) or bottom-up in nature
as largely irrelevant in that the latter theory posits that CSOs/NGOs are for the most part
merely symptomatic of spreading international institutions, but do not constitute an
important element of them or influence international politics/policy to any substantial
degree. IGOs including the UN thus may endeavor to pay at least superficial attention to
civil society because of the perception that some role afforded to civil society is
becoming a transnational norm and political/democratic expectation.
This study found a small minority of CSOs/NGOs to be regularly and actively
engaged within the UN-civil society dynamic via the ECOSOC consultative status
program. However, in general those organizations that participate do so to minimal
degrees or only sporadically and a large minority of CS-accredited CSOs/NGOs do not
appear to participate in any appreciable way. By implication, if the interaction between
the United Nations and potentially most of the civil society institutions with which it
presumably has the closest linkages is at best weak or sporadic, it is difficult to imagine
that via such programs the UN through trickle-down approaches has substantial impact
locally (i.e., global constructivist theory) or alternatively that local or state-based civil
society is reaching upward and outward to impact international policy to any substantive
degree.
The findings of this research revealed little indication of the existence of either
such dynamic, but may indicate that the reasons for minimal or non-participation within
the ECOSOC-CS program are even more varied and complex than initially realized.
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Rather than global or plural constructivism, the findings of this study may imply support
for liberal institutionalist theories in that decades-long expansion of IGOs as a trend, has
facilitated a corollary expectation of expanding international civil society and an
associated expectation of linkages between transnational governance and democratic
institutions on the one hand and transnational civil society on the other as a standardized
norm. Liberal institutionalists merely perceive CSO/NGO growth largely as a bi-product
of the increased influence of international institutions and globalization rather than a
significant source of influence upon the international dynamic (DeMars and Dijkzeul
2015). In the broadest of senses, the latter ideas also at least partly mirror some
constructivist concepts concerning the expansion of norms/expectations.
One can also see the possible applicability of rational-choice institutionalism in
that a formalized linkage between the United Nations and international civil society was
created in the form of the ECOSOC consultative status program behind the goal of
addressing real or perceived shortcomings---e.g. the need for more pluralistic and
democratic representation and potentially enhanced bureaucratic/program functionality
(or at least cultivating the appearance of achieving one or both of the latter) within the
UN dynamic. More IGOs are granting CSOs/NGOs access to their institutional processes
out of the perception that this is a newly standardized norm and via the expectation
within the framework of transnational politics that such actions bolster democratic
legitimacy. Within the field of international relations, such a dynamic is supported by
sociological institutionalism and constructivism both of which focus upon processes of
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norm diffusion and institutional replication as catalysts for construction and spread of
international norms.
The expanding numbers of CSOs/NGOs within ECOSOC’s consultative status
program and growing diversity in terms of geographical and policy/issue areas
represented within the CS program may be more theoretical than functional as a trend
within the UN dynamic. The study revealed little indication of CS-affiliated CSOs as
agents of democratization, serving as effective vehicles of representation of international
stakeholders, or of CSOs within the CS program holding any tangible form of oversight
with regard to the UN or its member states. In that the vast majority of NGOs within the
CS program appear to make negligible if any contribution within the UN framework,
realist, Marxist and English School theorists appear to have been proven at least partly
correct via their state-centric views of how the UN and transnational political systems
function. Reflective of structuralist visions of how a transnational political dynamic
operates, within the United Nations, member states have maintained their near total
monopoly on power and influence and seem poised to continue doing so for the
foreseeable future. In the process of safeguarding their hegemony state actors have in
effect diminished the potential influence of transnational civil society within the UN’s
institutional fabric.
The dualistic pluralist concept of realized/actual versus potential power is an
interesting area to explore within the context of the UN ECOSOC dynamic. This study
found no evidence of CSO/NGO erosion of the power, influence or sovereignty of UN
member states, nor was there any evidence of any real capacity for
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oversight/accountability of the UN or its members. The only plausible case to be made
for realized power on the part of CS-affiliated CSOs would be as purveyors of useful
information. However, given the degree to which CSOs/NGOs are segregated from
member states and many important UN organs (e.g., the General Assembly and Security
Council) and denied access to both of the latter, it is difficult to see how the vast majority
of organizations within the consultative status program could claim to have achieved
influence even via information politics as a medium.
The issue of potential power is perhaps less clear. No indication exists that CSO
access, input, or oversight capacity within the UN framework is poised to expand to any
appreciable degree in the immediate future. Such expansions could only happen via the
willingness and complicity of most member states, most of which---reflective of
structuralist perspectives---have throughout the more than 70 years of the UN’s existence
shown little-to-no willingness to forfeit their monopoly on political influence within the
organization. However, some potential at least theoretically exists for limited expansion
of the influence of organizations within the CS program such as improved access to UN
organs of secondary importance or expanded roles with regard to information sharing,
consultation, or implementation of UN initiatives in the field by CS-affiliated
CSOs/NGOs.
As intergovernmental organizations have become more prevalent and have grown
in power and influence, many including the UN have potentially become more sensitive
to perception and criticism related to the need for democratic norms (e.g. the inclusion of
diverse sources of input) to become more fully institutionalized. In the case of the UN
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ECOSOC consultative status program, extensive and continually expanding formal
linkages between the UN and transnational civil society have been established. However,
an actual capacity for vibrant, verdant exchange or an environment in which either a
globalist or pluralist vision of a constructivist dynamic within transnational governance is
being fully realized, has perhaps not as yet been achieved.
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
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NGOs in Consultative Status with UN-ECOSOC

General Background
1. Why did your organization seek Consultative Status with the UN?

2. Have these goals been achieved during your experience with the UN? Why or why not?

3. What is your classification as an NGO in Consultative Status with the UN?
General Status (

) _____

Special Status (

) _____

Roster Status

) _____ Do you feel your present classification is appropriate? Y ___ N ___

(

4. To what degree does this classification assist or impede your ability to participate in UN
programs?
(10 denotes a very high degree of difficulty, 0 denotes no difficulty)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
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5. Following obtaining your accreditation, has your NGO ever communicated with the UN (not
counting submission of quadrennial reports)?
Yes _____
No _____

6. On a scale of 0 (not important) to 10 (utmost importance) how would you rate the importance
of each of the following considerations concerning your organization’s desire to have UN
Consultative Status?
General prestige/visibility for organization
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Credibility in fundraising
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Networking with other NGOs/organizations
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other organizations
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Contributing written or verbal position statement on issues
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Other (please specify)________________________________________________
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
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7. Within your organization, who was most responsible for seeking UN Consultative Status?
CEO _____
Executive Director _____
Board Member(s) _____
Other (please specify title _______________________________) _____

8. How would you rate the beneficial impact upon your NGO of obtaining UN Consultative
Status in each of the following respects? (10 denotes highly beneficial, 0 denotes no benefit
directly derived)
Making meaningful connections with other NGOs in the US
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Making meaningful connections with other NGOs internationally
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Making meaningful contributions to the UN
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Prestige/legitimacy derived for your organization
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Media publicity for your organization
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
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Aid in fundraising for your organization
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Other (please specify: ______________________________)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Other (please specify: ______________________________)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Accreditation/Representation
1. Please indicate if a designated representative of your organization has successfully obtained a
UN Grounds Pass/ID for each of the following UN headquarters/offices …
New York Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______
Geneva

Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______

Vienna

Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______
Regional Offices

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining pass/ID: ______
Bangkok, Thailand Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______
Beirut, Lebanon Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______
Santiago, Chile Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining pass/ID: ______

2. In a typical year what total number of representatives of your organization will have completed
accreditation and obtained a UN Grounds Pass: ________
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3. At which of the following UN headquarters/offices has your organization participated in
meetings/conferences or some other function?
New York ______
Geneva

______

Vienna

______
Regional Offices

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ______
Bangkok, Thailand ______
Beirut, Lebanon ______
Santiago, Chile ______

How would you assess the overall ease/difficulty of designating and accrediting your
organization’s representatives to the UN?
(10 denotes a very high degree of difficulty, 0 denotes no difficulty)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

4. Which of the following best characterizes the nature of your designated UN representatives?
Full-time employee(s) of your NGO _______ (# in this category _____)
Part-time employee(s) of your NGO_______ (# in this category _____)
Board member(s) of your NGO _______ (# in this category _____)
Donor(s) to your NGO _______ (# in this category _____)
Other unpaid supporter(s) of your NGO _______ (# in this category _____)
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Participation
1. Approximately how many UN conferences/meetings/workshops has your organization attended
in the following periods:
2005-present: _____
1995-2005: _____
Pre-1995: _____

2. Aside from attending conferences has your organization…
Presented a written statement at the UN? Yes____ No____
Presented a verbal statement at the UN? Yes____ No____
Been asked by UN to present a written statement? Yes_____ No_____
Been asked by UN to present a verbal statement? Yes_____ No_____

3. To what degree do you feel that the UN values the participation of your NGO? (10 denotes
extremely high valuation, 0 denotes total lack of valuation)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

4. Has your organization ever organized/hosted an event (e.g., meeting among NGOs) at the UN?
Yes_____ No_____

Networking/Communication
1. To what degree has your organization networked with other NGOs in Consultative Status with
the UN? (10 denotes a very high degree of interaction, 0 denotes no interaction at all)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
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2. Since you obtained Consultative Status have any of the following directly contacted you?
UN-affiliated NGOs

Y_____(estimated # of times: ______ ) No_____

Foreign governments

Y_____(estimated # of times: ______ ) No _____

UN agency/office

Y _____(estimated # of times: ______ ) No _____

If yes, for what purpose did the other NGO(s) contact you (check all that apply):
General information sharing/introductions _____
Collaboration/sharing of research _____
Specific question about UN process _____
Specific question about your NGOs mission _____
Other (please specify__________________________________________) _____

3. To what degree has your organization communicated with the UN with a question/request via
the following mediums? (below each please rate level of satisfaction with the speed/substance
of reply from UN: 10 denotes complete satisfaction, 0 denotes complete lack of satisfaction)

Have you emailed the UN? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, how many times: ___________

10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Have you called the UN? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, how many times: ___________

10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Have you faxed the UN? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, how many times: ___________

10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
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Have you written the UN? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, how many times: ___________

10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
4. Has your organization ever participated in any NGO network(s)/coalition(s) active within the
UN framework? Y_____ N_____
Name(s) of network(s)/coalition(s):
Barriers
1. How would you rate each of the following as barriers to NGO participation with UN
programs? (10 denotes significant barrier, 0 denotes no barrier at all)
Understanding UN Processes (Clarity of Opportunities to Participate)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
Conference Registration
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
Designation/Credentialing of UN Reps
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
Financial Commitment/Expenses
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
Time/Personnel Commitment
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
Quadrennial Report
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
Geographical proximity/distance of UN functions
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
Support of your NGO’s board and/or donors
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
UN restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal position statements
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0
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Other (please specify ____________________________________________)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

2. How could the UN improve the overall experience for NGOs with Consultative Status?

3. To what degree is the cost and effort of obtaining and maintaining UN Consultative Status
justified by the benefits derived by your organization? (10 denotes highly justified, 0 denotes not
justified at all)
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0

Name of survey respondent: _____________________ NGO: ___________________________

Anonymity in this study is guaranteed. Respondents’ identities and the identities of participating
NGOs will be known only to the researcher and neither will ever be revealed to any third party,
nor will the identity of respondents/NGOs ever be published in any research derived from this
study.
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UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1996/31 – CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
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United Nations
Resolution 1996/31
Economic and Social Council
49th plenary meeting
25 July 1996
1996/31. Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental
organizations

The Economic and Social Council,

Recalling Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling also its resolution 1993/80 of 30 July 1993, in which it requested a general
review of arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, with a
view to updating, if necessary, Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968, as well
as introducing coherence in the rules governing the participation of non-governmental
organizations in international conferences convened by the United Nations, and also an
examination of ways and means of improving practical arrangements for the work of the
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations and the Non-Governmental
Organizations Section of the Secretariat,
Recalling further its decision 1995/304 of 26 July 1995,

285

Confirming the need to take into account the full diversity of the non-governmental
organizations at the national, regional and international levels,
Acknowledging the breadth of non-governmental organizations' expertise and the
capacity of non-governmental organizations to support the work of the United Nations,
Taking into account the changes in the non-governmental sector, including the emergence
of a large number of national and regional organizations,
Calling upon the governing bodies of the relevant organizations, bodies and specialized
agencies of the United Nations system to examine the principles and practices relating to
their consultations with non-governmental organizations and to take action, as
appropriate, to promote coherence in the light of the provisions of the present resolution,
Approves the following update of the arrangements set out in its resolution 1296 (XLIV)
of 23 May 1968:
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Part I
PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIVE
RELATIONS

The following principles shall be applied in establishing consultative relations with nongovernmental organizations:
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1. The organization shall be concerned with matters falling within the competence of the
Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies.
2. The aims and purposes of the organization shall be in conformity with the spirit,
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The organization shall undertake to support the work of the United Nations and to
promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance with its own aims and
purposes and the nature and scope of its competence and activities.
4. Except where expressly stated otherwise, the term "organization" shall refer to nongovernmental organizations at the national, subregional, regional or international levels.
5. Consultative relationships may be established with international, regional, subregional
and national organizations, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles and criteria established under the present resolution. The Committee, in
considering applications for consultative status, should ensure, to the extent possible,
participation of non-governmental organizations from all regions, and particularly from
developing countries, in order to help achieve a just, balanced, effective and genuine
involvement of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world.
The Committee shall also pay particular attention to non-governmental organizations that
have special expertise or experience upon which the Council may wish to draw.
6. Greater participation of non-governmental organizations from developing countries in
international conferences convened by the United Nations should be encouraged.
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7. Greater involvement of non-governmental organizations from countries with
economies in transition should be encouraged.
8. Regional, subregional and national organizations, including those affiliated to an
international organization already in status, may be admitted provided that they can
demonstrate that their programme of work is of direct relevance to the aims and purposes
of the United Nations and, in the case of national organizations, after consultation with
the Member State concerned. The views expressed by the Member State, if any, shall be
communicated to the non-governmental organization concerned, which shall have the
opportunity to respond to those views through the Committee on Non-Governmental
Organizations.
9. The organization shall be of recognized standing within the particular field of its
competence or of a representative character. Where there exist a number of organizations
with similar objectives, interests and basic views in a given field, they may, for the
purposes of consultation with the Council, form a joint committee or other body
authorized to carry on such consultation for the group as a whole.
10. The organization shall have an established headquarters, with an executive officer. It
shall have a democratically adopted constitution, a copy of which shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and which shall provide for the
determination of policy by a conference, congress or other representative body, and for
an executive organ responsible to the policy-making body.
11. The organization shall have authority to speak for its members through its authorized
representatives. Evidence of this authority shall be presented, if requested.
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12. The organization shall have a representative structure and possess appropriate
mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over
its policies and actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate
democratic and transparent decision-making processes. Any such organization that is not
established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement shall be considered
a non-governmental organization for the purpose of these arrangements, including
organizations that accept members designated by governmental authorities, provided that
such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organization.
13. The basic resources of the organization shall be derived in the main part from
contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members.
Where voluntary contributions have been received, their amounts and donors shall be
faithfully revealed to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.
Where, however, the above criterion is not fulfilled and an organization is financed from
other sources, it must explain to the satisfaction of the Committee its reasons for not
meeting the requirements laid down in this paragraph. Any financial contribution or other
support, direct or indirect, from a Government to the organization shall be openly
declared to the Committee through the Secretary-General and fully recorded in the
financial and other records of the organization and shall be devoted to purposes in
accordance with the aims of the United Nations.
14. In considering the establishment of consultative relations with a non-governmental
organization, the Council will take into account whether the field of activity of the
organization is wholly or mainly within the field of a specialized agency, and whether or
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not it could be admitted when it has, or may have, a consultative arrangement with a
specialized agency.
15. The granting, suspension and withdrawal of consultative status, as well as the
interpretation of norms and decisions relating to this matter, are the prerogative of
Member States exercised through the Economic and Social Council and its Committee on
Non-Governmental Organizations. A non-governmental organization applying for
general or special consultative status or a listing on the Roster shall have the opportunity
to respond to any objections being raised in the Committee before the Committee takes
its decision.
16. The provisions of the present resolution shall apply to the United Nations regional
commissions and their subsidiary bodies mutatis mutandis.
17. In recognizing the evolving relationship between the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations, the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, will consider reviewing the
consultative arrangements as and when necessary to facilitate, in the most effective
manner possible, the contributions of non-governmental organizations to the work of the
United Nations.
Part II
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONSULTATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS
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18. A clear distinction is drawn in the Charter of the United Nations between
participation without vote in the deliberations of the Council and the arrangements for
consultation. Under Articles 69 and 70, participation is provided for only in the case of
States not members of the Council, and of specialized agencies. Article 71, applying to
non-governmental organizations, provides for suitable arrangements for consultation.
This distinction, deliberately made in the Charter, is fundamental and the arrangements
for consultation should not be such as to accord to non-governmental organizations the
same rights of participation as are accorded to States not members of the Council and to
the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the United Nations.
19. The arrangements should not be such as to overburden the Council or transform it
from a body for coordination of policy and action, as contemplated in the Charter, into a
general forum for discussion.
20. Decisions on arrangements for consultation should be guided by the principle that
consultative arrangements are to be made, on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling
the Council or one of its bodies to secure expert information or advice from organizations
having special competence in the subjects for which consultative arrangements are made,
and, on the other hand, to enable international, regional, subregional and national
organizations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views.
Therefore, the arrangements for consultation made with each organization should relate
to the subjects for which that organization has a special competence or in which it has a
special interest. The organizations given consultative status should be limited to those
whose activities in fields set out in paragraph 1 above qualify them to make a significant
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contribution to the work of the Council and should, in sum, as far as possible reflect in a
balanced way the major viewpoints or interests in these fields in all areas and regions of
the world.
Part III
ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIPS
21. In establishing consultative relationships with each organization, regard shall be had
to the nature and scope of its activities and to the assistance it may be expected to give to
the Council or its subsidiary bodies in carrying out the functions set out in Chapters IX
and X of the Charter of the United Nations.
22. Organizations that are concerned with most of the activities of the Council and its
subsidiary bodies and can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that they have
substantive and sustained contributions to make to the achievement of the objectives of
the United Nations in fields set out in paragraph 1 above, and are closely involved with
the economic and social life of the peoples of the areas they represent and whose
membership, which should be considerable, is broadly representative of major segments
of society in a large number of countries in different regions of the world shall be known
as organizations in general consultative status.
23. Organizations that have a special competence in, and are concerned specifically with,
only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council and its subsidiary bodies, and
that are known within the fields for which they have or seek consultative status shall be
known as organizations in special consultative status.
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24. Other organizations that do not have general or special consultative status but that the
Council, or the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the Council
or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, considers can make occasional
and useful contributions to the work of the Council or its subsidiary bodies or other
United Nations bodies within their competence shall be included in a list (to be known as
the Roster). This list may also include organizations in consultative status or a similar
relationship with a specialized agency or a United Nations body. These organizations
shall be available for consultation at the request of the Council or its subsidiary bodies.
The fact that an organization is on the Roster shall not in itself be regarded as a
qualification for general or special consultative status should an organization seek such
status.
25. Organizations to be accorded special consultative status because of their interest in
the field of human rights should pursue the goals of promotion and protection of human
rights in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.
26. Major organizations one of whose primary purposes is to promote the aims,
objectives and purposes of the United Nations and a furtherance of the understanding of
its work may be accorded consultative status.
Part IV
CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNCIL
Provisional agenda
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27. The provisional agenda of the Council shall be communicated to organizations in
general consultative status and special consultative status and to those on the Roster.
28. Organizations in general consultative status may propose to the Council Committee
on Non-Governmental Organizations that the Committee request the Secretary-General to
place items of special interest to the organizations in the provisional agenda of the
Council.
Attendance at meetings
29. Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status may
designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the Council
and its subsidiary bodies. Those on the Roster may have representatives present at such
meetings concerned with matters within their field of competence. These attendance
arrangements may be supplemented to include other modalities of participation.
Written statements
30. Written statements relevant to the work of the Council may be submitted by
organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on subjects in
which these organizations have a special competence. Such statements shall be circulated
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the members of the Council, except
those statements that have become obsolete, for example, those dealing with matters
already disposed of and those that had already been circulated in some other form.
31. The following conditions shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation
of such statements:
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(a) The written statement shall be submitted in one of the official languages;
(b) It shall be submitted in sufficient time for appropriate consultation to take place
between the Secretary-General and the organization before circulation;
(c) The organization shall give due consideration to any comments that the SecretaryGeneral may make in the course of such consultation before transmitting the statement in
final form;
(d) A written statement submitted by an organization in general consultative status will
be circulated in full if it does not exceed 2,000 words. Where a statement is in excess of
2,000 words, the organizations shall submit a summary which will be circulated or shall
supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A
statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon a specific request of the Council
or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations;
(e) A written statement submitted by an organization in special consultative status or on
the Roster will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 500 words. Where a statement is
in excess of 500 words, the organization shall submit a summary which will be
circulated; such statements will be circulated in full, however, upon a specific request of
the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations;
(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Council, or the
Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, may invite organizations
on the Roster to submit written statements. The provisions of subparagraphs (a), (b), (c)
and (e) above shall apply to such statements;
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(g) A written statement or summary, as the case may be, will be circulated by the
Secretary-General in the working languages, and, upon the request of a member of the
Council, in any of the official languages.
Oral presentations during meetings
32. (a) The Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall make
recommendations to the Council as to which organizations in general consultative status
should make an oral presentation to the Council and on which items they should be heard.
Such organizations shall be entitled to make one statement to the Council, subject to the
approval of the Council. In the absence of a subsidiary body of the Council with
jurisdiction in a major field of interest to the Council and to organizations in special
consultative status, the Committee may recommend that organizations in special
consultative status be heard by the Council on the subject in its field of interest;
(b) Whenever the Council discusses the substance of an item proposed by a nongovernmental organization in general consultative status and included in the agenda of
the Council, such an organization shall be entitled to present orally to the Council, as
appropriate, an introductory statement of an expository nature. Such an organization may
be invited by the President of the Council, with the consent of the relevant body, to make,
in the course of the discussion of the item before the Council, an additional statement for
purposes of clarification.
Part V
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CONSULTATION WITH COMMISSIONS AND OTHER SUBSIDIARY ORGANS OF
THE COUNCIL
Provisional agenda
33. The provisional agenda of sessions of commissions and other subsidiary organs of the
Council shall be communicated to organizations in general consultative status and special
consultative status and those on the Roster.
34. Organizations in general consultative status may propose items for the provisional
agenda of commissions, subject to the following conditions:
(a) An organization that intends to propose such an item shall inform the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations at least 63 days before the commencement of the session
and before formally proposing an item shall give due consideration to any comments the
Secretary- General may make;
(b) The proposal shall be formally submitted with the relevant basic documentation not
later than 49 days before the commencement of the session. The item shall be included in
the agenda of the commission if it is adopted by a two-thirds majority of those present
and voting.
Attendance at meetings
35. Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status may
designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the
commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council. Organizations on the Roster
may have representatives present at such meetings that are concerned with matters within
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their field of competence. These attendance arrangements may be supplemented to
include other modalities of participation.
Written statements
36. Written statements relevant to the work of the commissions or other subsidiary organs
may be submitted by organizations in general consultative status and special consultative
status on subjects for which these organizations have a special competence. Such
statements shall be circulated by the Secretary-General to members of the commission or
other subsidiary organs, except those statements that have become obsolete, for example,
those dealing with matters already disposed of and those that have already been
circulated in some other form to members of the commission or other subsidiary organs.
37. The following conditions shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation
of such written statements:
(a) The written statement shall be submitted in one of the official languages;
(b) It shall be submitted in sufficient time for appropriate consultation to take place
between the Secretary-General and the organization before circulation;
(c) The organization shall give due consideration to any comments that the SecretaryGeneral may make in the course of such consultation before transmitting the statement in
final form;
(d) A written statement submitted by an organization in general consultative status will
be circulated in full if it does not exceed 2,000 words. Where a statement is in excess of
2,000 words, the organization shall submit a summary, which will be circulated, or shall
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supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A
statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon the specific request of the
commission or other subsidiary organs;
(e) A written statement submitted by an organization in special consultative status will be
circulated in full if it does not exceed 1,500 words. Where a statement is in excess of
1,500 words, the organization shall submit a summary, which will be circulated, or shall
supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A
statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon the specific request of the
commission or other subsidiary organs;
(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the chairman of the relevant commission
or other subsidiary organ, or the commission or other subsidiary organ itself, may invite
organizations on the Roster to submit written statements. The provisions in
subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) above shall apply to such statements;
(g) A written statement or summary, as the case may be, will be circulated by the
Secretary-General in the working languages and, upon the request of a member of the
commission or other subsidiary organ, in any of the official languages.
Oral presentations during meetings
38. (a) The commission or other subsidiary organs may consult with organizations in
general consultative status and special consultative status either directly or through a
committee or committees established for the purpose. In all cases, such consultations may
be arranged upon the request of the organization;
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(b) On the recommendation of the Secretary-General and at the request of the
commission or other subsidiary organs, organizations on the Roster may also be heard by
the commission or other subsidiary organs.
Special studies
39. Subject to the relevant rules of procedure on financial implications, a commission or
other subsidiary organ may recommend that an organization that has special competence
in a particular field should undertake specific studies or investigations or prepare specific
papers for the commission. The limitations of paragraphs 37 (d) and (e) above shall not
apply in this case.
Part VI
CONSULTATIONS WITH AD HOC COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL
40. The arrangements for consultation between ad hoc committees of the Council
authorized to meet between sessions of the Council and organizations in general
consultative status and special consultative status and on the Roster shall follow those
approved for commissions of the Council, unless the Council or the committee decides
otherwise.
Part VII
PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THEIR PREPARATORY PROCESS
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41. Where non-governmental organizations have been invited to participate in an
international conference convened by the United Nations, their accreditation is the
prerogative of Member States, exercised through the respective preparatory committee.
Such accreditation should be preceded by an appropriate process to determine their
eligibility.
42. Non-governmental organizations in general consultative status, special consultative
status and on the Roster, that express their wish to attend the relevant international
conferences convened by the United Nations and the meetings of the preparatory bodies
of the said conferences shall as a rule be accredited for participation. Other nongovernmental organizations wishing to be accredited may apply to the secretariat of the
conference for this purpose in accordance with the following requirements.
43. The secretariat of the conference shall be responsible for the receipt and preliminary
evaluation of requests from non-governmental organizations for accreditation to the
conference and its preparatory process. In the discharge of its functions, the secretariat of
the conference shall work in close cooperation and coordination with the NonGovernmental Organizations Section of the Secretariat, and shall be guided by the
relevant provisions of Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as updated.
44. All such applications must be accompanied by information on the competence of the
organization and the relevance of its activities to the work of the conference and its
preparatory committee, with an indication of the particular areas of the conference
agenda and preparations to which such competence and relevance pertain, and should
include, inter alia, the following information:
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(a) The purpose of the organization;
(b) Information as to the programmes and activities of the organization in areas relevant
to the conference and its preparatory process and the country or countries in which they
are carried out. Non-governmental organizations seeking accreditation shall be asked to
confirm their interest in the goals and objectives of the conference;
(c) Confirmation of the activities of the organization at the national, regional or
international level;
(d) Copies of the annual or other reports of the organization with financial statements,
and a list of financial sources and contributions, including governmental contributions;
(e) A list of members of the governing body of the organization and their countries of
nationality;
(f) A description of the membership of the organization, indicating the total number of
members, the names of organizations that are members and their geographical
distribution;
(g) A copy of the constitution and/or by-laws of the organization.
45. In the evaluation of the relevance of applications of non-governmental organizations
for accreditation to the conference and its preparatory process, it is agreed that a
determination shall be made based on their background and involvement in the subject
areas of the conference.
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46. The secretariat shall publish and disseminate to Member States on a periodic basis the
updated list of applications received. Member States may submit comments on any of the
applications on the list 14 days from receipt of the above-mentioned list by Member
States. The comments of Member States shall be communicated to the non-governmental
organization concerned, which shall have the opportunity to respond.
47. In cases where the secretariat believes, on the basis of the information provided in
accordance with the present resolution, that the organization has established its
competence and the relevance of its activities to the work of the preparatory committee, it
shall recommend to the preparatory committee that the organization be accredited. In
cases where the secretariat does not recommend the granting of accreditation, it shall
make available to the preparatory committee its reasons for not doing so. The secretariat
should ensure that its recommendations are available to members of the preparatory
committee at least one week prior to the start of each session. The secretariat must notify
such applicants of the reasons for non-recommendation and provide an opportunity to
respond to objections and furnish additional information as may be required.
48. The preparatory committee shall decide on all recommendations for accreditation
within 24 hours after the recommendations of the secretariat have been taken up by the
preparatory committee in plenary meeting. In the event of a decision not being taken
within this period, interim accreditation shall be accorded until such time as a decision is
taken.
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49. A non-governmental organization that has been granted accreditation to attend a
session of the preparatory committee, including related preparatory meetings of regional
commissions, may attend all its future sessions, as well as the conference itself.
50. In recognition of the intergovernmental nature of the conference and its preparatory
process, active participation of non-governmental organizations therein, while welcome,
does not entail a negotiating role.
51. The non-governmental organizations accredited to the international conference may
be given, in accordance with established United Nations practice and at the discretion of
the chairperson and the consent of the body concerned, an opportunity to briefly address
the preparatory committee and the conference in plenary meetings and their subsidiary
bodies.
52. Non-governmental organizations accredited to the conference may make written
presentations during the preparatory process in the official languages of the United
Nations as they deem appropriate. Those written presentations shall not be issued as
official documents except in accordance with United Nations rules of procedure.
53. Non-governmental organizations without consultative status that participate in
international conferences and wish to obtain consultative status later on should apply
through the normal procedures established under Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as
updated. Recognizing the importance of the participation of non-governmental
organizations that attend a conference in the follow-up process, the Committee on NonGovernmental Organizations, in considering their application, shall draw upon the
documents already submitted by that organization for accreditation to the conference and
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any additional information submitted by the non-governmental organization supporting
its interest, relevance and capacity to contribute to the implementation phase. The
Committee shall review such applications as expeditiously as possible so as to allow
participation of the respective organization in the implementation phase of the
conference. In the interim, the Economic and Social Council shall decide on the
participation of non-governmental organizations accredited to an international conference
in the work of the relevant functional commission on the follow-up to and
implementation of that conference.
54. The suspension and withdrawal of the accreditation of non-governmental
organizations to United Nations international conferences at all stages shall be guided by
the relevant provisions of the present resolution.
Part VIII
SUSPENSION AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSULTATIVE STATUS
55. Organizations granted consultative status by the Council and those on the Roster shall
conform at all times to the principles governing the establishment and nature of their
consultative relations with the Council. In periodically reviewing the activities of nongovernmental organizations on the basis of the reports submitted under paragraph 61 (c)
below and other relevant information, the Council Committee on Non-Governmental
Organizations shall determine the extent to which the organizations have complied with
the principles governing consultative status and have contributed to the work of the
Council, and may recommend to the Council suspension of or exclusion from
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consultative status of organizations that have not met the requirements for consultative
status as set forth in the present resolution.
56. In cases where the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations has decided to
recommend that the general or special consultative status of a non-governmental
organization or its listing on the Roster be suspended or withdrawn, the nongovernmental organization concerned shall be given written reasons for that decision and
shall have an opportunity to present its response for appropriate consideration by the
Committee as expeditiously as possible.
57. The consultative status of non-governmental organizations with the Economic and
Social Council and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended up to three years
or withdrawn in the following cases:
(a) If an organization, either directly or through its affiliates or representatives acting on
its behalf, clearly abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations including unsubstantiated or
politically motivated acts against Member States of the United Nations incompatible with
those purposes and principles;
(b) If there exists substantiated evidence of influence from proceeds resulting from
internationally recognized criminal activities such as the illicit drugs trade, moneylaundering or the illegal arms trade;
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(c) If, within the preceding three years, an organization did not make any positive or
effective contribution to the work of the United Nations and, in particular, of the Council
or its commissions or other subsidiary organs.
58. The consultative status of organizations in general consultative status and special
consultative status and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended or withdrawn
by the decision of the Economic and Social Council on the recommendation of its
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.
59. An organization whose consultative status or whose listing on the Roster is
withdrawn may be entitled to reapply for consultative status or for inclusion on the Roster
not sooner than three years after the effective date of such withdrawal.
Part IX
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
60. The members of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall be elected
by the Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation, in accordance with
the relevant Council resolutions and decision 1/ and rules of procedure of the Council. 2/
The Committee shall elect its Chairman and other officers as necessary.
61. The functions of the Committee shall include the following:
(a) The Committee shall be responsible for regular monitoring of the evolving
relationship between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. With a
view to fulfilling this responsibility, the Committee shall hold, before each of its sessions,
and at other times as necessary, consultations with organizations in consultative status to
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discuss questions of interest to the Committee or to the organizations relating to the
relationship between the non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. A
report on such consultations shall be transmitted to the Council for appropriate action;
(b) The Committee shall hold its regular session before the substantive session of the
Council each year and preferably before the sessions of functional commissions of the
Council to consider applications for general consultative status and special consultative
status and for listing on the Roster made by non-governmental organizations and requests
for changes in status, and to make recommendations thereon to the Council. Upon
approval by the Council, the Committee may hold other meetings as required to fulfil its
mandated responsibilities. Organizations shall give due consideration to any comments
on technical matters that the Secretary-General of the United Nations may make in
receiving such applications for the Committee. The Committee shall consider at each
such session applications received by the Secretary-General not later than 1 June of the
preceding year, on which sufficient data have been distributed to the members of the
Committee not later than six weeks before the applications are to be considered.
Transitional arrangements, if possible, may be made during the current year only.
Reapplication by an organization for status, or a request for a change in status, shall be
considered by the Committee at the earliest at its first session in the second year
following the session at which the substance of the previous application or request was
considered, unless at the time of such consideration it was decided otherwise;
(c) Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status shall
submit to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations through the
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Secretary-General every fourth year a brief report of their activities, specifically as
regards the support they have given to the work of the United Nations. Based on findings
of the Committee's examination of the report and other relevant information, the
Committee may recommend to the Council any reclassification in status of the
organization concerned as it deems appropriate. However, under exceptional
circumstances, the Committee may ask for such a report from an individual organization
in general consultative status or special consultative status or on the Roster, between the
regular reporting dates;
(d) The Committee may consult, in connection with sessions of the Council or at such
other times as it may decide, with organizations in general consultative status and special
consultative status on matters within their competence, other than items in the agenda of
the Council, on which the Council or the Committee or the organization requests
consultation. The Committee shall report to the Council on such consultations;
(e) The Committee may consult, in connection with any particular session of the Council,
with organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on
matters within the competence of the organizations concerning specific items already in
the provisional agenda of the Council on which the Council or the Committee or the
organization requests consultation, and shall make recommendations as to which
organizations, subject to the provisions of paragraph 32 (a) above, should be heard by the
Council or the appropriate committee and regarding which subjects should be heard. The
Committee shall report to the Council on such consultations;
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(f) The Committee shall consider matters concerning non-governmental organizations
that may be referred to it by the Council or by commissions;
(g) The Committee shall consult with the Secretary-General, as appropriate, on matters
affecting the consultative arrangements under Article 71 of the Charter, and arising
therefrom;
(h) An organization that applies for consultative status should attest that it has been in
existence for at least two years as at the date of receipt of the application by the
Secretariat. Evidence of such existence shall be furnished to the Secretariat.
62. The Committee, in considering a request from a non-governmental organization in
general consultative status that an item be placed in the agenda of the Council, shall take
into account, among other things:
(a) The adequacy of the documentation submitted by the organization;
(b) The extent to which it is considered that the item lends itself to early and constructive
action by the Council;
(c) The possibility that the item might be more appropriately dealt with elsewhere than in
the Council.
63. Any decision by the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations not to
grant a request submitted by a non-governmental organization in general consultative
status that an item be placed in the provisional agenda of the Council shall be considered
final unless the Council decides otherwise.
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Part X
CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARIAT
64. The Secretariat should be so organized as to enable it to carry out the duties assigned
to it concerning the consultative arrangements and the accreditation of non-governmental
organizations to United Nations international conferences as set forth in the present
resolution.
65. All organizations in consultative relationship shall be able to consult with officers of
the appropriate sections of the Secretariat on matters in which there is a mutual interest or
a mutual concern. Such consultation shall be upon the request of the non-governmental
organization or upon the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
66. The Secretary-General may request organizations in general consultative status and
special consultative status and those on the Roster to carry out specific studies or prepare
specific papers, subject to the relevant financial regulations.
67. The Secretary-General shall be authorized, within the means at his disposal, to offer
to non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship facilities that include:
(a) Prompt and efficient distribution of such documents of the Council and its subsidiary
bodies as shall in the judgement of the Secretary-General be appropriate;
(b) Access to the press documentation services provided by the United Nations;
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(c) Arrangement of informal discussions on matters of special interest to groups or
organizations;
(d) Use of the libraries of the United Nations;
(e) Provision of accommodation for conferences or smaller meetings of consultative
organizations on the work of the Economic and Social Council;
(f) Appropriate seating arrangements and facilities for obtaining documents during public
meetings of the General Assembly dealing with matters in the economic, social and
related fields.
Part XI
SECRETARIAT SUPPORT
68. Adequate Secretariat support shall be required for fulfilment of the mandate defined
for the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations with respect to carrying out the
wider range of activities in which the enhanced involvement of non-governmental
organizations is envisaged. The Secretary-General is requested to provide the necessary
resources for this purpose and to take steps for improving the coordination within the
Secretariat of units dealing with non-governmental organizations.
69. The Secretary-General is requested to make every effort to enhance and streamline as
appropriate Secretariat support arrangements, and to improve practical arrangements on
such matters as greater use of modern information and communication technology,
establishment of an integrated database of non-governmental organizations, wide and
timely dissemination of information on meetings, distribution of documentation,
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provision of access and transparent, simple and streamlined procedures for the attendance
of non-governmental organizations in United Nations meetings, and to facilitate their
broad-based participation.
70. The Secretary-General is requested to make the present resolution widely known,
through proper channels, to facilitate the involvement of non-governmental organizations
from all regions and areas of the world.
Notes
1/ Council resolutions 1099 (XL) and 1981/50 and Council decision 1995/304.
2/ Rule 80 of the rules of procedure of the Council.
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